On Feb 23, 4:10 pm, benjayk <benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com> wrote: > 1Z wrote: > > Then God does not exist as an actor in the world, but God does still exists > as an idea. > > 1Z wrote: > > >> >> 1Z wrote: > > >> >> >>"something existing" or simply existence exists, if it is meaningful > >> >> >> to use the word "not", "something that does not exist" or absence > >> >> exist > >> >> >> (existing in the absolute sense and not existing relative to > >> something > >> >> >> else) > >> >> >> and if if it is meaningful to use the word "two", "two of > >> something" > >> >> or > >> >> >> the > >> >> >> number 2 exists. > > >> >> > Nope. To say that two of something exist is not to say two exists. > > >> >> OK; I don't really get that, but let's say this is so. > > >> >> Then you get the functionally same structure as the numbers, but you > >> >> don't > >> >> call them "one, two, three,..." but "one of something, two of > >> something, > >> >> three of something,...". > > >> > I need functionally the same structure, because I need some basis > >> > for mathematics. But its an asbtract structure that doesn't exist. > > >> But if "one of something" doesn't exist "one stone" doesn't exist, > >> because a > >> stone clearly is something. > > > And if one stone exists, a stone exist, not "one" > > If one stone exists "one ..." exists because one stone IS "one ...". > One really means just "thing" or "one thing" or "one of one thing" or "one > of one of one of one of one thing".
And there I was thinking it was the successor of zero, or cardinality of a set whose only member is the empty set. > If we use more than one "one" there is > the convention that they both refer to the same thing, otherwise it might be > said that 1+1=3, because the second "1" may be another thing that is twice > as numerous - which we obviously want to avoid for the sake of clarity. > > 1Z wrote: > > >> If one of something doesn't exist you have to conclude that all things > >> (including all material things like atoms) fail to exist. Which is quite > >> a > >> strange conclusion. > > >> Furthermore you just said it IS an abstract structure, > > > Sure. But not an existing abstract structure. Just like > > the unicorn isn't an existing mythological animal. > > But "is" expresses existence. That was the "is" of identity. > Or what does "is" express else? It has at least three meanings. > The point is not that we can't deny existence in a particular context. We > may say numbers do not exist as material things (though even this is > debatable, because we can regard all material objects as instantiations of > numbers). > The point is that if we *completely* deny existence of numbers, "completely" > can just mean some restricted realm, because the usage of the words "one", > "two", "three",... already implies a kind of existence. No it doesn't. Use of words does not imply existence, otherwise "God does not exist" would imply "God exists". >All things we can > talk of do exist in some sense even if just a weak sense of "existence as > ideas" or "existence of possibility". That is false. If the thing X we are talking of is not defined as an idea, then the existence of an idea-of-the-thing-X, is not the existence of X itself. A thing can only exist as the kind of thing it is supposed to be. >It is trivial, really. It is trivially wrong. > But this trivial existence together with the axioms of arithmetics, "Yes, > doctor." and Church's thesis is all that is needed for Bruno's argument. It is useless for Bruno's argument because he needs minds to come from numbers, and that cannot work if numbers exist only *in* minds. > It > doesn't require numbers to be existent in any specific sense that you seem > to have in mind. Yes it does: it requires numbers to be primary compared to minds. It may require nothing more than that, but so what? > As soon as you use numbers you establish the necessary existence. > > 1Z wrote: > > > The abstract/concrete distinction needs an explanation. The Platonist > > explanation is that abstracta are invisible entities existing in a > > special > > realm. The formalist explanation is that concreta exist and abstracta > > donn't. > > The problem is that concreta are abstracta. My horse Tom at this wednesday > 12:30 is my horse Tom is a horse is is a mammal is an animal is something. > If something doesn't exist, my horse Tom can't either. You mean if nothing exists, your horse can't. However, that does not prove that concreta are abstracta > Furthermore we don't find absolute concreta anywhere. Who said we should? I clearly said the are disjoint categories. Concreta exist, abstracta don't > At the bottom we can > just find some probabilities of measuring something and not some ultimate > concrete thing. I didn't say "ultimately concrete" > The distinction between abstract/concrete is not difficult to explain. We > create all kinds of categories so why not a category that distinguishes > between specific things and less specific things. Why not a category that distinguishes between the existent, and concepts of the non existent? > I don't think it is more > fundamental than that. > -- > View this message in > context:http://old.nabble.com/Maudlin---How-many-times-does-COMP-have-to-be-f... > Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
