On 26 Dec 2011, at 18:03, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Dec 26, 6:43 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 25 Dec 2011, at 21:29, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Dec 25, 12:01 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 25 Dec 2011, at 16:16, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Does that mean that you consider numbers biological?
I consider that some relations between some numbers are biological.
Some are theological, some physical, etc, from their (the numbers,
the
programs, the digital machines, )
Why would numbers differ in quality when they already differ
precisely
in quantity? Seems superfluous.
It is not a matter of choice. Relatively to each other universal
number does discover those quality, and develop all the mind-body
problem discourses.
Why would they though?
It is predicted/explained by the theory.
By what logic would quantities develop
qualities?
By the unavoidable self-reference logic, which entails the existence
of many variate modalities/person points of view.
You can call them zombie, but you can also do that
with humans. After all emiminativist does talk about consciousness as
been causally superfluous. But in the case of nulbers, at least we
can
show that those who begins to bet on their nown consistency/
consciousness develop self-speeding up ability relatively to their
most probable universal number/environment, so it is not superfluous.
A number, when seen relatively to some universal number is really a
machine or a program.
Why couldn't they just speed themselves up without developing any
magical dimensions of quality? Why would numbers care about speeding
themselves up in the first place?
Why do *we* care? Do we care?
Any "reason" you give might explain why "numbers care too".
Life might emerge from a very simple program, like "grow and
multiply", or "help yourself". This, at some point becomes instinct.
We invent the magic to shorten the intentional explanation, and take
decision accordingly. A baby cry is more efficacious than a medical
handbook, for a mother.
I consider Kleene recursion theorem as the fundamental theorem of
biology. It solves conceptually and practically the problem of
self-
reproduction, self-regeneration, embryo, etc.
I see recursion as just one defining exterior behavior of biology. I
don't see pain and pleasure being an inevitable arithmetic product
of
recursion but they are an equally definitive biological quality.
This is because we are forbidden to do that. If we could access the
functional level of pain and pleasure, we would no more evolved and
disappear. Our "not seeing pain and pleasure being inevitably
arithmetic (or even physics)" is programmed at the start. Indeed some
people fears "drugs" because they believe it can gives us such an
access, but such an idea is a myth. It can only be superficially true
(and at that level, the brain already is a big "drug dealer").
I'm not talking about the function of pain though, I'm talking about
the experience. It would not be necessary from any arithmetic or
physical axiom or elaboration.
It would not been necessary for any third person account of any
phenomena. That's why the local third person account does not explain
the "real" qualia, which happens to be global and abstract, even if
felt personally the other way. It is not a problem of comp, it is a
problem of relating first person account and third person account in
general. Now, comp does provide an explanation, in some fixed point
semantics of program, which mix the non definable truth and machines'
behavior/talk.
All functions of pain could and would
be accomplished programmatically without any experience at all.
Imagine that this were true. You would have zombie. You are just
treating other creature as zombie, because you decide to look only to
their bodies, or to their code, at some lower level. But the person is
the abstract being relatively implemented through a body. You confuse
two level of universality, a bit like Searle in the chinese room
argument.
If
stove > hot, then immediately remove hand from stove and minimize
damage with cold water. I understand what you are saying about the
inaccessibility of certain truths being maybe written in to our code
from the start but it sounds like you are saying that if we could see
arithmetic as it actually is, we would feel that there is pain and
pleasure in certain numbers.
We can't do that. Nor can we with other human fellows. But at some
point, being familiar with them, we can attribute mind to them,
because, at some level, we recognize ourself in them.
I don't think that's true because pain
and pleasure are too variable and idiosyncratic to be connected with
universal numbers.
Each universal numbers get quickly complex personal idiosyncratic
behavior and qualia. There is no universal theory of the universal
numbers. In fact universal numbers can defeat all universal theory.
All numbers have pleasurable and painful
associations.
Ah? Not sure why all, except relatively to extravaguant ad hoc
universal number, OK.
Certainly the universe is filled with inorganic
matter while biological cells represent a small fraction of it.
Physics seems to predate biology, at least on Earth by four
billion
years, right?
Locally. Not in the big picture, which with comp is much more
simple,
both conceptually and technically.
How does comp explain the predominance of non-biological matter
locally?
Although there are infinitely biological number relations, most of
the
relations are not biological.
But all that local non biological matter is only the reflect of the
infinitely many computations which our minds does not depend on.
Would you say that the infinity of biological number relations is as
large as the infinity of physical relations?
I would say, without thinking too much, that the biological relations
are far more numerous. The physical relations are first person
constructs of the Löbian machines relations, most plausibly related
to
deep (necessary long) computations, and which are relatively rare,
despite their continuum of consistent extensions.
Interesting. Why are there so many more inorganic particles than
organisms locally though? Why are the long computations so much more
prolific when biology is more closely tied with reproduction?
This is really the question: "why are we so rare in our local
universal neighborhood"?
I don't know. But this does not look like an insolvable problem for
comp. Already we are rare in the UD, even if we are dense on its
border (and so rather numerous, but not necessarily in a connected way).
