2012/1/14 Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> > Thought I'd throw this out there. If computationalism argues that > zombies can't exist, therefore anything that we cannot distinguish > from a conscious person must be conscious, that also means that it is > impossible to create something that acts like a person which is not a > person. Zombies are not Turing emulable. >
No, zombies *that are persons in every aspect* are impossible. Not only not turing emulable... they are absurd. > > If we run the zombie argument backwards then, at what substitution > level of zombiehood does a (completely possible) simulated person > become an (non-Turing emulable) unconscious puppet? How bad of a > simulation does it have to be before becoming an impossible zombie? > > This to me reveals an absurdity of arithmetic realism. Pinocchio the > boy is possible to simulate mechanically, but Pinocchio the puppet is > impossible. You conflate two (mayve more) notions of zombie... the only one important in the "zombie argument" is this: something that act like a person ****in every aspects*** but nonetheless is not conscious... If it is indeed what you mean, then could you devise a test that could show that the zombie indeed lacks consciousness (remember that *by definition* you cannot tell apart the zombie and a "real" conscious person). Quentin > Doesn't that strike anyone else as an obvious deal breaker? > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
