On Sep 19, 1:28 am, "Stephen P. King" <[email protected]> wrote:
> I give number and their physical implementation an equal
> ontological status, they are independent of each other in that their
> behaviours are independent but co-existence the same way that we see in
> the Stone duality between abstract algebras and topological spaces. With
> this duality there is no need to explain interactions between minds and
> bodies. Minds and bodies are merely different aspects of a single
> neutral existence.
[CW] I do the same thing, only opening it up to non enumerating
sensorimotive experiences as well. I'm thinking of how the difference
between numbers and other types of ideal figures of the psyche is that
they achieve universal synchronization of their truths through the
embodiment of nothing other than that embodiment.
For example, we can make up a story about well known character, like
we can say "What Would Jesus Do?" and there is a certain degree of
coherence of the set of possible solutions to that question, depending
on the context the asking of the question invokes. It could be said
perhaps that the set of all possible answers to this question are a
kind of arithmetic definition of Jesus. This still gives us nothing of
the biblical story of Jesus. It picks up where that leaves off so that
all of these answers of what he would do say nothing about what he
did, where he came from, why it's important, etc. It's only a dynamic
silhouette of his identity. Even with an exhaustive compilation of one
trillion answers to that question in a database, in a sense, we would
not know as much about Jesus as would a young child five minutes into
his first church service.
That actually wasn't what I was going to say - the main point I have
is that any stereotype, archetype, story or other fictional ideal can
be explored in the imagination. What kind of car would Jesus drive,
etc. and we can dream up answers to those questions and maybe even
some sort of reasoning behind them. We may find support for some of
our intuitions and imaginations in the minds of others (and even
evangelize them). I would argue that to an extent arithmetic truth a
process like this, and in another sense it is the diametrically
opposite process. Instead of taking the fictive potential of the
psyche and pursuing ideals upon which to project faith, mathematics
pursues fictions which reflect fact.
We conjure archetypes of quantity rather than quality, not for faith
but for freedom from the need for faith. We should not be fooled by
the universality of 2+2 = 4. It is no more primitive than saying Satan
= Evil, it's just that the two statements represent opposite extremes
in our human sense-making capacities. Not trying to say that Evil is
as 'real' as 4, but if you notice, both statements really don't tell
us anything that we wouldn't already know just by examining our
definitions of the terms. The experience of computation is not
necessary if there were no limitations on the human mind; formulas and
statements are just ways of exposing the predefined sense of the
ideal. Computations only make sense as finite 1p sensorimotives. In
the 3-p computations would be redundant as they are public and
deterministic. Nothing in 3-p doesn't know the solutions so they can't
relate to problems.
> [SPK]
> You say this and yet the Yes Doctor requires a physical
> implementation. This is a logical contradiction, Bruno! Without the
> finite limits of the physical there can be no notion of minds or the
> experience of what it is like to have 1p. Without 1p the notion of
> number itself become meaningless. Mere existence does not confess
> articulation nor implementation of a computation. Existence is neutral,
> it is property-less and undistinguished. The mere existence of an
> entity does not supervene its properties therefore the existence of a
> number cannot determine its properties. The same holds for a
> computation. A computation cannot be said to be implemented merely
> because one can assert that the bit string of its algorithm 'exists'
> independent of a human's knowledge of such.
{CW] I agree. Existence is that which insists upon making sense or
being sensed. The content is determined by the dynamic interaction
within and between each and it's relation to all that exists.
>
>
>
> >> How are we to take literally an idea, used to explain and predict
> >> physical and psychical phenomena, that violates the simple principle
> >> that 'there is not such thing as a free lunch', without some
> >> explanation - other than some musings about the ideas of some famous
> >> Greek fellow?
>
> > If you doubt in the independence of the arithmetical truth, then
> > explain me the law of dependence, and explain me what are your
> > primitive elements in your theory.
>
> [SPK]
> I am not questioning the Independence of Arithmetic Truth, I am
> questioning the ability to have a meaningful notion of an entity whose
> existence alone determines its properties and valuations.
Right. The truth is in the sensemaking, in the applicability to
different contexts, not in the sanctity of the numerical entity. The
entity itself is fictional. That it's fiction serves the motive of
isolating the essence of existence (3-p public generic fact) doesn't
change that it is a human neurological behavior, no different than any
other OCD, just with much more productive consequences.
>
> [SPK]
> Yes and I deal with this by positing existence itself as the
> neutral primitive ground/universe. But comp itself, as a concept,
> requires some form of physical expression to be an object of
> comprehension. If an idea cannot be, for example, represented by some
> set of symbols or equivalent, how can we even know of its existence?
Even if it is represented, we can't know what it is unless that
representation decodes to a presentation in the form of direct
comprehension experience or indirect comprehension through experience
of it's consequences/graphs/engineering.
>
> [SPK]
> In its claim that the physical world is unnecessary. Please
> understand that I agree with your claim that the physical universe is
> not primitive ontologically. But I also claim that the Platonic universe
> cannot be said to be primitive ontologically either. We must have both;
> a dualism of some form is necessary.
A dualism which remains essentially whole but existentially
bifurcated...an essence-existence involuted sense monism. :)
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