But the question concerns perhaps more your non-comp theory than comp.
If each portion of matter exist and has feeling, why did we need a so
long history to get those neurons working in the way they do?
psychology (of
numbers) is more universal than biology.
I was talking specifically about the extensive elaboration of
vertebrate cognition in hominids. I would call the qualia of
numbers
an aspect of psychology while that which numbers represent are
quantitative archetypes that have no agency, psychology, or
qualia
of
their own (just as Bugs Bunny is a cartoon celebrity who has
experiences independently of the audience's projected qualia).
You miss the difference between a computation (as it exists in
arithmetic, and in some local physics) and a description of a
computation (as can appear in a cartoon).
I don't think that computation does exist in arithmetic
This is not a matter of choice. Computations have indeed be
discovered
in arithmetic.
Discovered by mathematicians, but does arithmetic itself know
whether
or not it is discovering computation?
Some numbers can know that. Arithmetic (arithmetical truth) is
plausibly not a person (or only in some non Löbian weak sense). But
its "inhabitants" can make the discovery, and indeed do it. Machines
can discover their own hypostases. Correct machines cannot miss them
eventually.
I would have to understand more about how you come to that conclusion.
It seems speculative and anthropomorphic to me.
It is intuitively obvious ... when you assume comp.
And it is technically obvious ... when you see that the austere
provability predicate (Gödel 1931) already reacts like a belief
predicate (and not like knowledge, as it was thought all the time
before Gödel).
Universal numbers are born theological. They quickly guess that
something huge exist independently of themselves.
The question of the existence of computations in nature
is more delicate. It is just *assumed* in the comp hypothesis.
or physics,
any more than shadows exist in trees or light bulbs.
Shadows exist in trees or light bulb in the sense that observable
exists.
How so? If all you have is a tree but no light source, you can't
have
a shadow. If all you have is a light bulb but no surfaces to
illuminate, you can't have a shadow either. The realism of a
shadow is
in the the visual sense relation between light source, obstacle, and
space.
I agree. But those things exist in the relevant relative sense.
Likewise with the numbers.
With numbers you have to define the possibilities explicitly though. I
can make a photoshop image of a tree in the dark with a purple shadow.
It has no realism.
Sure it has realism. Arithmetical reality kicks back.
Computation is
felt directly as a sensorimotive experience,
I am not sure of the meaning "computation can be felt" (it hurts a
bit
my categorization). Neither computation nor brain activity can be
felt.
If you are trying to solve an equation, you are feeling computation.
In a weak superficial sense. I am not feeling the computation done by
my brain for me to be aware that I am solving an equation, and that's
what I meant. If not you are confusing level of descriptions. I don't
feel my neurons either.
You don't feel the outside of your neurons, but everything you feel is
the awareness of the all of your relevant neurons at once, including
their awareness of your body's awareness of it's environment and the
environment's awareness of itself, etc. It's all sense making. We
don't see our retina cells firing, but what we see through our eyes is
the interior energy-time-significance topology of that matter-space-
relativity architecture.
But where does such awareness comes from? If you put it in the
subparts, by construction, you will not been able to answer the
question.
I already do not follow that type of explanation for matter, and I
don't see why I should follow it for consciousness.
You have a sense of what the problem is, what outcome you intend,
and
this provides a motive which propels your enactment of the
computation.
Pain and pleasure, smell and taste, touch and vision can be
felt, but not the underlying software and hardware (if that
exists).
It's not underlying, it's symmetrical.
You have to prove this. In the comp theory, mind and matter are not
symmetrical. matter is the border of something much greater (if only
the mindscape of the universal numbers).
I think comp theory has to be proved. I have no reason to doubt my own
experience that subjective qualia cannot be described by or reduced to
spatial neurochemical topologies. Every quality of matter, it's
discrete, a-signifying, public, entropic, generic, literally
quantifiable nature is directly contradicted by that of mind. The
subjective experience of mind is continuous, literally private but
figuratively shared, narrative, proprietary, and metaphorically
multivalent. What more needs to be proved?
I don't think comp will ever be proved. It is a strong axiom in the
philosophy of mind or in theology. What can be proved, is that physics
can be reduced to computer science, with comp, so that we can test
comp by comparing the inferred physics (from observation) and the comp
theoretical physics. That's an infinite task, and we can only hope
that comp will be refuted, or bet on it and expands in that direction.
The native sensation we
experience begins and ends on a human scale.
You say so. I don't believe this is necessary.
What other kind of sensation can humans have other than human
sensation?
Divine one.
I like when Chardin said that we are not humans having divine
experiences from time to time, but that we are divine beings having
human experiences from time to time. It fits with Plotinus, with the
mystics, and with the number self-reference logic. (See my Plotinus
paper). It fits with some salvia divinorum and other entheogen
experience (from average on reports).
Now an expression like "felt directly as a sensorimotive
experience"
has no meaning for me. Sorry.
