On 14 Feb 2011, at 07:13, Jason Resch wrote:

On Sun, Feb 13, 2011 at 10:46 AM, Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com > wrote:
On 2/13/2011 5:21 AM, 1Z wrote:

On Feb 12, 3:18 am, Brent Meeker<meeke...@dslextreme.com>  wrote:

What do you think the chances are that any random object in
Plato's heaven, or any random Turing machine will support intelligent life?
1 in 10, 1 in 1000, 1 in a billion?


Does that allow us to argue:

1) A universe selected from an uncountably infinite number of
possibilities has measure
2) Our universe exists so it has measure>0
3) Our universe is not selected from uncountably infinite
4) MUH indicates any universe must be selected from uncountable
infinite possibilities (since all
of maths includes the real line, etc)
5) MUH is false.

Hmmm. I think we argue that objects in Plato's heaven and Turing machines are not the right kind of things to support life.

I am very puzzled by this statement. You could help me understand by answering the following questions:

Why couldn't there be an accurate simulation of life on a Turing machine?

How can entities within a universe that exists in Plato's heaven distinguish it from a universe that does not?

That is a good argument which convinces many people, who actually ask "what is the MGA for?"

Here I can imagine what 1Z could answer to "How can entities within a universe that exists in Plato's heaven distinguish it from a universe that does not?". He assumes the existence of primary matter or of a primitively real physical universe, and will, by decision, attribute consciousness, only to the creature made off that primary matter, even if the consciousness relies in the computation implemented in that matter. So 1Z accepts the idea that arithmetical truth is full of zombies, like the "1Z" described in arithmetic through the arithmetical emulation of our galaxy (say). But that moves is made impossible by the MGA. To attach consciousness to matter, you have to introduce something non Turing emulable in that consciousness, or, like Jack Mallah did, attribute a physical activity to a piece of matter having no physical activity at all relevant with the computation. But this prevent to say "yes" to the doctor *qua computatio*.

Do you (the reader of the list, not Jason) agree with the 323 principle? If the physical running of a computer entails some consciousness, and if that running does not use the register 323, does the same running of that computer with the "323 register" deleted, run the same consciousness, or not?



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