2011/10/5 Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>
> On Oct 5, 2:54 am, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > Hi,
> > 2011/10/5 Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>
> > > Consciousness happens. Physics has nothing to say about what the
> > > content of any particular brain's thoughts should be. If give you a
> > > book about Marxism then you will have thoughts about Marxism - not
> > > about whatever physical modeling of a brain of your genetic makeup
> > > would suggest.
> > But reading a book is a physical process, photons from the book hit your
> > retina, which in turns generate electrical current through the nerves to
> > your brain which acts accordingly to its state and the new input.
> The same process would be taking place whether you could read or not.
> Your ability to make sense of the book depends on your subjective
> learning of language as well as the physical process of optical
> stimulation. Actually, my hypothesis includes the conjecture that
> photons may not be physical phenomena at all: http://s33light.org/fauxton
> > So If I have a model of a brain in the same state and gives it the same
> > input, It'll think about Marxism and not whatever whatever whatever...
> Without having a person who can tell you what they are thinking about,
> how would your model tell the difference? To physics by itself, every
> thought is whatever whatever whatever. The 3-p view of the brain is a-
> signifying and generic. The 1-p view of the psyche is signifying and
> proprietary. Your expectation that consciousness follows physics is
> only based upon the a priori unexplained fact of consciousness, not
> any kind of scientific insight into how consciousness could arise
> physically in something. It's that expectation which needs to be
> questioned, not the existence of subjectivity. The expectation of
> consciousness arising automatically from physical mechanisms alone
> exiles our ordinary experience of the world to some metaphysical never-
> never land, an orphaned dimension without any justification or
> ontology. It forces a Cartesian theater on us, but then denies it,
> leaving only promissory materialism...'science will provide'. I'm not
> buying it.
> > I don't know where your idea of having the model of a thing could help
> > predict inputs outside of it...
> I'm saying that you can't have a model for brain behavior for exactly
> that reason. Too much of it comes from outside of it, continuously,
> dynamically, interactively, intentionally, semantically, emotionally.
> It's the other guys here who are saying that the brain behavior can be
> predicted by biochemistry alone.
No they are not saying that. They are saying that a model of the brain fed
with the same inputs as a real brain will act as the real brain... if it was
not the case, the model would be wrong so you could not label it as a model
of the brain.
They never said they could know which inputs you could have and they don't
have to. They just have to know the transition rule (biochemichal/physical)
of each neurons and as the brain respect physics so as the model, and so it
will react the same way.
You do the same mistake with your tv pixel analogy. If I know all the
transition rule of *a pixel* according to input... I can build a model of a
TV that will *exactly* display the same thing as the real TV for the same
inputs without knowing anything about movies/show/whatever... I don't care
about movies at that level. They never said that they would explain/predict
the input to the tv, just replicate the tv.
> I used to think that too, but I have
> a better way of making sense of it now.
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