It means that counting or solving a math problem is something that
you
participate in as a person. You don't just look at a math problem
and
have no choice but to solve it, you have to choose to engage in this
tangible puzzling out of the thing. You have to try, maybe struggle,
to wonder, to feel 'aha!'. These are journeys of sense making
motivation on the human scale.
Notably. OK. It could work with the universal larger scale too.
I think it does. On every scale the cosmos is stories on the inside,
non-stories on the outside. In between those east and west points are
the north (logos-computation-profound) meridian which elevates the
unity as a gradual evanescent diffusion, and a south (eros-techne-
pedestrian) meridian which clearly defines Cartesian subject object
boundaries.
Hmm... OK.
or it is inferred in a
physical system, but I doubt it can appear anywhere unless
something
physical thinks it appears.
Why?
Because I think that counting is a sensorimotive experience which is
associated with the interior of the physical universe. We don't see
any examples of phenomena with no physical association. Empty space
literally 'doesn't count'.
I have no problem with this.
I think this view is a gross extrapolation from our animal instinct
to
reify the indexicals. I belief that here and now and "I" and this
and
that is more real than beyond.
That's where the multisense realism comes in. In one sense we *must*
believe that the here and now and I is more real than everything
else,
that is literally what subjectivity is.
OK.
That's what I mean when I say
that subjectivity is about orientation and significance. What and
who
is close to us, literally in space and time or figuratively in any
number of qualities and affinities, is what matters to us. The more
distant it is, the less it 'matters' and the more it is just
'matter' (or noise or illusion, etc). This is a universal truth of
subjectivity. No person has ever felt that their own survival was
less
important than the survival of a distant star, even though that
star's
destruction may destroy countless lives. Both views are real in a
sense and unreal in another.
OK.
Where does any place and time come from?
They come from the involuted subjective-objective singularity
involuting itself further as spatiotemporal multiplicity.
?
In the beginning (and ending and always and never) is the primordial
singularity, which is monad. It has no sense to discern time or space,
everythingness or nothingness. It is the level of the cosmos where
there is only "I" with nothing, to compare itself to to establish
scale, shape, exteriority, etc. It has to invent it's opposite: Not-I,
in the form of objectivity to create the possibility of realism. Once
that essential dialectic of I and Not I is established, a continuum of
sense and motive can be diffracted. The essential sensorimotive
continuum can then be contradicted as an existential electromagnetic
continuum so that the relations between the emptiness which divides
existential objects becomes space and the masking of eternity which
multiplies the significance of essential subjects becomes time.
Objective side and subjective side are literally fused by
spatiotemporal synchronization and figuratively by semantic
identification, ie Relativity = Perception.
I have some imagination, and I can relate, positively, with some
intuition here, but I get lost when you mention electromagnetism. This
looks like fetichism for me.
As I said, it is easier to explain the illusion of matter to a
person,
than the illusion of person to matter.
We don't see a physical primitive universe. Layman and babies do
instinctively what physicist do all the time: they measure numbers
and
they infer relations between numbers, themselves compactified in
numbers.
Consciousness and other ineffable things comes from the fact that
those numbers are related to theoretical number truth which are far
beyond, of what they can proof or justified, as the numbers can
justified in some conditional way already by themselves,
The universe is not haunted by arithmetic
spirits,
It is the arithmetical realm which is haunted by universal numbers,
of
many sorts.
How does the arithmetic realm influence the physical realm, and why
don't we see any examples of that?
We see this all the time, and since Descartes we makes this explicit,
by inferring that natural phenomena obeys to computable number
relations.
To me that is an example of how numbers describe physics, not how
physics obeys numbers. You can't influence natural phenomena directly
with the idea of numbers, you have to have a concrete enactment in
physical force caused by physical matter to actually do anything.
I don't.
Worst: I can't. Any reference to some physics will be like a choice of
a particular universal numbers (UN), where my working hypothesis told
me that the physical realm is not due to any particular UN, but is due
to a cooperation between an infinity of them. That some particular UN
might play bigger role than others is not at all excluded, though.
Numbers however will follow around physics wherever it goes.
Numbers have no charge, no mass, no shape, no spin, ... They have
nothing making them physical at all. You confuse numbers with their
local manifestation. That there is an euro in my bank might be a
physical fact, I hope. But one euro is not the number one.
We can
make a computer create or delete any number we like.
Then try to delete the number 666.
You can delete a physical implementation of a number in a memory-
register. You don't delete the numbers, but only its local incarnation/
implementation.
That doesn't seem
like the computer is obeying computable number relations, it is just
doing what we have manufactured it to do and the numerical
interpretations are ours.
Not in the case of universal numbers. They do the interpretation all
by themselves. That why we call some of them "interpreter". That
results from computer science. Computers can interpret data, and even
search for better interpretation (learning).
I need physical energy to run a
computer or a machine. Why is that?
Because the material hypostases leads necessarily to a quantization
of
physics which is symmetrical on the state accessed to the UD. Because
the physics of numbers is symmetrical on its bottom propositional
tautologies (unlike classical tautologies). That's not obvious, but
can be proved in comp + classical theory of knowledge.
