Hi, A brief remark.

On 8/9/2011 11:26 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Wed, Aug 10, 2011 at 12:50 AM, Craig Weinberg<whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:It does mean that a machine can't behave just like a living thing, because everything that a machine is, and everything that a living thing is, are behaviors and experiences. You can't assume that two completely different things have the same behaviors and experiences just because the behaviors that you think you observer seem like what you expect.I'm asking about observable behaviours, not experiences. Why do you always conflate the two while arguing that they should not be conflated?Everything a human does is determined by genetics and environment. Without the genetic or environmental programming, a human won';t ever learn, grow or change himself.That's an unfounded assumption. Conjoined twins have the same genetics and environment yet they are different people with different personalities. A dead body has the same genetics and environment as a living person, yet it doesn't learn or grow.Conjoined twins don't have the same environment since they are spatially separated, made of different matter. A dead body also has a different environment to a living body, since the chemical reactions inside it are very different. Genetics in conjunction with environment determines what sort of body and brain a being will have. what else could there possibly be?Are you now saying that your assumption that consciousness does not necessarily follow from conscious-like behaviour is a priori absurd?? So if a machine can behave like a human then it must have the same consciousness as a human, and to you this is now obvious a priori??Ugh. There is no such thing as conscious like behavior. Again. That is my point. If I am a cockroach, then cockroaches seem to behave like they are conscious to me and human beings are forces of nature. I can only think that this insight is not accessible to everyone because only some people seem to be capable of getting it and just overlook it over and over again. It is critically important to understand this point or everything that follows will be a strawman distortion of my position.Can you explain again what you think is a priori absurd?So, does cockroach-like behavior mean that a machine is a cockroach? Does a wooden duck decoy be the same thing as a duck?Cockroach-like behaviour means the thing behaves like a cockroach. If cockroaches are conscious (they may be) cockroachlike behaviour means the thing behaves like a conscious creature, namely a cockroach. It isn't actually a cockroach if it is a machine, but just as it can have cockroachlike behaviour without being a cockroach, it may have cockroachlike consciousness without being a cockroach.The form of argument is similar to assuming that sqrt(2) is rational and showing that this assumption leads to contradiction, therefore sqrt(2) cannot be rational. The only way to respond to this argument if you disagree is to show that there is some error in the logic, otherwise you *have* to accept it, even if you don't like it and you have conceptual difficulties with irrational numbers.No, I don't have to accept it. Consciousness is not accessible with mathematical logic alone. When you insist that it must beforehand, you poison the result and are forced into absurdity. You cannot prove to me that you exist. If you accept that that means you don't exist, then you have accepted that your own ability to accept or reject any proposition is itself invalid.No, I can't prove to you that I exist, or that I am conscious, or that I will pay you back if you lend me money. But I can prove to you that sqrt(2) is irrational and I can prove to you that if something has behaviour similar to a conscious thing then it will also have the consciousness of the conscious thing.You can't prove that you have consciousness but you are going to prove that something else has your consciousness because it acts like you do?No, I can prove that something that behaves as I do has a similar consciousness to mine. That doesn't mean that I am conscious or that I can prove that I am conscious.You need to be able to follow the proof in order to point out the error if you don't agree. There may be an error but simply saying you don't agree is not an argument.The error is that consciousness cannot be proved. It doesn't exist: it insists. Completely different (opposite) epistemology.I'm not trying to prove consciousness, only that such consciousness as an entity may or may not have will be preserved if the function of its brain is preserved.As for neurons having a finite set of behaviours, of course they do. It is a theorem in physics that a certain volume of space has an upper limit of information it can contain:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bekenstein_boundThere is no limit to the combinations of behaviors they can have over time though. There is a finite alphabet, but there is no limit to the possibilities of what can be written. Even the alphabet can be changed and expanded within the written text. New, unforeseeable behaviors are invented.No, there is an absolute limit to the behaviours that can be displayed over time by a brain of finite size.Over how much time? Infinite time = infinite behaviors.No, if the matter is finite the number of configurations is finite, so after a finite period of time all the possible configurations will be exhausted and you will start to repeat.

`How does the finity of matter require a finite number of`

`configurations or a discrete configuration space? Ever hear of`

`differential equations? Every bit of matter can have a quantity of`

`momentum, spin direction and relative position that varies as a smooth`

`function over (at least) teh Real numbers. Where is your leap from`

`smooth functions to finite state systems to Poincare recursions?`

Where is the assumption of discreteness coming from?

There is only a finite number of particles in the brainNo. The brain is constantly adding, removing, and changing particles. All of our cells are.But the brain is finite in size and the number of types of particle is finite. If you have a finite sentence length (the size of the brain) and a finite number of letters (the particles making up the brain) there is only a finite number of sentences that can be produced. In order to have infinite brain states you would have to allow the brain to expand infinitely in size.

`Why the preoccupation with finiteness? Is it that hard to consider`

`for a moment that you are tying to shoe horn a foot into a Cinderella`

`slipper that simply is too small? The point is that the brain can`

`somehow mimic processes that are infinite... How that happens I can only`

`speculate.`

If mental states supervene on physical states then there can't be more possible mental states than brain states.Mental states make sense of phenomena outside of the brain, through the brain, just as language communicates through words, inventing new ones as it goes..Whatever that means, there can't be more mental states than brain states, and there is only a finite number of possible brain states if the brain remains finite in size.

