1Z wrote: > > > > On Feb 18, 3:07 pm, benjayk <[email protected]> wrote: >> 1Z wrote: >> >> > On Feb 17, 8:52 pm, benjayk <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> 1Z wrote: >> >> >> > On Feb 17, 6:14 pm, benjayk <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> 1Z wrote: >> >> >> >> > On Feb 17, 3:10 pm, benjayk <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> 1Z wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Comp will imply that such a primary matter cannnot >> interfer >> >> at >> >> >> all >> >> >> >> >> >> with your consciousness, so that IF comp is correct >> physics >> >> has >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> be >> >> >> >> >> >> reduced to number theory, and such a primary matter is an >> >> >> invisible >> >> >> >> >> >> epiphenomena. >> >> >> >> >> >> > Physics cannot be eliminated in favour of non existent >> >> numbers. >> >> >> >> >> > Numbers >> >> >> >> >> > have to exist for the conclusion to follow >> >> >> >> >> >> Physics is not eliminated, on the contrary, physics is >> explained >> >> >> from >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> something non physical. >> >> >> >> >> > The anti realist position is not that numbers are some >> existing >> >> non- >> >> >> >> > physical >> >> >> >> > thing: it is that they are not existent at all. >> >> >> >> >> If numbers don't exist at all, what does a statement that seems >> >> very >> >> >> much >> >> >> >> like a non-fictional and true statement, like "I have two hands" >> >> mean? >> >> >> >> > It's asserting the existence of hands, not numbers. >> >> >> >> You can't have one without the other. >> >> >> The statement "2 hands exists" requires that "2 of something" (the >> >> number >> >> >> 2) >> >> >> exists. >> >> >> > The idea that "2 hands exist" implies that 2 exists implies that 3 >> >> > things exist (the left hand, the right hand and "two") >> >> >> Right. You just made an argument that ALL numbers do exist. Do you >> have a >> >> problem with that? >> >> > It was intended as a reductio ad absurdum >> >> That's what I thought, so I guessed you have a problem with the >> conclusion. >> What's absurd with all numbers existing? > > What's absurd is the 2=3
That 2 exists implies that 3 things exists does not mean 2=3. And 2=3 is not necessarily absurd, just an unusual expression. It might mean "2*...=3*..." . 1Z wrote: > >> 1Z wrote: >> >> >> 1Z wrote: >> >> >> >> 1Z wrote: >> >> >> >> >> If you have two hands, two does exists, otherwise you couldn't >> have >> >> >> two >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> something, right? >> >> >> >> > And if you have none of something, none exists. >> >> >> >> Well, so zero exists, I have no problem with that. >> >> >> >> 1Z wrote: >> >> >> >> >> Or is it a fictional statement? >> >> >> >> > Nope. You seem to think every word in a true sentence must >> >> >> > have a separate referent. However, "and", "or", "is", "not" etc >> >> >> > do not have separate referents. A true sentence must refer *as a >> >> >> > whole* >> >> >> > to some state of affairs. That is the only requirement. >> >> >> >> Not every word must have an object as referent, but every word >> implies >> >> >> the >> >> >> existence of an object that is connected to the word. >> >> >> > That's a straight contradiction. >> >> >> I expressed myself badly here... >> >> >> I wanted to express that some words don't seem to have a direct >> referent >> >> in >> >> the sense of an object, but that it is possible to objectify them and >> >> then >> >> they do have a referent. >> >> > What is objectify ? >> >> In this case I mean the linguistic act of transforming a non-noun word >> into >> a noun that expresses the same concept. >> I'm not sure if this can be properly called objectifying but this was the >> word that came to my mind. > > > Why should something have necessary and eternal existence > just because someone rephrased a sentence? That's not the reason that it has existence. The rephrasing is only intended to make it more clear that a referent exists, because it is easier to think of a referent as an object that is lingustically expressed as a noun. 1Z wrote: > >> >> Probably I should just say that every word has a referent. >> >> > Clearly not, e.g unicorn. >> >> Of course it has a referent. If you say "unicorn" this refers to ideas >> about >> an mythological creature. > > An idea about a unicorn is an individual of the type <idea>, Unicorns > do not exist because ideas about them do. But unicorns *themselves* can also be conceived of ideas. I have no problem of saying unicorns don't exist, but this only means "not existing in the same sense as horses do" and doesn't exclude the existence of unicorns in some more general sense. 1Z wrote: > > The Sense of a term is an idea in any case. There is no reason > why the Reference should bend back on itself an be an idea > as well. (Except for a few exceptions such as the referent > of "concept", "idea", etc). > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sense_and_reference The distinction between sense and reference makes sense on some level, but ultimately it still makes sense to conceive of the object that is referred to as the internal representation of (another, yet on some level the same) object that is referred to; that is, reference can be reference to sense. When it comes to abstract things like sense, reference and meaning it is inevitable that we conflate them because their meaning is broad, overlapping and vague. 1Z wrote: > >>That it does not refer to an animal in the same >> way as "horse" does, does not mean it has no referent at all. > > But if number terms just refer to ideas, that is not > Platonism, that is Psychologism I think it is no coincidence that platonism uses the word ideas to refer to abstract (and "more real") things, though it does not mean idea as "ideas in people's heads" but ideas as self-existent things. Unicorns do manifest as ideas in people's heads, but there still may be a self-existing idea of unicorns that manifests in many other structures (for example real unicorns on other planets, or ideas in the head of aliens). And I didn't even argue that numbers are just ideas in people's heads. Even if unicorns are just ideas in people's heads, numbers need not be. Also, I'm not defending platonism, but just that numbers exist. If they are just real as ideas in peoples heads, then ok. Then ideas really are the fundament of reality (if we accept comp). It is a weird consequence but it is possible. 