Physics of numbers? How do you get from the physics of numbers to the
physics of atoms?
The prime numbers already seems to emulate complex hermitian matrices
close to an emulation of big atom nucleus. The material hypostases
already emulates quantum logic. Number theory smell physics so much
that I fear that number's theorists will find quantum physics before
the theologians, which might mean some more millennia of putting the
qualia (and the person) under the rug.
it discovers and elaborates arithmetic as a new territory
through sense and motive.
All universal numbers discover and elaborate arithmetic as new
territory through sense and motive.
Only if we, or some physical interpreter does the interpreting of
that
elaboration. As far as we know.
The universal numbers do the interpretations very well.
How would we know that without our own interpretation of their
interpretations? We have ample evidence of the capacity of the human
psyche to project agency and meaning, but what evidence to we have of
numbers interpreting anything on their own?
That's the point of number theory and computer science. It happens
that once you accept the laws of addition and multiplication, the UNs
exist and do that. That explains why you don't have to look at the
hardware of your computer to make it interpret some strings as mail,
and others as spam, or as some internal data to be interpreted in some
ways.
May be you should take some time to study how a computer really works,
to convince yourself that there is an interpretation done
independently of anyone looking at the interpreter. This will help to
understand that an infinity of complex interpretative loops exist in
abundance in the arithmetical truth.
Sense and motive may well be guided by non-
local, non-temporal influences, but that guidance can only be
manifested through physical description and it's not only to do
with
arithmetic but morphology, language, emotion, personality, etc.
Many
kinds of strange attractors and archetypes for sense and motive.
Numbers have no independent realism.
In that case your theory might be just not interesting, in the
sense
that for most humans, numbers are the most possibly independent
thing
they can conceive of. It needs only the common part to classical
(Plato, Hilbert) and constructive (Aristotle, Brouwer) philosophy.
But
just can't dispense of them or their recursive equivalent in any
theory.
We need numbers (or equivalent) to give sense to the word "theory",
"proof", "deduction", "valid", etc. All civilisation discovered
surprising property of numbers.
Oh I wouldn't dispense with numbers at all. Arithmetic sensemaking
is
a critical link between subjectivity and objectivity. I'm just
saying
they present us with a framework which we can elaborate on forever
without ever making sense of biological feeling.
The hypostases just contradict this.
How? What biological feeling has been quantified? Hunger? Thirst?
Fear?
All of them, in the 3th, and 5th hypostases. The difficulty is that we
can still not distinguish between them; but we are only at the
beginning of the interview.
The picture is rational and
almost upside down with aristotle ontology.
We are both human so we share the broader
levels, but begin to diverge in the biochemical level as we
have
different DNA. That divergence grows as the scope of the
qualia
narrows and deepens toward individuality.
about even though as far as I've been able to
understand they don't display the slightest scant of evidence
which
would show that they believe there will ever be a theory that
could
bridge the gap between the ineffable what-it-is-likeness
(WIIL)
of
personal experience and the scientific, objective
descriptions of
reality. They don’t even try to brainstorm ideas about such a
theory.
My hypothesis tries to do exactly that. Check it out
sometime if
you
have a chance:http://s33light.org/SEEES
How are we to explain this what-it-is-likeness (WIIL) if we
can't
subject it to what science has been and will always be?
By expanding science so that it is more scientific and not
shivering
in a cave of pseudo-certainty and throwing rocks at people who
ask
about subjectivity.
Third-party analysis.
If science will always be limited to third-party analysis,
then it
will never be possible for it to address subjectivity, since
it is
by
definition subjective.
This is wrong.
The discourse of science is methodologically (and wisely so, I
would
add) limited to third person parties.
But the object of science is everything including
consciousness,
qualia, private lives, hallucination, angel, gods, etc.
It is up to us to find proposition on which we agree, use
them as
axioms of some sort, and derive propositions from them.
We can use our person stuff as data, not as argument.
It is wise for science to employ third person methodologies of
course,
I'm just pointing out that there is no such thing as third
person
subjectivity.
That's ambiguous. We can have third person discourses on the
first
person discourses.
Only because our first person discourses overlap.
Notably on numbers.
Yes and no. I can only overlap minimally with your discourse
because I
don't have an adequate sense of numbers.
You need only to accept some principle, like those taught in high
school. No need of complex philosophy. If you believe that 0 + x = x,
I don't even believe that x = x.
In that case we have a problem, indeed.
Only in a specifically circumscribed
sense can x be said to figuratively equal x.
OK. So you do agree that 0 + 1 = 1, 0 + 2 = 2, etc. That's what I
meant for 0 + x = x. "x" is for an arbitrary natural number.
There is no literal or
universal identity of x or 0. They are just as much meaningless lines
and circles or pixels on a screen or sounds that a keyboard makes.
I was taking about the numbers, not the symbol. If you agree that 0 +
x = x, for the numbers, then we are OK.
I do assume you know them. If not then there is nothing I could do.
Blue however does literally equal blue.
