On Aug 17, 1:09 pm, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > On 8/17/2011 5:41 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > There is no such thing as a functionally identical part that > > is not the genuine part. Any substitution potentially affects qualia, > > to what degree depends on the degree in isomorphism of the substitute, > > both logically and materially. > > This seems to be the crux of the argument: How close is close enough to > be *functionally* identical. Craig seems to think it is somewhere in the > neighborhood of one neuron might be substituted for another (from the > same person? same species?).
My guess is that you'd need a stem cell from a mammal. I would imagine that tissue transplants from human brains have already been attempted and failed. Think of it like a nation. If a baby is adopted into the US, he becomes an American. If she is transplanted from Italy as an adult, she is more of an Italian-American culturally. The transplanted neuron would likely have to learn the culture of that nervous system. > Stathis thinks that the relevant > functionality is just identical input/ouput at the synapses, which could > be realized by a silicon/plastic/... artificial neuron. I'm closer to > Stathis opinion. To continue the metaphor, that's like having an automatic car that knows how to drive on the roads and has a legal license plate being considered an American. > It's not clear whether Craig thinks that his spirit/free-will/sense > would be able to act on an artificial neuron and cause it to deviate > from strict physical determinism or not. My guess is that the artificial neuron makes it's own sense, it's just too primitive for what we would call free-will or feeling. It's more detection/reaction. It would be unable to fully contribute in the animal or human level sensorimotives of the brain, but it could facilitate dumb connections between organic neurons. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
