In order to understand my position you have to let go of the
fundamental ontological assumption that mechanics drive feeling.
You don't seem to grasp that the assumption is *not* that mechanics
drive feelings. The "assumption" (one extensively confirmed in
laboratories) is that mechanics drive actions. That's why it is
possible to imagine a philosophical zombie in which all *actions* are
the same because all the mechanics are functionally equivalent. You
have repeatedly started with this hypothesis and then ended by
contradicting the very hypothesis you started with. You apparently
assume that "feeling" (or "qualia") come from a ghost in the machine.
But then, contrary to the assumption that action is drive by
mechanics, you assert that behavior will be different even those the
mechanics are the same. This is simply incoherent.
can drive feeling, and feeling can drive mechanics, but if you base a
substitute cell architecture on nothing but the logical functionality
you can observe from 3p perspective, you're not going to get something
that exists as a 1p entity.
Fine. Then you believe there can be philosophical zombies. Beings that
are exactly like humans from every 3p perspective, but are different as
1p experiencers. So stop saying, "But their behavior will be different".
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