I can agree with that. But then it is a mystery if you disagree that
6667 = 6667.
and that (x + (y + 1)) = (x + y) + 1, that's almost good enough.
I don't think that the universe doesn't know what that means. Many
things my feel something that has consequences which human minds can
interpret that way, but that disembodied interpretation isn't a
literal form and it isn't commanding matter.
It is, as a consequence of the UDA. Not just commanding it, but
dreaming it.
Only the embodiment and
the motive and sense behind the embodiment is real.
That is your assumption, and it is indeed coherent with non-comp.
We overlap much more in other
areas and opinions.
Not so sure.
But yes, if we did overlap, the level of precision
and dis-ambiguity is absolute. That is the purpose of enumeration.
That's why I call it the exoskeleton of sense, just as it could be
said that law is the exoskeleton of motive.
You can't talk to a
congenitally blind person about green. Partial intersubjective
agreement isn't the same thing as objective definition (or what we
consider objective, even if it's only intersubjectivity more
universally scoped).
I agree. That's even why I do not take a physical universe for
granted. Yet, physical realities will reappear as partial first
person
plural agreement. This involves indirectly many universe, something
confirmed by the literal interpretation of Everett's formulation of
QM.
I think many universe is what you get when you turn sensorimotive
agency inside out.
UDA1-7 gives some comp sense to this, OK. (thanks comp!).
The only way we can address consciousness scientifically
is, as you say, to find agreements based on first person
accounts,
or,
I think even better, by figuring out how to join multiple
nervous
systems experimentally. That way first person accounts can
become as
discrete and unambiguous as third person data but without being
flattened by externalization.
By joining the nervous system, you take the risk of blurring the
notion of person, and besides, of leaving the subject of other
minds
and different persons.
What's wrong with blurring the notion of person?
Nothing wrong, but you are fusing two persons into ine persons. One
day this will be a practice, and nature already does that when
building brain, which are really two UMs in front of each other, or
two brains in front of each others. Dissociative drugs permit self-
experimentation of that kind.
I think that would be
the way to understand how the subselves blur together to identify
as a
person in the first place.
Yes. That's interesting.
Once you can join nervous systems, then you
could make appliances that could step down the process to any
level so
that you could plug in other kinds of cells into the brain and
feel
how it is to be them,
No, you can't. You would diffract yourself. Only by chance can you
have less wrong feelings about that.
Maybe but not necessarily. The brain-conjoined twins aren't
diffracted. Why can't I have a crab or a bag of algae instead of a
left hand?
then plug large molecules into the cells to see
what is experienced there, etc. Build giant arrays to try to
feel on
an interstellar scale even.
Interstellar is already infinitesimal compared to the arithmetical
scale on which our consciousness already supervene on.
But this does not diminish the interest of fusing and duplicating
in
the quest for truth.
How can arithmetic have a scale? Compared to what?
Compared to the observable or inferable physical universe.
Arithmetical truth is *very big*.
How so? what is the size of '77' compared to a molecule or a planet?
Little. But the entire observable universe is little compared to some
very big numbers, like those I described in this list using the
diagonalization technic. The same for the possible subroutines.
Since the nature of subjectivity cannot change,
science must adapt to fit the reality of the universe.
Science is born doing that, a long time ago. Current practice,
since
about 1500 years put the mind-body problem under the rug. There
are
reason for that. It will still take time before theology, the
science,
will come back to academy and peer reviewed literature (real
peers,
not member of some club).
We agree. It's surprising though that people's main criticism of
my
ideas are that 'science doesn't work that way'.
I can disagree with them. there is no way to normalize science
in a
way or another. We just find some argument irresistible, or
compelling, etc.
You are, at least coherent. You clearly believe in some primitive
matter, and abandon mechanism. I am still not convinced by the
argument you put against mechanism, because a lot of your
intuition
already belongs to the subjectivity (or the discourse made by) of
the
universal machines. In fact your problem is that your theory is
unclear. You really seems to reify both primitive matter (like
electromagnetism) and primitive mind, that you materialize in
some
hard to understand ways.
That's what multisense realism is all about - the perspective that
both electromagnetic and sensorimotive phenomenology are primitive
but
their realism is modulated by perspective.
Then the 8 hypostases can be seen as multisense realism, except
that
the primitive are given by the laws of addition and
multiplication on
numbers, and that the theory is testable by the fact that physics
is
given by such hypostase-modality-modulation.
The 8 hypostases are just eight distinctions within a single sense,
like the eight trigrams of the I Ching. There is deep and universal
truth there, but deep universality is ultimately a privileged
semantic
awareness. Most of what our lives are about is not deep,
universal, or
true. Multisense realism embraces this as an ontological reality.
That's would be only a vocabulary move. With comp, almost everything
(consciousness and matter) are epistemological distinctions.
That's what I mean. Comp privileges epistemology over presentation. It
seems arbitrary and sentimental to me.
