On 11 Feb 2012, at 18:41, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 2/11/2012 6:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 11 Feb 2012, at 07:32, Stephen P. King wrote:Hi ACW, Thank you for the time and effort to write this up!!! On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote:Bruno has always said that COMP is a matter of theology (orreligion), that is, the provably unprovable, and I agree withthis. However, let's try and see why that is and why someonewould take COMP as an assumption:- The main assumption of COMP is that you admit, at some level, adigital substitution, and the stronger assumption that if youwere to implement/run such a Turing-emulable program, it would beconscious and you would have a continuation in it. Isn't that astrong theological assumption?[SPK]Yes, but it is the "substitution" of one configuration of"stuff" with another such that the functionality (that allows forthe implementation/running of the Turing-emulable (Turingequivalence!)) program to remain invariant. One thing interestingto point out about this is that this substitution can be thereplacement of completely different kinds of stuff, like carbonbased stuff with silicon based stuff and does not require acontinuous physical process of transformation in the sense ofsmoothly morphism the carbon stuff into silicon stuff at someprimitive level. B/c of this it may seem to bypass the usualrestrictions of physical laws, but does it really?What exactly is this "physical stuff" anyway? If we take ahint from the latest ideas in theoretical physics it seems thatthe "stuff" of the material world is more about properties thatremain invariant under sets of symmetry transformations and lessand less about anything like "primitive" substances. So in asense, the physical world might be considered to be a wideassortment of bundles of invariants therefore it seems to me thatto test COMP we need to see if those symmetry groups andinvariants can be derived from some proposed underlying logicalstructure. This is what I am trying to do. I am really not arguingagainst COMP, I am arguing that COMP is incomplete as a theory asit does not yet show how the appearance of space, time andconservation laws emerges in a way that is invariant and notprimitive.So you miss the UDA point. The UDA point is that if COMP is true,it has to be complete as a theory, independently of the fact thatthe shorter time to derive physics might be 10^1000 millenia. Compexplains, by the UDA, that whatever you add to comp, or to RA, orto the UD, cannot play any role in consciousness, including thefeeling that the worlds obeys some role. So if comp is correct thelas of physics have to be derived from arithmetic alone. Then AUDAmakes a non trivial part of the derivation. We have already thesymmetry of the core bottom physics, the quantum indeterminacy, nonlocality, non cloning. But this is just for illustrating theconsistency: the UDA conclusion is that no matter what, theappearance of matter cannot use any supplementary assumption tocomp and/or arithmetic. You can sum up the UD by "comp is notcompletable". It is the Bell-von Neuman answer to Einstein, in youranalogy below. Arithmetic is made conceptually complete. Whateveryou add to it will prevent the comp solution of the mind-bodyproblem, a bit like evruthing you add to the SWE will reintroducethe measurement problem in quantum physics. Comp and arithmetic areconceptually complete, but of epistemologically highly incompleteand uncompletable.Also, once you agree that stuff is not primitive, you have todefine it from your primitive terms, which I don't see possiblegiven that your primitive is the word "existence" which is notdefined, nor even a theory.Hi Bruno,You are still not addressing my questions and what I see as aproblem. The speed issue and completeness is not just addressingfrom an internal perspective since we have to have invariance overmany different internal perspectives and these can vary over speedand complexity. This is illustrated by the discussion of how "stuff"can vary while preserving the functionality. The 'theory' ofexistence follows naturally from neutral monism, you just need spendthe effort to understand it.

`But I have not yet seen the theory. "Existence" is a word. A theory,`

`when presented, is a set of axioms and inference rules.`

Think of this another way, we have a choice between belief that"COMP is true" or "COMP is false".

`Assuming classical logic applies at the metalevel, and this is not`

`obvious to me.`

In order to have a coherent notion of a bet, both "COMP is True" and"COMP is false" have to exist side by side as equivalently possible.

`To bet on comp would be an error like Pascal gambit. You can only`

`evaluate the theory by yourself, trusting the doctor, and makes some`

`bet in case it is the only hope possible. There is no more reason to`

`believe that comp and non-comp are equivalently possible, than to`

`believe that Santa Klaus or non Santa Klaus are equivalently possible.`

If we consider that they only can have this "side by sideequivalence" in the mind, then we obtain the situation that theirtruth value is dependent on the choice,

?

but that would contradict COMP since built into it is the postulatethat truth is independent of belief.

Truth of elementary (first order) arithmetical proposition. Only.

We have to look at COMP from the point of view of many minds and notjust one, but so far you have stoically resisted doing this. Why?

`I have never resisted that. The many mind are in the material`

`hypostases. Many minds appears in the UDA through the collective`

`duplication of populations of individuals.`

`The appearance of matter, in the UDA explanation, comes from the many`

`minds/many dreams, so it is hard to say that I resist to that.`

OTOH, I am not arguing for any kind of return to naive realism orthat the physical world is the totality of existence. I do knowthat I am just a curious amateur, so I welcome any critique thatmight help me learn.Comp like QM does not admit supplementary axioms, or variables, toreinstall a physical realism.This makes no sense to me. QM disallows for any particularrealism in the sense of property definiteness prior to observation.

`That's only partially true in Everett. There is a local realism, which`

`is local, determinist and even clonable.`

We do not need to go through all of the no-hidden-variable theoremsagain, I hope! In fact, the logic of QM is proven to not befaithfully capture in any one form of Boolean representation becauseit is only representable as an Orthocomplete Lattice.

Yes. that's the part of physics already derived from comp.

