On Thu, Jul 28, 2011 at 3:07 PM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>wrote:

> On Jul 28, 12:27 pm, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > Materials don't have experiences, minds have experiences.
> Minds are the experiences of neurological material. They aren't
> freefloating mentalness.
> I think you have
> > taken reductionism to an extreme, and are trying to explain perceptions
> and
> > thoughts in terms of the periodic table.  If the material is important to
> > perceptions, you must show how the material creates macroscopic effects
> > which manifest as different behavior for the mind.
> We are the living example of how material is important to perceptions.
> A few hundred micrograms of LSD proves that that is the case.
Are you suggesting that the LSD itself is what is having these trippy
experiences, rather than causing neurons to behave differently and thus
alter patterns of thought in the brain?

Would you say LSD is always in the state of this feeling, and we only share
in that feeling when it gets stirred in with the other molecules in the

> >You would have to show
> > that the words "I see yellow" bubble up from effects of carbon to affect
> the
> > evolution of the neural network (since the utterance comes from neural
> > signals).
> You're assuming the neural network is the mind. It isn't. The
> collective experience of the neurons which participate in the network
> is the mind.

All external movement and speech is caused by neurons.  For behavior to be
altered, the neurons must be affected in some way by something.

> Seeing yellow isn't a signal, it's an experience of
> neurons,

Neuron's don't receive yellow light, the skill is opaque.  Neurons in the
brain therefore don't sense yellow, they sense the activity of other

> the timing of which can be detected electromagnetically, but
> not it's content. It's a whole other periodic table of experience and
> meaning. Instead of hydrogen, you have detection, instead of helium
> you have cycle/circuit, etc.
> >This seems magical to me, and against what is known about
> > neurology.  Neurons are known to be affected by other neurons, they are
> not
> > not known to be affected by neurons own feelings which stem from the
> > feelings of the atoms which compose them.
> I understand that. I think that the conventional view of mind as some
> metaphysical 'emergent property' is magical. You're right, neurons and
> atoms are not known to possess feelings - that's why I'm here trying
> to explain that they do, and in fact there is nowhere else that the
> could come from. (post: 'Nobody Here But Us Neurons'
> http://s33light.org/post/3391830214)
It is a theory, and you have a right to it, but if you expect others to
adopt it it should explain something other theories have failed to, or
present some evidence for it.

> > I think your hypothesis can be disproved by an argument  from information
> > theory:
> > How many states can a carbon atom be in?
> > How many experiences can a human mind have?
> > The latter is much larger than the former.  Therefore the feelings of
> carbon
> > atoms cannot be the explanation of human experience.  If the range of
> > possibilities for some phenomenon is large, then that phenomenon must be
> > explained in terms of something having at least that many states.  You
> > cannot say something with 1,000,000 possible states is explained by
> > something with only 5 possible states.  Lets only consider the human
> visual
> > experience.  Let's assume a person can see roughly a million colors and a
> > million pixels.  This is equivalent to 1,000,000^1,000,000 possible
> visual
> > experiences.  For this range of experiences to be possible, there must be
> > some physical system having at least this many possible states.  It won't
> > come from something small, unless you consider the combination of a large
> > number of individual components as one large state (but this is
> > anti-reudctionist).  This leads to the idea that a mind or a perception
> is a
> > large structure of inter-related pieces, not individual atoms or
> molecules.
> The mind is a large structure of inter-related phenomena, but they
> don't act like pieces or atoms of molecules. Go back to the coin
> metaphor. The occidental side is discrete and atomic, the oriental
> side is oceanic and subtractive. The essence of an atom is not the
> shape of the atom. Gold is not the same thing as 79 bowling pins or 79
> dots. Gold only arises through 79 protons. Think of it as a frequency
> being tuned into by the atom, picking up it's qualia like a radio show
> from beyond time and space.
> > > I do have a clue that it exists. I am it. I live it. Yellow is not
> > > Turing emulable and I can imagine yellow anytime I want.
> >
> > Just because you don't know how the experience of yellow is emulated
> doesn't
> > mean it is not emulable.
> That's promissory materialism. It's coming from overconfidence in
> 'emulation'. Heat cannot be emulated.

Sure it can.

> Yellow is just visually
> experience of a different frequency of heat. If you make something
> hot, it is not an emulation, it's just hot.

It provides warmth within the emulation.

> Consciousness is the same
> thing. Again, there is no substitute for experience.

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