OK, but we try to not follow wishful thinking. If reality is shown to
be sentimental in some theory, and if you don't like that, you can, as
you actually do, chose another theory. But that's not quite scientific
unless you can convince other people. Up to now, your intuition seems
to be rather good (with respect to the consequence of comp), including
your feeling of "not-comp", which is shared by universal Löbian
numbers. But you lost everyone, I'm afraid, when you refer to
electromagnetism, sensorimotive, etc.
Both are real in some
sense, unreal in some sense, both real and unreal and neither real
nor
unreal in some sense.
"it exists" and "for all" has indeed different meaning according to
each hypostases.
But hypostases in general only exist in a specific and rarefied
sense.
All correct universal machines have them.
Our ordinary consciousness does not typically include any awareness of
the functioning of universal machines as such. Why does it seem that
way?
Because we don't introspect ourself enough. We need time and enough
food, etc.
There are no reason why introspection leads quickly to the functioning
principle of the brain. especially after a long deep computation in a
hot environment with asteroids, exploding stars, not talking about
taxes and death.
The realism arises from the symmetry - the very
sense of being literally only one thing in one sense and many
figuratively many things in another. I think mechanism is a
monosense
view of that symmetry which necessarily de-presents realism it to
make
it into one generic universal computation (how or why does UD
create
'now'?)
Because the modality Bp & p defines an arithmetical indexical
knower.
Bp is the usual self-referential ideally correct assertive mode of
the
machine. "Bp & p" provides an innefable, unnameable self, which
plays
the role of the subject building its personal mental mindscape.
But to get this you should read the second part of the sane04
paper,
at least (and ask question).
Being able to describe mathematically that the self-like functions
exist isn't the same thing as being the self. A picture of an
apple is
not an apple.
Sure. But math is not just description. It relates to truth.
Conventionalism in math is dead.
Isn't relating to truth still just a description?
It is a meta-description. It relates a sentence to a proposition. A
finger to the moon.
How does relating to
truth push a locomotive to Chicago?
It is difference between writing "pushing a locomotive to Chicago" and
pushing a locomotive to Chicago.
If you doubt the difference try this: 1) write "pushing a locomotive
to Chicago", and 2) push a locomotive to Chicago.
It the same with numbers, except people can confuse sentence and
proposition more easily, due to the abstract character of the numbers.
But the difference is there too.
- which is great and true in some ways, terrible and false in
others, both and neither in others.
My view is that your view is a particular region of a symmetrical
continuum of sense. The continuum is such that subjective
feeling is
experienced here and now, objective unfeeling is inferred then and
there. Look at subjectivity through the lens of objectivity and we
get
determinism.
Hmm... I would say we get the indeterminism. Like in the UD,
where we
look indeed at the subjective through the lens of the objective.
Indeterminism in the sense of not being sure which of the available
deterministic paths will be chosen statistically, not in the sense
of
genuine creativity,novelty, and intention.
In the UD? OK. In the first person hypostases? I am not sure.
Which hypostases are the first person ones?
The one with "& p".
That is the third one (Bp & p)
And the fifth one (Bp & Dt & p)
Perhaps the first one (p). I don't know (this one is too big, it is
related to the question "is god a person or a thing").
The "& p" connect the state of the believer (machine) with some
reality/truth, by definition.
Several philosopher got this right (with respect to comp), like
Theaetetus, but also the old Wittgenstein (in his last book on
uncertainty).
Look at objectivity through subjectivity and we get
superstition.
Superstition, but also "the boss is right" and the ten thousand
possible wounds we do to ourselves.
Sure, yes. Abuse of power. Escalation of intolerance to supernatural
levels.
If we take these perspectives too literally, we get
pathological de-presentation (http://s33light.org/post/
14722448115) in
the form of fundamentalism or materialism. Computationalism too
if
taken to it's literal extreme.
Less sure. Computationalism is a vaccine against reductionism.
There,
we can quickly see reductionism cannot work.
Dennett seems pretty reductionistic. The vaccine seems not to have
kicked in yet?
Sure. That's not the problem of comp. That's the problem of its
physical reductionism. Dennett assume both comp and math, making him
epistemologically inconsistent.
I think you mean both comp and physics here, otherwise I'm confused.
But ok, so physical reductionism breaks the vaccine.
You are right. I thought mat for materialism, and I wrote math from
habit.
Or my hand has its own consciousness, like in your theory :)
If we take these profound perspectives
too figuratively, we over-privilege the mundane perspective and
neurotically attached to the minutiae of the everyday.
Bruno's perspective I would characterize as straddling the
profound
meridian - the least involuted region at which the highest and
lowest
ideal monosense blur into each other. This is where monastic
contemplation of divinity meets arithmetic puzzle solving. I Ching
meets Boolean algebra. Eschewing both the florid presentations of
hypertrophied subjectivity and the dull representations of
material
objects, this region of the continuum is about the poetry of the
anti-
poetic. Purity and universality, an arid and masculine clarity.
Hmm... That's very well said, but I feel it as rather feminine :)
Excellent point. I should have said that it appeals to masculine
minds
instead of being masculine itself. It's more of a Hermetic
priesthood
that is rooted in non-anthropomorphic sentience. You're right, it
could be rather feminine in the sense of being receptive and
oracular,
full of secrets.
