On 11 Feb 2012, at 07:32, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi ACW, Thank you for the time and effort to write this up!!! On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote:Bruno has always said that COMP is a matter of theology (orreligion), that is, the provably unprovable, and I agree with this.However, let's try and see why that is and why someone would takeCOMP as an assumption:- The main assumption of COMP is that you admit, at some level, adigital substitution, and the stronger assumption that if you wereto implement/run such a Turing-emulable program, it would beconscious and you would have a continuation in it. Isn't that astrong theological assumption?[SPK]Yes, but it is the "substitution" of one configuration of"stuff" with another such that the functionality (that allows forthe implementation/running of the Turing-emulable (Turingequivalence!)) program to remain invariant. One thing interesting topoint out about this is that this substitution can be thereplacement of completely different kinds of stuff, like carbonbased stuff with silicon based stuff and does not require acontinuous physical process of transformation in the sense ofsmoothly morphism the carbon stuff into silicon stuff at someprimitive level. B/c of this it may seem to bypass the usualrestrictions of physical laws, but does it really?What exactly is this "physical stuff" anyway? If we take a hintfrom the latest ideas in theoretical physics it seems that the"stuff" of the material world is more about properties that remaininvariant under sets of symmetry transformations and less and lessabout anything like "primitive" substances. So in a sense, thephysical world might be considered to be a wide assortment ofbundles of invariants therefore it seems to me that to test COMP weneed to see if those symmetry groups and invariants can be derivedfrom some proposed underlying logical structure. This is what I amtrying to do. I am really not arguing against COMP, I am arguingthat COMP is incomplete as a theory as it does not yet show how theappearance of space, time and conservation laws emerges in a waythat is invariant and not primitive.

`So you miss the UDA point. The UDA point is that if COMP is true, it`

`has to be complete as a theory, independently of the fact that the`

`shorter time to derive physics might be 10^1000 millenia. Comp`

`explains, by the UDA, that whatever you add to comp, or to RA, or to`

`the UD, cannot play any role in consciousness, including the feeling`

`that the worlds obeys some role. So if comp is correct the las of`

`physics have to be derived from arithmetic alone. Then AUDA makes a`

`non trivial part of the derivation. We have already the symmetry of`

`the core bottom physics, the quantum indeterminacy, non locality, non`

`cloning. But this is just for illustrating the consistency: the UDA`

`conclusion is that no matter what, the appearance of matter cannot use`

`any supplementary assumption to comp and/or arithmetic. You can sum up`

`the UD by "comp is not completable". It is the Bell-von Neuman answer`

`to Einstein, in your analogy below. Arithmetic is made conceptually`

`complete. Whatever you add to it will prevent the comp solution of the`

`mind-body problem, a bit like evruthing you add to the SWE will`

`reintroduce the measurement problem in quantum physics. Comp and`

`arithmetic are conceptually complete, but of epistemologically highly`

`incomplete and uncompletable.`

`Also, once you agree that stuff is not primitive, you have to define`

`it from your primitive terms, which I don't see possible given that`

`your primitive is the word "existence" which is not defined, nor even`

`a theory.`

I guess I have the temerity to play Einstein against Bruno's Bohr. :-)

See just above.

OTOH, I am not arguing for any kind of return to naive realism orthat the physical world is the totality of existence. I do know thatI am just a curious amateur, so I welcome any critique that mighthelp me learn.

`Comp like QM does not admit supplementary axioms, or variables, to`

`reinstall a physical realism.`

I think it is, but at the same time, it has solid consequences anda belief in it can be justified for a number of reasons:a) Fading qualia thought experiment, which shows thatconsciousness is utterly fickle if it doesn't follow a principle offunctional / organizational invariance. Most of our sense datatends to point that such a principle makes sense. Avoiding it meansconsciousness does not correspond to brain states and p. zombies.Certainly! We need a precise explanation for psycho-physicalparallelism.