1Z wrote: > >> 1Z wrote: >> >> >> 1Z wrote: >> >> >> >> If it is meaningful to use the word "and", "something and >> something" >> >> or a >> >> >> conjunction exists, if it is meaningful to use the word "or", >> >> "something >> >> >> or >> >> >> something" or a disjunction exists, if it is meaningful to use the >> >> word >> >> >> "is", >> >> >> > To say "there is an existing statue of liberty" says nothing more >> >> > that "there is a statue of liberty" >> >> >> That depends how you interpret the sentence. In general I agree, but >> >> "there >> >> is an existing statue of liberty" might be used with "existing" in the >> >> sense >> >> of existing in the stable consensus reality. >> >> >> So you could say "there is an existing statue of liberty" (that exists >> in >> >> the consensus reality) in contrast to "there is a 'non-existant' >> statue >> >> of >> >> serfdom" (that is absent in the consensus reality; but it does exists >> in >> >> my >> >> imagination). >> >> >> Your comment is probably meant to imply there is something wrong with >> >> what I >> >> wrote, but I don't get what it is. >> >> > It is that words like "is" don't need a referent >> >> I don't know what you mean by that. In what way do words "need" anything? >> >> My point is that "is" clearly has a referent, namely existence. >> Existence exists, I hope you agree with that. > > > Existence is the referent of "existence", not of "Is". "Is" is used to refer to the existence of objects. Distinguishing between verbs and nouns is just a characteristic of language. "Existence of Unicorns: Truth" expresses the same as "Unicorns truly exist." or "The Present. Sandwich as meal. The eater: Me." expresses the same as "I eat a sandwich.". 1Z wrote: > > I have already pointed out that the "is" > of predication can be used with non-existent > subjects. Yes, but still "is" inevitably refers to existence/being (because "to be" means "to posses BEing"), so it refers to existent objects. That it may be used to "non-existent" objects merely indicates that it refers to objects that are non-existent *in some context*. Existent objects are sometimes non-existent in a relative sense. For example non-existent at a specific time or place (An egg does not exist in my house right now, but eggs still exist) or non-existent as non-existence in some conceptual realm (for example there does not exist a colour "three" but 3 still exists) or non-existent as non-sensical (for example a four sided triangle does not exist as one coherent object, still a four sided triangle exists as a mental object conisting of two ideas that are not compatible and thus confusing). 1Z wrote: > > "God is omnipotent" > uses the "is" of predication to indicate a hypothetical > property of God, and could even be used in an argument > for the non existence of God. > Then God does not exist as an actor in the world, but God does still exists as an idea. 1Z wrote: > >> >> 1Z wrote: >> >> >> >>"something existing" or simply existence exists, if it is meaningful >> >> >> to use the word "not", "something that does not exist" or absence >> >> exist >> >> >> (existing in the absolute sense and not existing relative to >> something >> >> >> else) >> >> >> and if if it is meaningful to use the word "two", "two of >> something" >> >> or >> >> >> the >> >> >> number 2 exists. >> >> >> > Nope. To say that two of something exist is not to say two exists. >> >> >> OK; I don't really get that, but let's say this is so. >> >> >> Then you get the functionally same structure as the numbers, but you >> >> don't >> >> call them "one, two, three,..." but "one of something, two of >> something, >> >> three of something,...". >> >> > I need functionally the same structure, because I need some basis >> > for mathematics. But its an asbtract structure that doesn't exist. >> >> But if "one of something" doesn't exist "one stone" doesn't exist, >> because a >> stone clearly is something. > > > And if one stone exists, a stone exist, not "one" If one stone exists "one ..." exists because one stone IS "one ...". One really means just "thing" or "one thing" or "one of one thing" or "one of one of one of one of one thing". If we use more than one "one" there is the convention that they both refer to the same thing, otherwise it might be said that 1+1=3, because the second "1" may be another thing that is twice as numerous - which we obviously want to avoid for the sake of clarity. 1Z wrote: > >> If one of something doesn't exist you have to conclude that all things >> (including all material things like atoms) fail to exist. Which is quite >> a >> strange conclusion. >> >> Furthermore you just said it IS an abstract structure, > > Sure. But not an existing abstract structure. Just like > the unicorn isn't an existing mythological animal. But "is" expresses existence. Or what does "is" express else? The point is not that we can't deny existence in a particular context. We may say numbers do not exist as material things (though even this is debatable, because we can regard all material objects as instantiations of numbers). The point is that if we *completely* deny existence of numbers, "completely" can just mean some restricted realm, because the usage of the words "one", "two", "three",... already implies a kind of existence. All things we can talk of do exist in some sense even if just a weak sense of "existence as ideas" or "existence of possibility". It is trivial, really. But this trivial existence together with the axioms of arithmetics, "Yes, doctor." and Church's thesis is all that is needed for Bruno's argument. It doesn't require numbers to be existent in any specific sense that you seem to have in mind. As soon as you use numbers you establish the necessary existence. 1Z wrote: > > The abstract/concrete distinction needs an explanation. The Platonist > explanation is that abstracta are invisible entities existing in a > special > realm. The formalist explanation is that concreta exist and abstracta > donn't. The problem is that concreta are abstracta. My horse Tom at this wednesday 12:30 is my horse Tom is a horse is is a mammal is an animal is something. If something doesn't exist, my horse Tom can't either. Furthermore we don't find absolute concreta anywhere. At the bottom we can just find some probabilities of measuring something and not some ultimate concrete thing. The distinction between abstract/concrete is not difficult to explain. We create all kinds of categories so why not a category that distinguishes between specific things and less specific things. I don't think it is more fundamental than that. -- View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/Maudlin---How-many-times-does-COMP-have-to-be-false-before-its-false--tp30792507p30996093.html Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. 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