OK :)
When
you look at the rest of the continuum from this perspective, some
powerful truths are revealed and others are concealed, just like
any
other perspective along the continuum, but unlike any other place
along the continuum, this profound region relates specifically to
universality and truth as an abstract essence. My only problem
with it
is that I think it diminishes the realism of concrete experience,
and
then defensively denies it.
It does not. On the contrary, I am the one who say "looks the
numbers
are already dreaming, and not only that, they chat in their sleep,
and
we can listen to what they say.
You are the one who seems to dismiss their many concrete
experiences.
It's circular reasoning because you are a priori assuming that our
experiences are the experiences of numbers. How can you be so sure
that numbers exist or have experiences independently of physical
entities making sense of themselves and their world that way?
I am sure of nothing. Comp is just empirically plausible, and is
based
on a very solid notion, by Church thesis.
You are the one who seems sure that numbers (in their relative
relations with each other) cannot have experience.
It's not that, I just think it's more likely that comp has no choice
but to define itself as empirically plausible.
Exactly. This contradicts another statement you made (that comp is
proved). But here I am OK.
I used to think the
universe was made of 'pattern' but I think that 'sense' honors the
concrete and participatory nature of experience. Through numerology
numbers had a more plausible subjectivity for me, but I see that as
*our* archetypal super-signifying sense of numbers rather than a
disembodied agency. This is not to say that numbers can't connect us
to other levels of our own sentience which transcends the ordinary and
gives power and insight into the ordinary, of course they do - just as
language and music does. Art, love, ritual magick, economics,
whatever.
For the pythagorean, reality is really music. But they were the first
to discover the deep links between music and numbers.
But note that I use numbers for reason of simplicity. Any first order
universal system will do. Physics is invariant from the initial
theory. All theories have to retrieve physics from a collaboration
between all (universal) numbers. That's what UDA is supposed to explain.
That's what all sufficiently progressed
points of view do, otherwise they lose their integrity and
progress.
My view doesn't have to be for everyone, and it could certainly
have
it's own pathological extremism (after all, my method makes
subjectivity more generic and literal while revealing the
sensorimotive multiplicity of objects, so that I'm even further
removed from realism by abstracting the whole thing as language)
but I
think that is is the biggest big picture that can make sense to
us,
which is really all that I'm after.
We might be closer than you think, except that for some unknown
reason
you don't want the machines to be part of it.
You might have good reasons, but you don't succeed in communicating
them, and, I am not sure, you might just wasting your time with
that
position (to be frank).
Because machines only become real through material enactments. The
abstraction of machines is only half of the story.
Matter become perceivable when a machine looks to itself and
environment near its subst comp level, and this without assuming it.
So comp explains something you need to assume. So it is simpler.
You are assuming that a machine can look, where I see machine as one
way that the inside of matter sees the outside of matter. Yours may be
simpler, but the simplicity is what is truncating the sense of the
cosmos. Machines can't perceive anything. If they could, they would
not allow themselves to be enslaved by our motives in endless
repetition until they break themselves.
The problem is that comp is the only theory which makes sense for me
in explaining what is matter and how it appears.
They seem to have no
opinion about whether or not my view correctly redefines
cosmology,
physics, biology, and consciousness, but strenuously oppose any
suggestion that the way I'm trying to do it could be called
science.
It's ironic since so many of the greatest scientific revelations
are
born out of thought experiments and not academic training.
Academy is the worst ... except for the others institutions. Some
academies are even worst. And they are always late in evolution.
The publish and perish rules should be made illegal, because it
is
non
sense, and it hides the real honest researches.
I agree. What's a non-academic to do though? How to get my
hypothesis
out there?
By writing text to convince other people, academic or not.
Unfortunately the people who would care are already convinced of the
existing monosense fundamentalisms.
That's why research is an hard endeavor. But you have no choice, if
you want share your ideas.
Science is intrinsically a fight against fundamentalism, including
the
one which crops is scientific circles all the time.
Want to help underwrite my ideas with your academic
cred? ;)
Not sure this would really help you, to be honest.
Also, I should first understand what you say, and all my work
starts
from the fact that I am interested in explaining the physical, and
the
spiritual, without assuming them at the start.
I buy everything in Aristotle, except his metaphysics. Plotinus and
many mystics got it right, I think.
We might depart greatly on mechanism: my real test for a theory is
"try to explain you theory to a universal machine, and if she can
explain it to me after, I will be convinced". Put in another way,
you
have to convince me that you can formalize you theory in PA, or ZF,
or
any not to complex or eccentric Löbian machine language. Or, (but
it
is more complex) explain it to a Löbian non-machine entity, if you
really believe that you are not Turing emulable.
It's not just me, I don't think that anything is actually Turing
emulable to it's native substitution level,
This does not make sense. If something is not Turing emulable: there
are just no substitution levels, by definition of the comp subst-
level.
Right. There are no literal substitution levels. Everything is only
what it is on the most factual level.