`But there is no psycho-physical parallelism. The metaphysical physical`

`*is* an illusion, naïve or not. The physical itself is arithmetical`

`truth see from the observable point of view (suggested to be handled`

`by the logics of observation Bp & Dt (& p), at the G and G* levels).`

My tentative explanation is that at our level a form of dualismholds. A dualism quite unlike that of Descartes, since instead of"separate substances", it is proposed that the logical and thephysical are two distinct aspect of reality that follow on equal yetanti-parallel tracks. As Vaughan Pratt explains in his papers, thelogical processes and the physical processes have dynamics that havearrows that point in opposite directions. Schematically and crudelywe can show a quasi-category theory diagram of this duality:---- > X -----> Y -----> | | <----- A <------B <-----

`I am OK with this. This is already derivable from the many dualisms`

`contained in the octalist machines points of view, notably between`

`"intelligible" (Bp) and (matter intelligible Bp & Dt). It does reverse`

`the arrow in a way akin to Pratt. It is not a parallelism, or anti-`

`parallelism, though, for the 1p and 3p are not symmetrical. Then the`

`qualia, and the first person plural quanta, are given by the machine's`

`semantics for the logic obeyed by Bp & Dt & p.`

`I have no idea what your neutral monism refer too, except a sort of`

`vague God-like notion of Existence, but that's not a (scientific)`

`theory, yet. And, by UDA, whatever it adds to comp and arithmetic has`

`to refute the comp physics, or comp itself. Craig is, at least,`

`coherent on this: he abandon comp, to save an unintelligible notion of`

`matter and mind (alas).`

Bruno

The vertical lines represent the Stone duality relation and thehorizontal arrow represent logical entailment and physicalcausation. The chaining (or "residuation") rule is "X causes Y iffB necessitates A", where X and A and duals and Y and B and duals.This duality prohibits zombies and disembodied spirits. There ismuch more to this diagram as it does not include the endomorphisms,homeomorphisms and other mappings and objects that are involved inthe full implementation of the residuation rule.I just found a paper by Martin Wehr www.dcs.ed.ac.uk/home/wehr/newpage/Papers/qc.ps.gzthat elaborates on Pratt's idea and explains residuation better!Here is the abstract:Quantum Computing: A new Paradigm and it's Type Theory Martin Wehr Quantum Computing Seminar, Lehrstuhl Prof. Beth, Universit"at Karlsruhe, July 1996 To use quantum mechanical behavior for computing has been proposed by Feynman. Shor gave an algorithm for the quantum computer which raised a big stream of research.This was because Shor's algorithm did reduce the yet assumedexponentialcomplexity of the security relevant factorization problem, to a quadratic complexity if quantum computed. In the paper a short introduction to quantum mechanics can be found in the appendix. With this material the operation of the quantum computer, and the ideas of quantum logic will be explained. The focus will be the argument that a connection of quantum logic and linear logic is the right type theory for quantum computing. These ideas are inspired by Vaughan Pratt's view that the intuitionistic formulas argue about states (i.e physical quantum states) and linear formulas argue about state transformations (i.e computation steps). ***b) Neuroscience and physics suggests that we do indeed admit sucha substitution level, or that the functions of the brain are Turing-emulable (although obviously the architecture is massively paralleland running it on a TM is not optimal, but then, neither is runningphysics, either way, this is unimportant due to specific(provable)instances of the CTT(Church Turing Thesis)).I agree but we do need more detail of the 1p and 3p aspects ofthis idea.c) a and b do not directly suggest the continuity part, althoughwe can't really guarantee continuity that much ourselves. Giventhat we can never experience a moment past our death, we wouldalways experience being alive, that is, the Anthropic Principlewhere the laws of physics happen to be that which support or iscompatible with us (trivial statement, maybe even too general). Thecontinuity bet is a matter of past observations, although it'sutterly unprovable, on the other hand, we usually expect a next OMand that we will wake up in the morning, that the sun will "rise"and so on (by induction, regardless if consciously realized ornot). That one could continue their existence in a differentmachine body which is functionally equivalent is not utterlypreposterous to me, at least not much more than when oneconsiders how strange it must be that their consciousnessfollows their body/senses even when the body moves through spaceand time, sometimes even with discontinuities (sleep, etc).This assumption is almost magical, but not really: it's aconsequence of some strong "no magic" assumptions in the nature ofreality, but as we can see, sufficiently advanced technology isindistinguishable from magic and sufficiently strong "no magic"assumptions can also be quite indistinguishable from magic (more onthis later).Pratt's duality explains all of this without any magic at all!Well there is some magical mathematics... ;-)d) The UDA paints a picture which seems to include an explanationfor QM/MWI, thus confirming some current physical theories. Yourobjection to COMP immortality applies to MWI as well - there is MWIimmortality as well, just a bit more limited in fancifulness. Yet,MWI is one of the simplest possible realist interpretations of QM(by various Occam's Razor formalizations). COMP itself scores highon the simplicityscore - easy to describe ontology (after reasoning is done),although very rich, it also gives reasonably satisfactory (partialor full) answers/hints to some ancient questions (such as "whysomething instead of nothing", "what is matter", "what is mind"along with some more concrete questions...)Yes, MWI still suffers from a basis problem even thoughdecoherence arguments can seem to make the problem go awaytemporarily in calculations, but it returns every time a new basisis introduced to consider a different set of observables. Iconjecture that "there is something rather than nothing becausesomething is just a piece of nothing distinguished from anotherpiece of nothing by a third piece of nothing." As Russell Standishargued in his book, Nothing and Everything are indistinguishable.