On Sep 5, 1:01 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> May be Mechanism will be refuted, but meanwhile it illustrates that
> some explanation exists. If mechanism is correct it does explains
> completely gravity, time, space, quanta, and it does explain almost
> completely the qualia, except for a gap, which can been made as little
> as you wish, and which (the gap) can be justified entirely in the
> theory (like we can explain why we have a blind spot).
When you say that mechanism explains qualia almost completely, are you
talking about the 1-p (plural) sequestering of it, the non
computability of it, or is there something else? Does this mechanism
rely on the idea that meaning is transferred from something like a
person to a machine purely by a machine 'acting like' a person seems
to act? You would agree though that a ventriloquist does not transfer
the ability to feel, see, and understand to his dummy, I assume, so
doesn't that mean that the difference between a wooden dummy and a
machine capable of human feeling is just a matter of degree of
complexity. If so, I think to claim that explains qualia almost
completely is not only premature, but, to my mind, somewhat deceptive.
It's a con. (Sorry, not accusing you personally - just the presumption
of the position).
> I think the hard problem is 99% solved, and 100% metasolved. And given
> that the solution predicts how matter appears and behave, the only
> thing to do to get the whole picture is to derive physics from self-
> reference/machine's theology. This might lead to a refutation of comp,
> or to a refutation of the classical theory of knowledge (although I
> doubt this can be possible).
I think that the way it approaches the hard problem is itself self-
referential. By equating consciousness with computation to begin with,
it makes sense that computation can be used to find itself to be the
source of consciousness. To me, the fact that consciousness is private
and non-computable are the least descriptive possible aspects of them.
It diminishes the relevance of how significance is achieved through
qualia, minimizes the intensity of biological commitment to survival
and things like the difference between pain and pleasure. I don't see
that a number can be spectacularly painful. Unless you're talking
about a particular arithmetic configuration that explains misery and
ecstasy or blue versus red?
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to email@example.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at