On Sep 5, 1:01 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > May be Mechanism will be refuted, but meanwhile it illustrates that > some explanation exists. If mechanism is correct it does explains > completely gravity, time, space, quanta, and it does explain almost > completely the qualia, except for a gap, which can been made as little > as you wish, and which (the gap) can be justified entirely in the > theory (like we can explain why we have a blind spot).
When you say that mechanism explains qualia almost completely, are you talking about the 1-p (plural) sequestering of it, the non computability of it, or is there something else? Does this mechanism rely on the idea that meaning is transferred from something like a person to a machine purely by a machine 'acting like' a person seems to act? You would agree though that a ventriloquist does not transfer the ability to feel, see, and understand to his dummy, I assume, so doesn't that mean that the difference between a wooden dummy and a machine capable of human feeling is just a matter of degree of complexity. If so, I think to claim that explains qualia almost completely is not only premature, but, to my mind, somewhat deceptive. It's a con. (Sorry, not accusing you personally - just the presumption of the position). > > I think the hard problem is 99% solved, and 100% metasolved. And given > that the solution predicts how matter appears and behave, the only > thing to do to get the whole picture is to derive physics from self- > reference/machine's theology. This might lead to a refutation of comp, > or to a refutation of the classical theory of knowledge (although I > doubt this can be possible). I think that the way it approaches the hard problem is itself self- referential. By equating consciousness with computation to begin with, it makes sense that computation can be used to find itself to be the source of consciousness. To me, the fact that consciousness is private and non-computable are the least descriptive possible aspects of them. It diminishes the relevance of how significance is achieved through qualia, minimizes the intensity of biological commitment to survival and things like the difference between pain and pleasure. I don't see that a number can be spectacularly painful. Unless you're talking about a particular arithmetic configuration that explains misery and ecstasy or blue versus red? Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.