`Your claim would be true if and only if there only existed a finite`

`universe that is composed of an irreducible and finite number of parts.`

`The problem is that you cannot know what universe that is. Consider how`

`choising a particular finite partition on a data set is a form of 'axiom`

`of choice'.`

`Ever hear of the Banach-Tarsky paradox? .If you assume a three (or`

`four) dimensional finite universe that is partitioned in a finitesimal`

`way and the axiom of choice,".. then you can tell how to disassemble a`

`solid ball into five pieces and reassemble those pieces into two balls`

`just as solid and the same size as the original. I want to emphasize`

`that this is a mathematical prescription. You can't do it in reality`

`because you have to use the axiom of choice to do the fitting. It says`

`"there is a way" to fit the pieces together, but doesn't say what the`

`way is." - selfAdjoint`

`(http://www.physicsforums.com/archive/index.php/t-438.html) Does this`

`paradox not give you pause? If you assume a axiom of choice you will`

`violate the laws of conservation.`

`"The *Banach--Tarski paradox* is a theorem`

`<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theorem> in set theoretic`

`<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Set_theory> geometry`

`<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geometry> which states that a solid ball`

`<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ball_%28mathematics%29> in 3-dimensional`

`space can be split into a finite number of non-overlapping pieces, which`

`can then be put back together in a different way to yield /two/`

`identical copies of the original ball. The reassembly process involves`

`only moving the pieces around and rotating them, without changing their`

`shape. However, the pieces themselves are complicated: they are not`

`usual solids but infinite scatterings of points. A stronger form of the`

`theorem implies that given any two "reasonable" solid objects (such as a`

`small ball and a huge ball) --- solid in the sense of the continuum`

`<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Continuum_hypothesis> --- either one can`

`be reassembled into the other. This is often stated colloquially as "a`

`pea can be chopped up and reassembled into the Sun".`

`The reason the Banach--Tarski theorem is called a paradox`

`<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paradox> is that it contradicts basic`

`geometric intuition. "Doubling the ball" by dividing it into parts and`

`moving them around by rotations <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rotation>`

`and translations`

`<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Translation_%28geometry%29>, without any`

`stretching, bending, or adding new points, seems to be impossible, since`

`all these operations preserve the volume`

`<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Volume>, but the volume is doubled in the end.`

`Unlike most theorems in geometry, this result depends in a critical way`

`on the axiom of choice <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axiom_of_choice> in`

`set theory. This axiom allows for the construction of nonmeasurable sets`

`<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nonmeasurable_set>, collections of points`

`that do not have a volume in the ordinary sense and require an`

`uncountably <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uncountable> infinite number`

`of arbitrary choices to specify. Robert Solovay`

`<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Solovay> showed that the axiom of`

`choice, or a weaker variant of it, is necessary for the construction of`

`nonmeasurable sets by constructing a model of ZF set theory`

`<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zermelo%E2%80%93Fraenkel_set_theory>`

`(without choice) in which every geometric subset has a well-defined`

`Lebesgue measure <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lebesgue_measure>. On the`

`other hand, Solovay's construction relies on the assumption that an`

`inaccessible cardinal`

`<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inaccessible_cardinal> exists (which`

`itself cannot be proven from ZF set theory); Saharon Shelah`

`<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saharon_Shelah> later showed that this`

`assumption is necessary." -`

`http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Banach%E2%80%93Tarski_paradox`

`Therefore your reasoning here fails. Only if you assume a`

`one-to-one map between mental states and physical states can your`

`premise hold and what was it that you where trying to prove? You cannot`

`assume that which you with to prove.`

If the number of possible brain states is finite then the number of possible mental states is an equal or smaller finite number (probably much smaller).Neither brain states nor mental states are finite or bound to each other explicitly. Some are bound explicitly, some are not. Think of a venn diagram with the self as the intersection of neurology and experience.So can you have a change in mental state without a change in brain state? Brain activity would then seem to be superfluous - you do your thinking with a disembodied soul.

`Why could not dynamics of the brain count too? Ions flow in the`

`neuron's fluids, they have momenta, relative position and .. WOW ..`

`spin! For one frozen in time snap shot of the brain an infinite number`

`of mental states could intersect!`

So you would say of your friend: "I have known him for twenty years, have had many conversations with him and always considered him very smart, but now that I know he is a robot I realise that all along he was as dumb as a rock".Of course. It's not unusual for people to deceive themselves in long term relationships. If you had the friend, would you not be fazed at all to discover that he is a robot? What if you found out that that he reports your every conversation to GoogleBook, and that is programmed to replace you and dispose of your body in the river, would you still would have faith in his intelligence and your friendship enough to try to win him over and talk him out of it?I'd be surprised if my friend was a robot but if he was intelligent before I knew he would still be intelligent after I knew. If he tried to kill me then I would be upset, by I would also be upset if my flesh and blood friend tried to kill me.So you would find it no different whether it is a lifelong friend who has been betraying you for 20 years versus a robot who was programmed to extract business intelligence from you from the start? You would hold the robot personally responsible and not GoogleBook?I don't know why you chose Google Books as an example but if it could somehow be intelligent enough to drive a humanlike robot then Google Books would be responsible for its actions.

Google books is a great resource! Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.