On Aug 17, 1:09 pm, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> On 8/17/2011 5:41 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> > There is no such thing as a functionally identical part that
> > is not the genuine part. Any substitution potentially affects qualia,
> > to what degree depends on the degree in isomorphism of the substitute,
> > both logically and materially.
>
> This seems to be the crux of the argument: How close is close enough to
> be *functionally* identical. Craig seems to think it is somewhere in the
> neighborhood of one neuron might be substituted for another (from the
> same person? same species?).  

My guess is that you'd need a stem cell from a mammal. I would imagine
that tissue transplants from human brains have already been attempted
and failed. Think of it like a nation. If a baby is adopted into the
US, he becomes an American. If she is transplanted from Italy as an
adult, she is more of an Italian-American culturally. The transplanted
neuron would likely have to learn the culture of that nervous system.

> Stathis thinks that the relevant
> functionality is just identical input/ouput at the synapses, which could
> be realized by a silicon/plastic/... artificial neuron.  I'm closer to
> Stathis opinion.

To continue the metaphor, that's like having an automatic car that
knows how to drive on the roads and has a legal license plate being
considered an American.

> It's not clear whether Craig thinks that his spirit/free-will/sense
> would be able to act on an artificial neuron and cause it to deviate
> from strict physical determinism or not.

My guess is that the artificial neuron makes it's own sense, it's just
too primitive for what we would call free-will or feeling. It's more
detection/reaction. It would be unable to fully contribute in the
animal or human level sensorimotives of the brain, but it could
facilitate dumb connections between organic neurons.

Craig

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