On 06 Feb 2011, at 16:30, 1Z wrote:



On Feb 6, 8:51 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 06 Feb 2011, at 01:02, 1Z wrote:



On Feb 5, 8:44 pm, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote:

That's my point, COMP does not add more white rabbits from this pov.

I dare say. But the Mathematical Multiverses do add a lot more WRs
than
physical multiverses.

Prove this.

It's already stated by Tegmark. Further proof is given by the
fact that physics uses only a subset of mathematics.

Tegmark is right on third person mathematicalism. I did show before that if you assume comp you don't need more than arithmeticalism. A good thing because "mathematical" is harder to define than arithmeticalism. Note that mathematicalism subsumes the ontology of arithmeticalism. But Tegmark doesn't take into account neither the first person indeterminacy (local or global), nor a theory of mind (which in case of comp it is easy, given that it is computer science and computer's computer science, ...)




Once you take into account the relative points of view (of the
machines, by using the self-reference logic for example

Prove that.

Sorry. I don't have to do that. I am the one translating a problem (the mind-body problem) into a body problem in computer science or in arithmetic. If you believe that comp leads to WR, show them to me, and justify your measure choice. Which is truly an open problem at the least. And then I show that by taking the points of view of the self- referentially correct machine into account (which is perhaps just an elementary politesse) we have to take into account a catalog of points of views to just formulate the problem.

Bruno



) this is
already refuted. Mathematical reality kicks back.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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