On Sep 6, 3:13 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 06 Sep 2011, at 02:26, Craig Weinberg wrote:

> > When you say that mechanism explains qualia almost completely, are you
> > talking about the 1-p (plural) sequestering of it, the non
> > computability of it, or is there something else? Does this mechanism
> > rely on the idea that meaning is transferred from something like a
> > person to a machine purely by a machine 'acting like' a person seems
> > to act?
> No. You need to duplicate the behavior of the components of the  
> machine at some right level of substitution.
> "acting like" might be enough, but is somehow hard to define.

What accounts for substitution level? Is it a hard threshold whereby
Pinocchio becomes a real boy suddenly, or is it a gradient of
escalating qualia? Either way seems insufficient for the same reason
that vanishing or absent qualia seem unlikely. If Pinocchio
spontaneously opens his eyes one day as a fully realized human being,
that would have odd subjective problems (do they project a simulated
history in their memory or do they know that they came into existence
today but know everything about the world and their own lives?) or do
they gradually come online with morbid in-between states of tortured
semi-consciousness without means to express or relieve their

> > You would agree though that a ventriloquist does not transfer
> > the ability to feel, see, and understand to his dummy, I assume, so
> > doesn't that mean that the difference between a wooden dummy and a
> > machine capable of human feeling is just a matter of degree of
> > complexity.
> No. The dummy should behave the same in presence and absence of the  
> ventriloquist. But even more, the "dummy" body should do the right  
> computations.

To me, the computations are the ventriloquist. They are just a way for
the ventriloquist to save his act on disk, so that they can be
executed at a later time through the dummy.

> > If so, I think to claim that explains qualia almost
> > completely is not only premature, but, to my mind, somewhat deceptive.
> > It's a con. (Sorry, not accusing you personally - just the presumption
> > of the position).
> The theory explains why numbers develop many sort of beliefs. Some of  
> them being lived as self-referentially true but non communicable, or  
> non provable. They also follows axioms or theorems in theories of  
> qualia done independently of comp.

It sounds promising, but without an example it's oblique to me. It's
critical acclaim of an idea that I haven't been able to get out of the
intriguing packaging. Isn't there some natural language example you
can give me of the theory - without variables or big picture
generalizations? Can you tell me a story about one particular number
and why it has developed a belief, or one particular qualia that is
explained by a particular computation theory?

> >> I think the hard problem is 99% solved, and 100% metasolved. And  
> >> given
> >> that the solution predicts how matter appears and behave, the only
> >> thing to do to get the whole picture is to derive physics from self-
> >> reference/machine's theology. This might lead to a refutation of  
> >> comp,
> >> or to a refutation of the classical theory of knowledge (although I
> >> doubt this can be possible).
> > I think that the way it approaches the hard problem is itself self-
> > referential. By equating consciousness with computation to begin with,
> > it makes sense that computation can be used to find itself to be the
> > source of consciousness. To me, the fact that consciousness is private
> > and non-computable are the least descriptive possible aspects of them.
> The theory explains the role of consciousness: it speeds up UMs  
> relatively to other UMs.

That concurs with my ideas too. Cumulative entanglement is a way of
encapsulating or recapitulating computation (sort of literally 'coming
to a head') - but, I don't think it gets to the heart of the matter at
all. It doesn't address the qualitative quality of qualia. To say that
consciousness has a role in a machine universe is putting the cart
before the horse. It is the machine that has a role in supporting
consciousness. To say that consciousness has a role in computation is
to say that a screenplay has a role within a movie set, but that the
stage and props are primitives from which movieness arises.

> > It diminishes the relevance of how significance is achieved through
> > qualia, minimizes the intensity of biological commitment to survival
> > and things like the difference between pain and pleasure.
> I have no clue why you say so.

Because numbers don't have to care about anything.

> > I don't see
> > that a number can be spectacularly painful. Unless you're talking
> > about a particular arithmetic configuration that explains misery and
> > ecstasy or blue versus red?
> I don't see any problem here, other than mathematical questions. You  
> can't refute Newton physics by saying that it cannot predict weather.

But you shouldn't you refute the use of Newton physics to predict
weather when people suggest that there is no problem in doing it?


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