On 07 Feb 2012, at 18:52, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Feb 6, 11:30 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

More seriously, in the chinese room experience, Searle's error can be
seen also as a confusion of level. If I can emulate Einstein brain,
"I" can answer all question you ask to Einstein,

You're assuming that a brain can be emulated in the first place.

Together with Searle, for the purpose of following its thought experiment, and show where it is invalid. You might study the detailed answer to Searle, by Dennett and Hofstadter in the book Mind's I. I appreciate Searle, Lucas and Penrose of presenting real argument which can be shown precisely wrong. I am not sure Searle understood his error, or recognize it. he might belong to the philosopher who starts from a personal conviction (which is a symptom of not wanting to play the *science* game. Penrose did recognize his error, but hide it and seem unaware of the gigantic impact of precisely that error. Godel's theorem does not shown that "we" are not machine, but he shows that we cannot consistently know which machine we are, and that's the start of the meta formal explanation of the appearance between the subjective and objective indeterminacies, for any Löbian machine looking inside.

that were true, there is no need to have the thought experiment.

I think Quentin has a theory here, that you might be stupid.
Joseph Knight has another theory, which is that you are a troll.

You do seem avoiding reasoning, to reassert in many ways a conviction that you have. You want to seem to change the rule of the game, where, personally, I want them to be applied in any field, notably in theology, defined as the notion of truth about entities. Basically Plato's definition of Theology. Truth. The truth we search, not the one we might find.

but the trick is that
I emulate Einstein himself, and I provide the answer that Einstein
answers me (and I guess I will have to make some work to understand
them, or not).

It still doesn't make you Einstein, which is Searle's point.

And of course I am not Einstein, in that display, but Searle is the one who makes the confusion. Einstein is the relatively concrete immaterial person which has been temporary able to manifest itself through the easy but tedious task to emulate its brain. Searle confused an "easy" low level of simulation (neurons, say) with the emulated person, which, if you deny the consciousness, is an actual zombie (corroborating Stathis' early debunking of your argument).

There is no problem with having conviction, Craig, but you have to keep them personal, and this for reasoning for comp or for non-comp, or on whatever. It is the very idea of *reasoning* (always from public assumptions).

If not I am afraid you are just not playing the game most participant want to play in the list.

Both in "science" and in "philosophy" there are scientists and philosophers. Scientists are those who can recognize they might be wrong, or that they are wrong. You seem to be unable to conceive that comp *might* be true, (in the weak sense of the existence of *some* level of substitution), and you seem be unable to put down your assumption and a reasoning which leads to your conviction. Worst, you seem gifted in rhetorical tricks to avoid error recognition (abunding in Knight's idea that you might be a troll, which I am not yet sure).



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