On Aug 17, 1:09 pm, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> On 8/17/2011 5:41 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> > There is no such thing as a functionally identical part that
> > is not the genuine part. Any substitution potentially affects qualia,
> > to what degree depends on the degree in isomorphism of the substitute,
> > both logically and materially.
> This seems to be the crux of the argument: How close is close enough to
> be *functionally* identical. Craig seems to think it is somewhere in the
> neighborhood of one neuron might be substituted for another (from the
> same person? same species?).  

My guess is that you'd need a stem cell from a mammal. I would imagine
that tissue transplants from human brains have already been attempted
and failed. Think of it like a nation. If a baby is adopted into the
US, he becomes an American. If she is transplanted from Italy as an
adult, she is more of an Italian-American culturally. The transplanted
neuron would likely have to learn the culture of that nervous system.

> Stathis thinks that the relevant
> functionality is just identical input/ouput at the synapses, which could
> be realized by a silicon/plastic/... artificial neuron.  I'm closer to
> Stathis opinion.

To continue the metaphor, that's like having an automatic car that
knows how to drive on the roads and has a legal license plate being
considered an American.

> It's not clear whether Craig thinks that his spirit/free-will/sense
> would be able to act on an artificial neuron and cause it to deviate
> from strict physical determinism or not.

My guess is that the artificial neuron makes it's own sense, it's just
too primitive for what we would call free-will or feeling. It's more
detection/reaction. It would be unable to fully contribute in the
animal or human level sensorimotives of the brain, but it could
facilitate dumb connections between organic neurons.


You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to