On 06 Feb 2012, at 16:54, John Clark wrote:
Well it had better be! If the outside world could be anything we
wanted it to be then our senses would be of no value and Evolution
would never have had a reason to develop them. In reality if we
project our wishes on how we interpret the information from our
senses too much our life expectancy will be very short; I don't like
that saber toothed tiger over there so I'll think of him as a cute
little bunny rabbit.
Hmm... If you succeed of thinking of the saber toothed tiger as a cute
little bunny rabbit, your body will not send the fear chemicals needed
by the tiger to trigger an attack response. The tiger might be very
impressed, and think twice before eating you, even if hungry.
I agree with your reply with respect to Craig point, though. Logicians
like to joke with not completely relevant counter-example.
More seriously, in the chinese room experience, Searle's error can be
seen also as a confusion of level. If I can emulate Einstein brain,
"I" can answer all question you ask to Einstein, but the trick is that
I emulate Einstein himself, and I provide the answer that Einstein
answers me (and I guess I will have to make some work to understand
them, or not).
That is an interesting error, and I would not judge someone because he
does an error (although I am not sure Searle recognizes it or
understand it).
The confusion between provability and computability is of that type.
RA (arithmetic without induction) can already simulate PA (arithmetic
with induction), yet, like me simulating Einstein, RA remains unable
to prove many theorems that PA can prove. For RA, proving that PA
proves some proposition P might be much easier than proving P. RA can
easily prove that PA and ZF prove the consistency of RA, but RA can
hardly prove that.
RA can emulate PA, ZF, you, and me. (in the comp theory). And this
does not mean that RA will ever believe what PA, ZF, or you, or me
might assert or believe.
Bruno
John K Clark
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