2012/1/16 Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> > > On Jan 15, 3:07 pm, Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]> wrote: > > 2012/1/14 Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> > > > > > Thought I'd throw this out there. If computationalism argues that > > > zombies can't exist, therefore anything that we cannot distinguish > > > from a conscious person must be conscious, that also means that it is > > > impossible to create something that acts like a person which is not a > > > person. Zombies are not Turing emulable. > > > > No, zombies *that are persons in every aspect* are impossible. Not only > not > > turing emulable... they are absurd. > > If you define them that way then the word has no meaning. What is a > person in every aspect that is not at all a person?
The *only thing* a zombie lacks is consciousness... every other aspects of a persons, it has it. > The only way the > term has meaning is when it is used to define something that appears > to be a person in every way to an outside observer (and that would > ultimately have to be a human observer) but has no interior > experience. That is not absurd at all, and in fact describes > animation, puppetry, and machine intelligence. > Puppetries, animations do not act like a person. They act like puppetries, animations. A philosophical zombie *acts like a person but lacks consciousness*. > > > > > > > > > > If we run the zombie argument backwards then, at what substitution > > > level of zombiehood does a (completely possible) simulated person > > > become an (non-Turing emulable) unconscious puppet? How bad of a > > > simulation does it have to be before becoming an impossible zombie? > > > > > This to me reveals an absurdity of arithmetic realism. Pinocchio the > > > boy is possible to simulate mechanically, but Pinocchio the puppet is > > > impossible. > > > > You conflate two (mayve more) notions of zombie... the only one important > > in the "zombie argument" is this: something that act like a person ****in > > every aspects*** but nonetheless is not conscious... If it is indeed what > > you mean, then could you devise a test that could show that the zombie > > indeed lacks consciousness (remember that *by definition* you cannot tell > > apart the zombie and a "real" conscious person). > > No, I think that I have a workable and useful notion of zombie. I'm > not sure how the definition you are trying use is meaningful. It seems > like a straw man of the zombie issue. We already know that > subjectivity is private, what we don't know is whether that means that > simulations automatically acquire consciousness or not. The zombie > issue is not to show that we can't imagine a person without > subjectivity and see that as evidence that subjectivity must > inherently arise from function. My point is that it also must mean > that we cannot stop inanimate objects from acquiring consciousness if > they are a sufficiently sophisticated simulation. > > Craig > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
