On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote:
I do not see how this deals effectively with the concurrency problem!
:-( Using the Platonia idea is a cheat as it is explicitly unphysical.
But physics by itself does not explain consciousness either (as shown by MGA). Maybe I just don't see what the concurrency problem is.
It has no constraints of thermodynamics, no limits on speeds of signals,
no explanation as to how an Ideal Form is defined, e.g. what is the
standard of its perfection, ect. It is no different from the Realm of
God in religious mythos, so what is it doing here in our rational
considerations? Forgive me but I was raised by parents that where
Fundamentalists "Believers", so please understand that I have an allergy
to ideas that remind me of the mental prison that I had to work so hard
to escape.
I'm not asking you to share all of Plato's beliefs here. It's merely a minimal amount of "magic", not unlike the "magic" you have to accept by positing a 3p world. The amount is basically this: arithmetical (or computational) sentences have truth values independent of anything physical and consciousness/qualia may be how some such arithmetical truth feels from the inside. Without at least some axioms, one cannot get anywhere, you can't reduce arithmetic to only logic and so on. Why would Platonia have to have the same constraints as our physical realms - it need only obey to constraints of logic and math, which usually means stuff that is contained within the Church Turing Thesis and its implications. Speed of signals? If some theory is inconsistent, it's only there as part of the reasoning of some other machine. Ideal Form? How do you define an integer or the axioms that talk about arithmetic? Popular religious mythos tend to be troublesome because they involve *logically impossible* properties being attributed to Gods and other beings - things which are inconsistent. It's not like one doesn't assume some axioms in any theory - they are there in almost any scientific theory. Yet, unlike popular religions, you're free to evaluate your hypotheses and use evidence and meta-reasoning to decide which one is more likely to be true and then try to use the results of such theories to predict how stuff will behave or bet on various things. Of course, it's not hard to get trapped in a bad epistemology, and I can see why you'd be extra skeptical of bad theories, however nobody is telling you to believe a theory is true or false, instead it asks you to work out the consequences of each theory's axioms (as well as using meta-reasoning skills to weed down overly complex theories, if you prefer using Occam's) and then either choose to use or not use that particular theory depending if the results match your observations/expectations/standards/... (if expectations are broken, one would either have to update beliefs or theories or both).

What ever the global structure that we use to relate our ideas and provide explanations, it makes sense that we do not ignore problems that are inconvenient. A big problem that I have with Platonia is that it does not address the appearance of change that we finite semi-autonomous beings observe. The problem of time is just a corollary to this. I would prefer to toss out any postulates that require *any* "magic". "Magic" is like Arsenic poison, every little bit doubles the harmful effects. Why do we even need a notion of 3p except as a pedagogical tool? What we need, at least, is a stratification scheme that allows us to represent these differences, but we need to understand that in doing this we are sneaking in the notion of a 3p that is equivalent to some kind of agent whose only mission is to observe differences and that is a fallacy since we are trying to explain observers in the first place.

Unless we have some way to handle a fundamental notion of change, there is no way to deal with questions of change and time. Please notice how many instances we are using verbs in our considerations of COMP ideas. Where and how does the change implicit in the verb, as like "running the UD", obtain? We cannot ignore this. I am highlighting the concurrency problem b/c it shows how this problem cannot be ignored. The Platonic Realm, especially the Arithmetic Realist one, is by definition fixed and static, nothing changes in it at all! How do we get the appearance of time from it? It is possible to show how, but the proponents of COMP need to explain this, IMHO. It is incoherent at best to make statements like "the UD is running on the walls of Platonia". How is that even a meaningful claim? Another problem is the problem of space as we see in the way that 1p indeterminacy is defined in UDA. We read of a notion of "cutting and pasting". Cut 'from" where and pasted "to" where? How is the difference in "position" of say, Washington and Moscow, obtain in a Realm that has nothing like "space"? Unless we have a substrate of some kind that transformations can act upon and yet the transformations and the substrate are not distinguished, there is no "cut and pasting" possible. What makes the difference between the substrate and the transformation? Bruno et al seems to consider this in terms of Godel numbering schemes but what distinguishes a Godel number of a program from a program?



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