2012/1/14 Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>
> Thought I'd throw this out there. If computationalism argues that
> zombies can't exist, therefore anything that we cannot distinguish
> from a conscious person must be conscious, that also means that it is
> impossible to create something that acts like a person which is not a
> person. Zombies are not Turing emulable.
No, zombies *that are persons in every aspect* are impossible. Not only not
turing emulable... they are absurd.
> If we run the zombie argument backwards then, at what substitution
> level of zombiehood does a (completely possible) simulated person
> become an (non-Turing emulable) unconscious puppet? How bad of a
> simulation does it have to be before becoming an impossible zombie?
> This to me reveals an absurdity of arithmetic realism. Pinocchio the
> boy is possible to simulate mechanically, but Pinocchio the puppet is
You conflate two (mayve more) notions of zombie... the only one important
in the "zombie argument" is this: something that act like a person ****in
every aspects*** but nonetheless is not conscious... If it is indeed what
you mean, then could you devise a test that could show that the zombie
indeed lacks consciousness (remember that *by definition* you cannot tell
apart the zombie and a "real" conscious person).
> Doesn't that strike anyone else as an obvious deal breaker?
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All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.
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