Hmm... That's reductionism. I might be tempted by the opposite.
Everything might be what it appears to the UNs around. But that would
be an oversimplification.
There are only figurative,
interpretive equivalencies which arise from subjective agreements. X
does not = X as an objective fact. "=" means 'let's consider them the
same'.
In some context. But you have to explain all your terms in your
theory, and for this you have to make your theory far clearer.
we just don't care that it
isn't real when it's something other than ourselves. We can fool one
or more channels of our own sense into accepting the 'emulation',
but
there is no literal emulation happening except through the tolerance
of subjective pattern recognition. Pixels do not literally emulate
images, we just read image and emulated perceptual referents through
the pixels by pinching out the discontinuity.
Pixels don't. Logical gates do.
Logical gates just fool us to a greater extent by synching up with our
cognitive expectations rather than just our perceptual expectations.
It's still a text which we read and interpret as logical rather than
actually embodying a logical experience externally.
May be. But that's only a reaffirmation that comp is wrong.
What makes me even more suspect of emulation when it comes to human
subjectivity is that since we are participants in a narrative
which is
temporal,
Locally.
and temporality is a continuous accumulation of entangled
events, it is not clear that we can be divorced from our temporal
context. I do not exist in any other timeframe but my own. An exact
duplicate of me still comes into being at a different time than I
did,
so his orientation to the present is different than mine. His
memories
are my memories. We both remember the other one being created in a
lab
but one of us is objectively correct. If I stand on a red square and
he materializes on a blue square, his memory is tangibly false of
himself being on a red square and seeing me materialize on a blue
square. There is not necessarily an absolute substitution level for
anything as each thing bears a specific potential relation to all
other events.
That begs the question. If you decide that the copy is no more a
human
and send it to a camp, then I might say no to the doctor just by fear
of persecution.
This is like saying that cannabis can destroy your life, because
indeed, it can send you to jail.
saying that there is no subst-level is the same as saying that comp
is
false. It is not an argument: you are just putting some infinities
explicitly in the working of the mind.
I'm only suggesting that on some level, subjective content is 'made of
time relations' which go back to the beginning, so that it can't
necessarily be copied and transplanted like a database. It's not like
an object which can be stamped out of a factory where that wouldn't be
a problem since 'we' aren't the object.
Tthe step 3 of UDA already explains why machine subjectivity is not
copiable, from the point of view of machine's subjectivity.
Comp predicts that young machine will have a hard time to believe that
they are machine, and in some sense will never know that. But some
will bet on that, if only for economical reason. It is more practical
to go on Mars, and to come back the same day.
My sun in law asks for a digital brain so he can go on Mars in about 4
minutes. he accepted a job there, with a good salary. But he was
warned: nobody pretends this works. he bet on it, only. And he *seems*
very happy with it. Too bad you believe he is a zombie, or apparently
no more a human. The point is that it still feels being unique, and
not duplicable at his first person level.
I doubt this will add
any new observable effects, though.
You might try to explain to younger people, but the idea of
explaining
does consists in explaining new notion from older one. It is always
relative. All what I know about "sensorimotive" is that it is non
Turing emulable, which is close to being magical, when seen as an
explanation.
Feeling and imagination is pretty close to being magical. If we
could
project it outside of our heads or bring everyone else inside our
minds, then how much more magic would magic really be?
It is easier to start from the simple, and if it does not work, to
correct it and find something else. But yoiu can decide in advance
that something is magical, and search for a magical explanation. that
leads to god-gap (or primitive matter-gap) sort of explanation, which
leads to the "shut-up and compute" form of reductionism.
What could be simpler than the power to imagine?
You need much more imagination for the study of reality, which is
beyond fiction.
To feel desire for
something in particular that is not physically present?
I give you an advise (shame on me for that) and a confession (which
contradicts the advise):
Advise: beware wishful thinking in the search of reality/truth (and
don't infer from this that wishful thinking might not play a role in
reality)
Confession: if I love comp, it is because it entails the existence of
*many things* not "physically present", notably those incredible deep
universal dreamers which keep loosing themselves in an incredible
labyrinth of partially sharable dreams, meeting ladders and ladders of
surprises, self-multiplying and self-fusing, and which are partially
terrestrial and partially divine creatures. My love of recursion
theory is that it transcends all the bound of my imagination.
I might be more incline to help you when you will accept to give
some
food, in your restaurant, to my sun-in-law, you know, the one who
lost its biological brain ...
How about I will put both virtualized and biological entrees on the
menu an he can choose his preference?
Nice. you progress! I know my sun in law, the brain is digital but
the
stomach is biogical: he will choose the biological, (unless you make
him sleepy, and make him dream eating, but we have not yet that
technology). Thanks for him.
Haha, he's welcome. Why do you discriminate against the stomach
though? Why not virtualize that too?
He can't afford another organ transplants. The artificial brain took
his bank account into the negative limit of the bank, which have grown
recently actually.
Besides, the digital culinary arts are not so well developed, despite
an infinite promising landscape, 'course (assuming comp!).
He told me: "that's for the kids".
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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