On 16 Jan 2012, at 07:52, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2012/1/16 Craig Weinberg <[email protected]>
On Jan 15, 3:07 pm, Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]> wrote:
> 2012/1/14 Craig Weinberg <[email protected]>
>
> > Thought I'd throw this out there. If computationalism argues that
> > zombies can't exist, therefore anything that we cannot distinguish
> > from a conscious person must be conscious, that also means that
it is
> > impossible to create something that acts like a person which is
not a
> > person. Zombies are not Turing emulable.
>
> No, zombies *that are persons in every aspect* are impossible. Not
only not
> turing emulable... they are absurd.
If you define them that way then the word has no meaning. What is a
person in every aspect that is not at all a person?
The *only thing* a zombie lacks is consciousness... every other
aspects of a persons, it has it.
That is right. People should not confuse the Hollywood zombie and the
"philosophical zombie" which are 3p-identical to human person, but
lack any 1-p perspective.
Note also that Turing invented his test to avoid the philosophical
hard issue of consciousness. In a nutshell Turing defines
"consciousness" by "having an intelligent behavior". The Turing test
is equivalent with a type of "no zombie" principle.
It is like saying that if zombie exist, you have to treat them as
human being, because we cannot know if they are zombie.
The only way the
term has meaning is when it is used to define something that appears
to be a person in every way to an outside observer (and that would
ultimately have to be a human observer) but has no interior
experience. That is not absurd at all, and in fact describes
animation, puppetry, and machine intelligence.
Puppetries, animations do not act like a person. They act like
puppetries, animations. A philosophical zombie *acts like a person
but lacks consciousness*.
Exactly.
Bruno
>
>
>
> > If we run the zombie argument backwards then, at what substitution
> > level of zombiehood does a (completely possible) simulated person
> > become an (non-Turing emulable) unconscious puppet? How bad of a
> > simulation does it have to be before becoming an impossible
zombie?
>
> > This to me reveals an absurdity of arithmetic realism. Pinocchio
the
> > boy is possible to simulate mechanically, but Pinocchio the
puppet is
> > impossible.
>
> You conflate two (mayve more) notions of zombie... the only one
important
> in the "zombie argument" is this: something that act like a person
****in
> every aspects*** but nonetheless is not conscious... If it is
indeed what
> you mean, then could you devise a test that could show that the
zombie
> indeed lacks consciousness (remember that *by definition* you
cannot tell
> apart the zombie and a "real" conscious person).
No, I think that I have a workable and useful notion of zombie. I'm
not sure how the definition you are trying use is meaningful. It seems
like a straw man of the zombie issue. We already know that
subjectivity is private, what we don't know is whether that means that
simulations automatically acquire consciousness or not. The zombie
issue is not to show that we can't imagine a person without
subjectivity and see that as evidence that subjectivity must
inherently arise from function. My point is that it also must mean
that we cannot stop inanimate objects from acquiring consciousness if
they are a sufficiently sophisticated simulation.
Craig
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]
.
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
.
--
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]
.
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
[email protected].
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
