On 09 Mar 2011, at 20:51, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 3/9/2011 9:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I can see why in a movie they do not, as there is no mathematical relation between the frames.

OK. Nice.


But they do have a relation via the thing that was filmed.

The point consists in showing that the projection of the movie does not generate consciousness. Not that consciousness did not exist in relation with the movie. With the movie, we can upload the boolean plane machine, and make that consciousness again manifested. But the movie itself does not compute anything. It describes a computation and consciousness is in the computation, not in the description of the computation. The relation between the movie and the computation is akin to the relation between a proof and the Gödel number of that proof. They are related, but they are not the same thing.

It is a subtle point. It is nicely capture formally with the self- reference logic, where we can show that p <-> Bp, but only because we know that the machine is correct (by definition or choice). The machine cannot know that.

Then I showed that a movie is a relative thing. for an observer, there is a movie in front of a immobile spectator, but for another observer there is an immobile pellicle with a moving observer. But comp makes the observer's presence not needed, so that the consciousness cannot supervene on the "running of the movie", given that for another observer there is no running at all.

Of course the movie displays the same physical activity as the boolean graph, and this means that consciousness, if we keep comp, has to be related to the abstract computation, not on his implementation is such or such universal system.

But then consciousness, pain, qualia are often considered as abstract/ immaterial, so it is not so astonishing that we have to identify it with abstract relation that a person/machine can have with herself.

But this means that we have to solve the mind-body problem by explaining the "illusion of matter" from the consciousness, and not the contrary.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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