- Another assumption of COMP is the Church Turing Thesis. Verystrong mathematical evidence is for it being true, and we can showit for just about any finite (but unbounded) machine followingfinite rules. It's a hypothesis/assumption because in the generalform it's not provable because it's too general, but we can proveany individual case we care to try, there's also many strongintuitions for why it has to be true. I don't think there are manycomputer scientists who don't believe in it, but usually those thatdon't just try to define CTT in wider scope than it is (such ashypercomputation, which it obviously doesn't include), such issuesare a matter of definition and shouldn't be considered to beincluded in this assumption.I have no problem at all with CTT, i just have a serious problemwith the idea that CTT is completely divorced from the physical.- Consistency of arithmetic (existence of the standard model ofarithmetic), existence of truth value of arithmetical sentences.The existence of truth values does not, in itself, define them.Additional structure is required to define not only what domain thetruth value lies in but how it is mapped to our propositions andsentences.The consistency belief is both intuitive as well as one about acertain Turing Machine never halting (which can be made in strongertheories, but cannot be believed any more than you can believe thatarithmetic is consistent). A belief in a sentence being either trueor false independent of anything is not much different from thebelief that a machine either halts or doesn't halt (and no otherchoice exists).This is again a matter of theology - of the provably unprovablestuff.Although, again, it's a strong "no magic" assumption, that given afinite self-contained set of rules (addition, multiplication)applied on finite self-contained objects (numbers), it will alwaysyield the same result and nothing whatsoever can change that.I agree that "given a finite self-contained set of rules(addition, multiplication) applied on finite self-contained objects(numbers), it will always yield the same result" but this does notaddress my problem. Unless there is something physical that issomehow different but equal in ontological level to show resultsside by side, there is no proof of equivalence, all there is ismodulo isomorphism and barely even that.- A hidden assumption: we have minds/are conscious/experiencequalia. This is a bit magical, but it's hidden in the firstassumption that I listed.It is not magical, it is quite ordinary. It is the most ordinaryof facts that I am conscious of what my hands are doing at thismoment, for example... But what is this "my"? If it is just anillusion generated by some kind of feedback loop, how does the delaythat allows the loop come to be? It is interesting that there is amapping in category theory that shows this exact kind of mapping:the Idempotent Endomap<endomapIdempotent.png>It is interesting to note the properties of this mapping. See,for example: ls.poly.edu/~jbain/Cat/lectures/13.MoreCats.pdfThe thing is - the only thing we can be certain of, but cannotcommunicate is having a mind. From our observations we can inferthe existence of the external world and that our bodies are part ofit, we can also observe that the states of our brain correlate verywell with our conscious experience. A different computationalisttheory (eliminative materialism) takes this hidden assumption andposts its negation as an axiom. The problem with that is that theexternal world is only inferred by using observation, thus itcannot really be accepted by most conscious observers (who aredelusional in such a theory), however such a theory is notinconsistent if consciousness is ignored. If you ignore the mindassumption, you can completely ignore almost all of COMP's strangeconclusions because none of them would matter, but the existence ofprimitive matter would be saved in such a theory.I agree. I just do not require matter nor mind to be primitive,I argue that both are aspects of a single neutral primitive.All of these are assumptions which are not uncommon for mostsecular-minded people: the first is widely considered by the "nomagic" camp, it also is required if you don't want consciousness tobe utterly strange and magic current evidence, the second is widelyconsidered true by anyone who studied computability/math/comp sci,the third is usually considered true, if it's false, pretty muchall math we know is false, and there are many intuitions why it'slikely true. Given these assumptions, COMP is a fairly rationaltheory with a few unprovable, but widely accepted "no magic"assumptions. However, even with these assumptions, you can't reallyavoid some really unusual magic (given only the first assumption).The strange conclusion is hidden in the assumptions, just mostpeople don't see it (strangely it's not uncommon for people to holdthose assumptions and still not see that primitive matter isutterly incompatible with a non-eliminative form ofcomputationalism).I agree. Onward! Stephen --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

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