On 09 Feb 2012, at 13:20, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 2/9/2012 5:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 08 Feb 2012, at 18:47, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 2/8/2012 11:46 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 07 Feb 2012, at 18:52, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Feb 6, 11:30 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
I think Quentin has a theory here, that you might be stupid.
Joseph Knight has another theory, which is that you are a troll.

Umm, could one's theory of another be such that it is a faithful subimage of the theory maker?

Maybe I have a theory that Bruno is a Tyrant and Craig is a Jester. ;-)

You do seem avoiding reasoning, to reassert in many ways a conviction that you have. You want to seem to change the rule of the game, where, personally, I want them to be applied in any field, notably in theology, defined as the notion of truth about entities. Basically Plato's definition of Theology. Truth. The truth we search, not the one we might find.

Could you imagine that your representation is not singular? There is more than one way of thinking of the idea that you are considering.

How? Either your consciousness changes in the Turing emulation at some level, or it does not (comp). The rest is logic, and can be explained in arithmetic, which can be formalized in contexts which eliminate the 'metaphysical baggage". In theoretical science we can always been enough clear so that colleagues, or nature, can find a mistake, so that we can progress. In (continental-like) philosophy, that's different, but that is the reason why I avoid such type of philosophy at the start.

but the trick is that
I emulate Einstein himself, and I provide the answer that Einstein answers me (and I guess I will have to make some work to understand
them, or not).

It still doesn't make you Einstein, which is Searle's point.

And of course I am not Einstein, in that display, but Searle is the one who makes the confusion. Einstein is the relatively concrete immaterial person which has been temporary able to manifest itself through the easy but tedious task to emulate its brain. Searle confused an "easy" low level of simulation (neurons, say) with the emulated person, which, if you deny the consciousness, is an actual zombie (corroborating Stathis' early debunking of your argument).

There is no problem with having conviction, Craig, but you have to keep them personal, and this for reasoning for comp or for non- comp, or on whatever. It is the very idea of *reasoning* (always from public assumptions).

If not I am afraid you are just not playing the game most participant want to play in the list.

Both in "science" and in "philosophy" there are scientists and philosophers. Scientists are those who can recognize they might be wrong, or that they are wrong. You seem to be unable to conceive that comp *might* be true, (in the weak sense of the existence of *some* level of substitution), and you seem be unable to put down your assumption and a reasoning which leads to your conviction. Worst, you seem gifted in rhetorical tricks to avoid error recognition (abunding in Knight's idea that you might be a troll, which I am not yet sure).

  But you cannot be wrong, Bruno, right? LOL

Of course I can be wrong. But you have to show the error if you think so. I worked hard to make the argument modularized in many "simple" steps to help you in that very task.

And of course comp can be wrong too, but if my argument is correct, the only way to know that is to find a physical facts contradicting the comp physical prediction. That should not be too difficult given that comp gives the whole of physics. In 1991, after the discovery of the p->BDp (the arithmetical quantization) I predicted that comp+Theaetetus would be refuted before 2000.



Dear Bruno,

My best expression of my "theory", although it does not quite rise to that level, is in my last response to ACW under the subject line "Ontological problems of COMP". My claim is that your argument is self-refuting as it claims to prohibit the very means to communicate it. I point out that this problem can easily be resolved by putting the abstract aspect of COMP at the same ontological level as its interpersonal expressions, but this implies dualism which you resist.

You keep telling me that you defend neutral monism, and now you pretend that I am wrong because I resist to dualism? I have explained that comp, and thus arithmetic alone, explains many form of dualism, all embedded in a precise Plotionian-like 'octalism'.

That is your choice, but you need to understand the consequences of Ideal monism. It has no explanation for interactions between minds.

It is not a matter of choice, but of proof in theoretical framework.

Then the neutral arithmetical monism explains very well the interactions between minds a priori. Only UDA shows that we have to explain matter entirely through dream interferences (say). That is a success, because it explains conceptually the origin of the physical laws, and the explanation is constructive, once we agree on the classical axioms for knowledge, making comp testable.



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