2012/1/16 Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>

>
> On Jan 15, 3:07 pm, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > 2012/1/14 Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>
> >
> > > Thought I'd throw this out there. If computationalism argues that
> > > zombies can't exist, therefore anything that we cannot distinguish
> > > from a conscious person must be conscious, that also means that it is
> > > impossible to create something that acts like a person which is not a
> > > person. Zombies are not Turing emulable.
> >
> > No, zombies *that are persons in every aspect* are impossible. Not only
> not
> > turing emulable... they are absurd.
>
> If you define them that way then the word has no meaning. What is a
> person in every aspect that is not at all a person?


The *only thing* a zombie lacks is consciousness... every other aspects of
a persons, it has it.


> The only way the
> term has meaning is when it is used to define something that appears
> to be a person in every way to an outside observer (and that would
> ultimately have to be a human observer) but has no interior
> experience. That is not absurd at all, and in fact describes
> animation, puppetry, and machine intelligence.
>

Puppetries, animations do not act like a person. They act like puppetries,
animations. A philosophical zombie *acts like a person but lacks
consciousness*.

>
> >
> >
> >
> > > If we run the zombie argument backwards then, at what substitution
> > > level of zombiehood does a (completely possible) simulated person
> > > become an (non-Turing emulable) unconscious puppet? How bad of a
> > > simulation does it have to be before becoming an impossible zombie?
> >
> > > This to me reveals an absurdity of arithmetic realism. Pinocchio the
> > > boy is possible to simulate mechanically, but Pinocchio the puppet is
> > > impossible.
> >
> > You conflate two (mayve more) notions of zombie... the only one important
> > in the "zombie argument" is this: something that act like a person ****in
> > every aspects*** but nonetheless is not conscious... If it is indeed what
> > you mean, then could you devise a test that could show that the zombie
> > indeed lacks consciousness (remember that *by definition* you cannot tell
> > apart the zombie and a "real" conscious person).
>
> No, I think that I have a workable and useful notion of zombie. I'm
> not sure how the definition you are trying use is meaningful. It seems
> like a straw man of the zombie issue. We already know that
> subjectivity is private, what we don't know is whether that means that
> simulations automatically acquire consciousness or not. The zombie
> issue is not to show that we can't imagine a person without
> subjectivity and see that as evidence that subjectivity must
> inherently arise from function. My point is that it also must mean
> that we cannot stop inanimate objects from acquiring consciousness if
> they are a sufficiently sophisticated simulation.
>
> Craig
>
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