On Jul 28, 12:27 pm, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Materials don't have experiences, minds have experiences.
Minds are the experiences of neurological material. They aren't
I think you have
> taken reductionism to an extreme, and are trying to explain perceptions and
> thoughts in terms of the periodic table. If the material is important to
> perceptions, you must show how the material creates macroscopic effects
> which manifest as different behavior for the mind.
We are the living example of how material is important to perceptions.
A few hundred micrograms of LSD proves that that is the case.
>You would have to show
> that the words "I see yellow" bubble up from effects of carbon to affect the
> evolution of the neural network (since the utterance comes from neural
You're assuming the neural network is the mind. It isn't. The
collective experience of the neurons which participate in the network
is the mind. Seeing yellow isn't a signal, it's an experience of
neurons, the timing of which can be detected electromagnetically, but
not it's content. It's a whole other periodic table of experience and
meaning. Instead of hydrogen, you have detection, instead of helium
you have cycle/circuit, etc.
>This seems magical to me, and against what is known about
> neurology. Neurons are known to be affected by other neurons, they are not
> not known to be affected by neurons own feelings which stem from the
> feelings of the atoms which compose them.
I understand that. I think that the conventional view of mind as some
metaphysical 'emergent property' is magical. You're right, neurons and
atoms are not known to possess feelings - that's why I'm here trying
to explain that they do, and in fact there is nowhere else that the
could come from. (post: 'Nobody Here But Us Neurons'
> I think your hypothesis can be disproved by an argument from information
> How many states can a carbon atom be in?
> How many experiences can a human mind have?
> The latter is much larger than the former. Therefore the feelings of carbon
> atoms cannot be the explanation of human experience. If the range of
> possibilities for some phenomenon is large, then that phenomenon must be
> explained in terms of something having at least that many states. You
> cannot say something with 1,000,000 possible states is explained by
> something with only 5 possible states. Lets only consider the human visual
> experience. Let's assume a person can see roughly a million colors and a
> million pixels. This is equivalent to 1,000,000^1,000,000 possible visual
> experiences. For this range of experiences to be possible, there must be
> some physical system having at least this many possible states. It won't
> come from something small, unless you consider the combination of a large
> number of individual components as one large state (but this is
> anti-reudctionist). This leads to the idea that a mind or a perception is a
> large structure of inter-related pieces, not individual atoms or molecules.
The mind is a large structure of inter-related phenomena, but they
don't act like pieces or atoms of molecules. Go back to the coin
metaphor. The occidental side is discrete and atomic, the oriental
side is oceanic and subtractive. The essence of an atom is not the
shape of the atom. Gold is not the same thing as 79 bowling pins or 79
dots. Gold only arises through 79 protons. Think of it as a frequency
being tuned into by the atom, picking up it's qualia like a radio show
from beyond time and space.
> > I do have a clue that it exists. I am it. I live it. Yellow is not
> > Turing emulable and I can imagine yellow anytime I want.
> Just because you don't know how the experience of yellow is emulated doesn't
> mean it is not emulable.
That's promissory materialism. It's coming from overconfidence in
'emulation'. Heat cannot be emulated. Yellow is just visually
experience of a different frequency of heat. If you make something
hot, it is not an emulation, it's just hot. Consciousness is the same
thing. Again, there is no substitute for experience.
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