On 16 Feb 2012, at 18:58, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/16/2012 11:54 AM, acw wrote:On 2/16/2012 15:59, Stephen P. King wrote:Yes, COMP assumes that there is a subst. level, which means that stuff below the subst. level may vary (or even look like noise, due to 1p-indeterminacy, we tend to think of this, in our universe, as the quantum foam and the like). A doctor (which is included in the assumption, but if it weren't...) only need be able to copy/emulate either exactly at the right subst. level or slightly below it (copying at a higher level may entail memory loss or functionality loss or worse). What this effectively means is that you don't need to be able to read the full quantum state (which is not possible), but just quasi-classical states, which we can do and which should be either at subst. level or below. (If the subst. level was below, COMP would be practically false, as we do assume that the observer's universal number is at least partially stable at the subst. level). No violation of the no-cloning theorem here. And aside from that we can copy/transmit quasi-classical information pretty well.On 2/16/2012 6:57 AM, acw wrote:On 2/15/2012 07:07, Stephen P. King wrote:[SPK]Interesting. How then do we explain the fact that humans suffer all kinds of computational errors such as schizophrenia, dismorphia, etc. We intentionally lie... The list of computationally erroneous behavior ofthe brain is almost endless. How does this occur given COMP? But Idigress. Explaining "physical reality" is to explain the properties that it has as opposed to those that it does not, UDA does not do that. It even presupposes things that are simply not possible in the physicalworld, such as teleportation and computations generating knowledgewithout the use of resources. Even a Reversible computer requires memoryto compute and memory is a physical quantity.The notion of teleportation used in UDA is nothing magical orrequiring new physics. The experiments in the UDA can be read as aftersomeone said "yes" to the doctor and became a SIM(SubstrateIndependent Mind), thus after the substitution, they can know one oftheir godel numbers/programs (assuming correct observation). This essentially means that said program state can be transmitted and ran/instantiated anywhere you want and with any delay or order or form. A "teleportation" from A to B would merely require the SIM to stop itself in A, have another program transmit it to B(for example through the Internet or some other communication channel) and have someone run it in B, for example on a general purpose Turing-equivalent computer or more likely a special-purpose digital brain (for better performance within our physics) with access to anenvironment(or more, such as VRs). For all intents and purposes this isn't any different from me writing a program and you downloading it and running it on your own hardware. For UDA 1-5 this works trivially. For UDA 6, it also works, with changes in software. UDA 7 does make astronger assumption: the sufficiently robust universe, however onedoesn't really assume strong physical continuity by now (by 1-6), so Idon't see UD even has to be coherently ran all at once and in a continuous manner (for example a running like that in "Permutation City" would work just well, "in the dust"). If you do consider someother 'everything' theories like Tegmark's or Schmidhuber, they alsogrant you an UD (and I would venture to say that your neutralExistence might also grant you such robust universes). UDA 8 you seemto disagree with, but I don't see what explanatory power could any primitively physical structure grant you: all possible digitalisedobservers and their continuations already have to be in the UD, thus you cannot use primitive physics for prediction. Thus the only claimthat one could make for saving primitive physics would be that itallows for consciousness to manifest (for example by implementing thebody). UDA 8 and MGA show that such a claim is specious andunnecessary. You seem to disagree with it, although its not clear tome as to why or how. You seem to claim that physical reality isn't primary (COMP agrees, it emerges from arithmetical/computational truth), although don't agree with the way it emerges in COMP or its nature(?)? Does that mean that you don't think that all possible observers are contained in the UD? To be frank, I'm still rather confused at what point your theory becomes incompatible or predictsdifferent things than COMP (given the standard assumptions used in theUDA).Dear ACW,Please rethink exactly what teleportation requires to be possible. It isnot any different from the ability to copy information.Hi ACW,There is a problem with this way of thinking in that it assumes that all of the properties of objects are inherent in the objects themselves and have no relation or dependence on anything else. This is is wrong. We know from our study of QM and the experiments that have been done, that the properties of objects are definite because of interdependence and interconnections (via entanglement) between all things within our event horizon. You seem to be laboring under the classical Newtonian view. To have a consistent and real idea of teleportation one has to consider, for example, the requirements of quantum teleportation. It is things like that that are preventing COMP from being a realistic explanatory theory.
But comp does not assume QM.And if it happens that QM plays a role in consciousness, it means that the comp level might be lower than what the neurophysiologists believe today, but it does not impact on the validity of comp => arithmetic-TOE. It would just mean that our generalized brain is bigger, and that some sub-quantum dovetailer win the measure on computation in UD*. But that's should be part of comp derivation of QM. I don't exclude this, nor do I exclude that comp leads to a contradiction.
:-( I like COMP and UDA because I see them as ideas that have errors can be corrected. This is not to say that my own ideas are not error filled! We are all, including me, finite and fallible.Onward! Stephen --You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to email@example.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en .
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