On 8/17/2011 5:41 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
There is no such thing as a functionally identical part that
is not the genuine part. Any substitution potentially affects qualia,
to what degree depends on the degree in isomorphism of the substitute,
both logically and materially.

This seems to be the crux of the argument: How close is close enough to be *functionally* identical. Craig seems to think it is somewhere in the neighborhood of one neuron might be substituted for another (from the same person? same species?). Stathis thinks that the relevant functionality is just identical input/ouput at the synapses, which could be realized by a silicon/plastic/... artificial neuron. I'm closer to Stathis opinion.

It's not clear whether Craig thinks that his spirit/free-will/sense would be able to act on an artificial neuron and cause it to deviate from strict physical determinism or not.


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