On 8/17/2011 5:41 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
There is no such thing as a functionally identical part that
is not the genuine part. Any substitution potentially affects qualia,
to what degree depends on the degree in isomorphism of the substitute,
both logically and materially.
This seems to be the crux of the argument: How close is close enough to
be *functionally* identical. Craig seems to think it is somewhere in the
neighborhood of one neuron might be substituted for another (from the
same person? same species?). Stathis thinks that the relevant
functionality is just identical input/ouput at the synapses, which could
be realized by a silicon/plastic/... artificial neuron. I'm closer to
It's not clear whether Craig thinks that his spirit/free-will/sense
would be able to act on an artificial neuron and cause it to deviate
from strict physical determinism or not.
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