On Aug 23, 7:18 pm, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > On 8/23/2011 3:36 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > On Aug 23, 5:58 pm, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > > >> On 8/23/2011 2:13 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > >>> The basic difference is the ability to feel. Literally proving it > >>> would require a brain implant that remotes to the device, but I would > >>> be very impressed if a machine could convincingly answer personal > >>> questions like 'what do you want', or 'what's bothering you'. If they > >>> could continue to converse fluently about those answers and reveal a > >>> coherent personality which was not preconfigured in the software. > > >> "Not preconfigured in software" sounds like an escape clause. Your use > >> of speech was preconfigured in the software of your brain. All infants > >> learns to speak the language they hear - and if they don't hear any they > >> make one up. > > > Right. Making one up = not preconfigured. If a machine can make a > > coherent identity up for itself with a point of view without having > > any templates to choose from, then I would be impressed. Note that > > infants making up their own language don't wind up with a mix of > > French, Chinese, and Braille. Let a machine tell me what it wants or > > how it feels without a programmer telling it how it might answer. > > But there are strong similarities in all languages, including made up > ones.
There are strong similarities in identities too, so a computer should have no trouble discovering it's own if it's experiences were like ours - but they aren't. > So what makes you think evolution hasn't programmed how you > feel? It has programmed how we feel, but it hasn't programmed *that* we feel. Evolution has evolved DNA from simpler molecules and atoms. The experiences of those things evolved as well. We are the capitulated experience of that evolution of experience and how experience has shaped experience-ability. We mistake our intellectual experience for a universal sense and when we impose it on matter of lesser ability, all it can do is just what we tell it to do, thereby reflecting our own sense back to us and not causing it to learn how to feel like us or understand what we understand. And if it has why deny consciousness to a machine programmed by a > human to want certain things. I'm not denying it, I'm pointing out that we're fooling ourselves if we think that's possible. It is no different from making a movie with cartoons that say they want certain things. The cartoon has no consciousness, that's absurd. It's the consciousness of the cartoonist which is refracted to us through the sense we can make of the cartoon images. The cartoon itself isn't even an image, it's meaningless shaded regions. It means nothing to spider or a plant, it's a purely human to human text. A computer is the same thing, it's a human to human text processor. A text is not an interpreter, it's just that which is interpreted by an interpreter. What difference does it make where the > desire comes from? It makes a difference if you are talking about replacing your brain with something that keeps your body alive and pretends to be you. It makes a difference if you are talking about making something to use as a perpetual servant. Otherwise it's fine. We imagine that fictional characters are real all the time, I don't have a problem with that at all - it's fun. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.