An OL is similar but not surjective to an infinite number of BooleanAlgebras and there does not exist a way to pick out one of them inan a priori way. There is also the isomorphism between anydualization of a finite vector space and between Hilbert spaces ofthe same # of dimension that shows this same property.OTOH, we can use the SSA idea to pick out a Boolean algebra byidentifying some sub-lattice of the OL, but this only works if wehave many observers, each with a set of local observables so thatthe collection acts like the questioners in a Surprise 20 Questionsgame.

No problem for comp here.

I think it is, but at the same time, it has solid consequencesand a belief in it can be justified for a number of reasons:a) Fading qualia thought experiment, which shows thatconsciousness is utterly fickle if it doesn't follow a principleof functional / organizational invariance. Most of our sense datatends to point that such a principle makes sense. Avoiding itmeans consciousness does not correspond to brain states and p.zombies.Certainly! We need a precise explanation for psycho-physicalparallelism.But there is no psycho-physical parallelism. The metaphysicalphysical *is* an illusion, naïve or not. The physical itself isarithmetical truth see from the observable point of view (suggestedto be handled by the logics of observation Bp & Dt (& p), at the Gand G* levels).But cannot you see that this claim that "there is no psycho-physical parallelism" completely undermines the entire result? Anillusion cannot act as a coherent substrate upon whichrepresentations can be implemented.

In which theory. You should prove this.

So in effect you are denying the existence of the computer monitorwith which you are reading this email,

Why should I do that? You jump too hastily.

`And you are supposed to do the same with your more constricted form of`

`neutral monism, which still remains just one word for me.`

`I don't deny anything physical. I deny the possibility that we have`

`bioth comp and something primitively physical. In the precise sense`

`that physics has to be reduced to number's theology, like biology can`

`be reduced to chemistry.`

and the whiteboards upon which you write your symbolic systems ofequations and your eyes that read this and everything else that actsas a relatively stable substrate upon which one arithmetic truth canbe compared to another.

`Arithmetic is simpler to understand than any theory of any pice of`

`matter. You seem to reintroduce primary physics, which contradict your`

`neutral monism. Is your Existence the existence of the physical?`

The physical cannot be just the arithmetic truth for such issingular, it has to be at least the comparison between a pair ofarithmetic truths and for this to be possible there has to be arelatively stable substrate. There is no escape from this necessity.

`Where does that substrate comes from? is it assumed or derived in your`

`"theory"? What is it?`

`Comp eliminate physical substrates. You need just to agree that 0+x =`

`x, o*x = 0, and a few other formula.`

My tentative explanation is that at our level a form of dualismholds. A dualism quite unlike that of Descartes, since instead of"separate substances", it is proposed that the logical and thephysical are two distinct aspect of reality that follow on equalyet anti-parallel tracks. As Vaughan Pratt explains in his papers,the logical processes and the physical processes have dynamicsthat have arrows that point in opposite directions. Schematicallyand crudely we can show a quasi-category theory diagram of thisduality:---- > X -----> Y -----> | | <----- A <------B <-----I am OK with this. This is already derivable from the many dualismscontained in the octalist machines points of view, notably between"intelligible" (Bp) and (matter intelligible Bp & Dt). It doesreverse the arrow in a way akin to Pratt. It is not a parallelism,or anti-parallelism, though, for the 1p and 3p are not symmetrical.Then the qualia, and the first person plural quanta, are given bythe machine's semantics for the logic obeyed by Bp & Dt & p.The diagram is strictly 3p. It would be helpful if you wrote upan informal article on the octolism. It is very difficult tocomprehend it from just your discussion of the hypostases.

`See my Plotinus paper(*). Or read the second part of sane04(**). I`

`have already provided many explanations, so you can also look in the`

`archives, on AUDA, "interview" perhaps, etc. Ask any (enough precise)`

`question.`

(*) http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/CiE2007/SIENA.pdf (**) http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html

I have no idea what your neutral monism refer too, except a sort ofvague God-like notion of Existence, but that's not a (scientific)theory, yet. And, by UDA, whatever it adds to comp and arithmetichas to refute the comp physics, or comp itself. Craig is, at least,coherent on this: he abandon comp, to save an unintelligible notionof matter and mind (alas).Read the discussion of neutral monism by Bertrand Russell andothers.

`I love BR, but his philosophy of math and physics is obsolete. It is`

`pre-Godelian, and pre-UDA, if I can say.`

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/neutral-monism/ is a good overview(even though the pluralism of neutral entities assumption isproblematic as Spinoza understood). It would be helpful to you andthe rest of us if you spent some time refreshing your understandingof what theology is by comparing the many theologies that alreadyexist or by learning from the wisdom of those that have done suchstudies. I hope that Bertrand Russell is someone that you canrespect as I respect your skills and understanding of modal logics.

`I am NOT a modal logician. Just an expert in self and selves. it is`

`just that Solovay axiomatizes the selves propositional logic soundly`

`and completely by the very particular modal logic G and G*. It is not`

`a chapter of modal logic (or a tiny one which most modal logicians are`

`usually not so much interested). It is a chapter on entities,`

`including machines, self-reference. Comp makes it the main tool to`

`proceed and derive theology and physics.`

`Theology (of machine) is used in the sense of Plato, that is of study`

`of the Truth (about a machine). Strong LUMs can study the theology of`

`simpler LUMs, mathematically. Then lift them at their risk and perils,`

`because they cannot know if it applies to them (they don't know if`

`they are correct)).`

`I have a high esteem for Bertrand Russell. I read the entirety of its`

`work (except Principia Mathematica, of course). But we have progressed`

`since, if only through the discovery of the UMs and LUMs.`

Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.