On Tue, Jul 26, 2011 at 11:10 AM, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Jul 25, 7:44 pm, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>> The argument in the paper is independent of any particular theory of
>> consciousness. It just asks the question of whether consciousness can
>> be separated from externally observable brain function.
>
> With my theory of consciousness, that's the wrong question to ask.
> It's like asking whether pronunciation of words can be separated from
> words. It's not a meaningful question. The most exterior facing
> aspects of consciousness can be detected externally, and the most
> interior facing aspects of physics - such as perceptual qualia, can be
> detected internally. Each part of the phenomenological continuum
> overlaps in one range, can be related in another, and sharply diverges
> at the extreme, until the extremes resolve in ineffability.

You say the question is meaningless but then answer it in the affirmative.

> We could
>> assume for the sake of argument that consciousness is miraculous:
>> could God make a neuron that functions normally in its interaction
>> with other neurons but lacks consciousness?
>
> It's the same thing as my YouTube argument. If you make a program that
> splices together YouTube clips of someone speaking English phonemes,
> and then connect that up to a simple ELIZA/bot-like script, you have
> made an image of a person who functions (close to) normally in it's
> interaction with users online. A really snazzy version of this might
> be able to fool everyone into thinking that they are talking to a real
> person, yet I see that obviously there isn't really a virtual person,
> just a clever GUI for a database front end.
>
>>The answer, I think, is
>> no, for it would lead to absurdity. As far as I can understand your
>> theory, it would allow for the creation of zombie neurons, therefore
>> it must be wrong.
>
> Not zombie neurons, just zombie imitation neurons. A natural neuron
> could not be a zombie, but you could make a neuron that you think
> should function like a natural neuron and it would not be able to be
> well integrated into the person's consciousness. If the imitation is
> biological, genetic, and atomic, then it is a very good imitation and
> I would expect a good chance for success, even if alternate gene
> sequences or cell architectures were employed. If you cut out the
> entire biochemical layer, and try to reproduce human consciousness
> with only solid state electronics, you're going to get different
> results which would exclude the ability to feel or understand human
> experience in the absence of a living human.

So you can end up both behaving as if you have normal vision and
believing that your vision is normal while being completely blind. Are
you happy with this as a possibility? Or do you see how it could be
avoided if consciousness and the non-conscious function of neural
tissue can be separated?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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