On 2/9/2012 5:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Feb 2012, at 18:47, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/8/2012 11:46 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 07 Feb 2012, at 18:52, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Feb 6, 11:30 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
I think Quentin has a theory here, that you might be stupid.
Joseph Knight has another theory, which is that you are a troll.
Umm, could one's theory of another be such that it is a faithful
subimage of the theory maker?
Maybe I have a theory that Bruno is a Tyrant and Craig is a Jester. ;-)
You do seem avoiding reasoning, to reassert in many ways a
conviction that you have.
You want to seem to change the rule of the game, where, personally,
I want them to be applied in any field, notably in theology, defined
as the notion of truth about entities. Basically Plato's definition
of Theology. Truth. The truth we search, not the one we might find.
Could you imagine that your representation is not singular? There is
more than one way of thinking of the idea that you are considering.
How? Either your consciousness changes in the Turing emulation at some
level, or it does not (comp). The rest is logic, and can be explained
in arithmetic, which can be formalized in contexts which eliminate the
In theoretical science we can always been enough clear so that
colleagues, or nature, can find a mistake, so that we can progress.
In (continental-like) philosophy, that's different, but that is the
reason why I avoid such type of philosophy at the start.
but the trick is that
I emulate Einstein himself, and I provide the answer that Einstein
answers me (and I guess I will have to make some work to understand
them, or not).
It still doesn't make you Einstein, which is Searle's point.
And of course I am not Einstein, in that display, but Searle is the
one who makes the confusion. Einstein is the relatively concrete
immaterial person which has been temporary able to manifest itself
through the easy but tedious task to emulate its brain.
Searle confused an "easy" low level of simulation (neurons, say)
with the emulated person, which, if you deny the consciousness, is
an actual zombie (corroborating Stathis' early debunking of your
There is no problem with having conviction, Craig, but you have to
keep them personal, and this for reasoning for comp or for non-comp,
or on whatever. It is the very idea of *reasoning* (always from
If not I am afraid you are just not playing the game most
participant want to play in the list.
Both in "science" and in "philosophy" there are scientists and
philosophers. Scientists are those who can recognize they might be
wrong, or that they are wrong. You seem to be unable to conceive
that comp *might* be true, (in the weak sense of the existence of
*some* level of substitution), and you seem be unable to put down
your assumption and a reasoning which leads to your conviction.
Worst, you seem gifted in rhetorical tricks to avoid error
recognition (abunding in Knight's idea that you might be a troll,
which I am not yet sure).
But you cannot be wrong, Bruno, right? LOL
Of course I can be wrong. But you have to show the error if you think
so. I worked hard to make the argument modularized in many "simple"
steps to help you in that very task.
And of course comp can be wrong too, but if my argument is correct,
the only way to know that is to find a physical facts contradicting
the comp physical prediction. That should not be too difficult given
that comp gives the whole of physics. In 1991, after the discovery of
the p->BDp (the arithmetical quantization) I predicted that
comp+Theaetetus would be refuted before 2000.
My best expression of my "theory", although it does not quite rise
to that level, is in my last response to ACW under the subject line
"Ontological problems of COMP". My claim is that your argument is
self-refuting as it claims to prohibit the very means to communicate it.
I point out that this problem can easily be resolved by putting the
abstract aspect of COMP at the same ontological level as its
interpersonal expressions, but this implies dualism which you resist.
That is your choice, but you need to understand the consequences of
Ideal monism. It has no explanation for interactions between minds.
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to email@example.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at