On 10/14/2011 5:50 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Fri, Oct 14, 2011 at 05:01:26PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 13 Oct 2011, at 23:50, Russell Standish wrote:I don't see why Bayes' theorem assumes a physical universe.## Advertising

Bayes' theorem does not assume a physical universe. But some use of bayes theorem to justify the laws of physics, presuppose that a physical universe is an object (may be mathematical, like in Tegmark) among other objects.Then why couldn't the physical universe be a trace (aka history) of UD*?All it assumes is a prior probability distribution. Something like the universal prior of Solomonoff-Levin, or the distribution of observer moments within UD*.I don't think such a distribution makes sense. What makes sense is a computational state, and a distribution of (competing) universal machines relating that state with other states through the computations that they emulate.Whenever an observer interprets multiple different input strings (ie observations) as the same thing, the S-L distribution makes sense. Particularly so if the mapping process is a computation.It is discussed in my book (page 83). The terminology (Occam catastrophe) is mine, but it is certainly possible that other people may have raised the issue by a different name.I will look at this again asap. I thought we discuss all this during the ASSA/RSSA debate.I don't recall this issue being discussed during that debate. There was some discussion on it after my book came out, but more about the conclusion that self-awareness is required for consciousness, which apparently people found counter-intuitive for some reason.I don't see the relation with this.There is, but I'll let you reread the book if you're interested.What would it be with respect of UD*?.IFAICT, UD* should be equivalent to the all strings ensemble.I don't think so at all. This is missing the highly non trivial structure on the set of all computations coming from the non trivial notion of computations. Allmost all strings are random, but no computations at all is random, except the result of the application of the identity program on the arbitrary inputs when dovetailing on inputs. But that is just a part of UD*. Most of UD* is not random at all, and it has an extreme redundancy. There is the presence of deep computations, self-referential entities, etc.You may be right, but I think that needs to be demonstrated.? The UD generates computations, and only computations, so in all portion of the UD*, there is nothing random at all. randomness crops out in the machine's epistemologies or first person views, because they are intrinsically ignorant to which computations they can belong.The UDA indicates we must be supervenient on all programs passing through our current observer moment. Randomness comes differentiating between running programs (eg being in Washington or being in Moscow). I know there are only a countable number of programs. Does this entail only a countable number of histories too? Or a continuum of histories? I did think the latter (and you seemed to agree), but I am partially influenced by the continuum of histories available in the "no information" ensemble (aka "Nothing").

`There must be a continuum of histories since there are infinitely long histories which go`

`through a given state (or is it an OM - I don't think they are the same) infinitely many`

`times. But if you're only looking ahead a finite interval then it seems there would only`

`be a countable, or even finite, number of continuations. That would be the relative`

`measure for predicting physics.`

Brent

Could it be that there are only a countable number of histories after all, given there are only a countable number of programs. That would be one big difference right there.If true, it should give rise to observable differences between my theory and yours, which would be an interesting and important result.Yes. You are still trying a theory which would be comp-independent, apparently. Good luck :)Its always worth clarifying what still goes through in an argument when some of the assumptions are relaxed, even if the programme itself hits a wall.It wasn't a critique of your UDA and AUDA reasoning, (which I agree does not use probability, nor anthropic principle) but of your statement that Bayes' and the Anthropic Principle is inapplicable.Not in all context. The anthropic principle might been use for deriving cosmological principles, but not the physical *laws*.Why not?Well, because UDA shows that the laws of physics are logico- arithmetical, and that they take the form of internal (epistemological) relative statistics on computation.I actually don't get that conclusion from your work, so it might be worth elaborating more. The Theatetus definition leading to the AUDA has the feel of something "put in by hand", rather than being a logical consequence of the UDA. Nothing wrong with that, of course, but we should be honest with it, if it is the case.

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