On Feb 18, 2:03 pm, "Stephen Paul King" <stephe...@charter.net> wrote:
> Hi,
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: 1Z
> Sent: Friday, February 18, 2011 7:04 AM
> To: Everything List
> Subject: Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its
>
> false?
>
> >>On Feb 17, 8:52 pm, benjayk <benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com> wrote:
>
> snip
> >> Probably I should just say that every word has a referent.
> [1Z]
> >Clearly  not, e.g unicorn.
>
> [SPK]
>
>     I invite you to read a good book on Semiotic Theory, such as that of
> Umberto Ecco. The point is that even the word "unicorn" has a referent, even
> if that referent is some imagination. Is a cartoon drawing of a horse with a
> single horn protruding from its head not recognized as a unicorn?

It's a picture of unicorn. Which is to say, it is an individual of
the type <picture>. It cannot be said that unicorns exist because
pictures of them do.

 If we are
> going to literally and seriously argue that only nouns can refer to actual
> physical entities,

That isn't the argument at all. The argument is that what a word's
reference, if it has one, is indicated by it's sense.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sense_and_reference

Words like
"thought", "memory" have mental referents because their
senses make it clear they are meant to refer  to mental entities.
"Unicorn" has the sense of a kind of four legged animal:
if  no such animal can be found, it can't be taken
to refer to something else (such as picture or concept)
because that would break the sense-reference link

> then we are disallowing for any conversations regarding
> the dearly departed or anything that is out of sensory range of the
> conversants (among many more).

You seem to be assuming that reference exhausts meaning. But
conversations
about fictive, hypothetical or defunct entities are still meaningful
because
the terms involved have Sense.

>     Referents do not need to be autonomously instantiated as physical beings
> to be referents. Following the same reasoning numbers do not need to exist
> as autonomous entities either, all that is really required is that
> interlocutors can comprehend each other's implied meanings.

All that is required for what? That mathematicians understand each
other is not a sufficient condition for Platonism

>  We seem to be
> having another instance of the debate between nominalism and universalism...
>     Parenthetically, what does this have to do with the subject of Maudlin
> and COMP's veracity?


Platonism

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Reply via email to