On 09 Feb 2012, at 13:20, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/9/2012 5:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Feb 2012, at 18:47, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/8/2012 11:46 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 07 Feb 2012, at 18:52, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Feb 6, 11:30 am, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
I think Quentin has a theory here, that you might be stupid.
Joseph Knight has another theory, which is that you are a troll.
Umm, could one's theory of another be such that it is a faithful
subimage of the theory maker?
Maybe I have a theory that Bruno is a Tyrant and Craig is a
Jester. ;-)
You do seem avoiding reasoning, to reassert in many ways a
conviction that you have.
You want to seem to change the rule of the game, where,
personally, I want them to be applied in any field, notably in
theology, defined as the notion of truth about entities.
Basically Plato's definition of Theology. Truth. The truth we
search, not the one we might find.
Could you imagine that your representation is not singular? There
is more than one way of thinking of the idea that you are
considering.
How? Either your consciousness changes in the Turing emulation at
some level, or it does not (comp). The rest is logic, and can be
explained in arithmetic, which can be formalized in contexts which
eliminate the 'metaphysical baggage".
In theoretical science we can always been enough clear so that
colleagues, or nature, can find a mistake, so that we can progress.
In (continental-like) philosophy, that's different, but that is the
reason why I avoid such type of philosophy at the start.
but the trick is that
I emulate Einstein himself, and I provide the answer that
Einstein
answers me (and I guess I will have to make some work to
understand
them, or not).
It still doesn't make you Einstein, which is Searle's point.
And of course I am not Einstein, in that display, but Searle is
the one who makes the confusion. Einstein is the relatively
concrete immaterial person which has been temporary able to
manifest itself through the easy but tedious task to emulate its
brain.
Searle confused an "easy" low level of simulation (neurons, say)
with the emulated person, which, if you deny the consciousness,
is an actual zombie (corroborating Stathis' early debunking of
your argument).
There is no problem with having conviction, Craig, but you have
to keep them personal, and this for reasoning for comp or for non-
comp, or on whatever. It is the very idea of *reasoning* (always
from public assumptions).
If not I am afraid you are just not playing the game most
participant want to play in the list.
Both in "science" and in "philosophy" there are scientists and
philosophers. Scientists are those who can recognize they might
be wrong, or that they are wrong. You seem to be unable to
conceive that comp *might* be true, (in the weak sense of the
existence of *some* level of substitution), and you seem be
unable to put down your assumption and a reasoning which leads to
your conviction.
Worst, you seem gifted in rhetorical tricks to avoid error
recognition (abunding in Knight's idea that you might be a troll,
which I am not yet sure).
But you cannot be wrong, Bruno, right? LOL
Of course I can be wrong. But you have to show the error if you
think so. I worked hard to make the argument modularized in many
"simple" steps to help you in that very task.
And of course comp can be wrong too, but if my argument is correct,
the only way to know that is to find a physical facts contradicting
the comp physical prediction. That should not be too difficult
given that comp gives the whole of physics. In 1991, after the
discovery of the p->BDp (the arithmetical quantization) I
predicted that comp+Theaetetus would be refuted before 2000.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Dear Bruno,
My best expression of my "theory", although it does not quite
rise to that level, is in my last response to ACW under the subject
line "Ontological problems of COMP". My claim is that your argument
is self-refuting as it claims to prohibit the very means to
communicate it. I point out that this problem can easily be resolved
by putting the abstract aspect of COMP at the same ontological level
as its interpersonal expressions, but this implies dualism which you
resist.
You keep telling me that you defend neutral monism, and now you
pretend that I am wrong because I resist to dualism?
I have explained that comp, and thus arithmetic alone, explains many
form of dualism, all embedded in a precise Plotionian-like 'octalism'.
That is your choice, but you need to understand the consequences of
Ideal monism. It has no explanation for interactions between minds.
It is not a matter of choice, but of proof in theoretical framework.
Then the neutral arithmetical monism explains very well the
interactions between minds a priori. Only UDA shows that we have to
explain matter entirely through dream interferences (say). That is a
success, because it explains conceptually the origin of the physical
laws, and the explanation is constructive, once we agree on the
classical axioms for knowledge, making comp testable.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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