On 11 Feb 2012, at 18:41, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 2/11/2012 6:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 11 Feb 2012, at 07:32, Stephen P. King wrote:


    Thank you for the time and effort to write this up!!!

On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote:

Bruno has always said that COMP is a matter of theology (or religion), that is, the provably unprovable, and I agree with this. However, let's try and see why that is and why someone would take COMP as an assumption:

- The main assumption of COMP is that you admit, at some level, a digital substitution, and the stronger assumption that if you were to implement/run such a Turing-emulable program, it would be conscious and you would have a continuation in it. Isn't that a strong theological assumption?
Yes, but it is the "substitution" of one configuration of "stuff" with another such that the functionality (that allows for the implementation/running of the Turing-emulable (Turing equivalence!)) program to remain invariant. One thing interesting to point out about this is that this substitution can be the replacement of completely different kinds of stuff, like carbon based stuff with silicon based stuff and does not require a continuous physical process of transformation in the sense of smoothly morphism the carbon stuff into silicon stuff at some primitive level. B/c of this it may seem to bypass the usual restrictions of physical laws, but does it really? What exactly is this "physical stuff" anyway? If we take a hint from the latest ideas in theoretical physics it seems that the "stuff" of the material world is more about properties that remain invariant under sets of symmetry transformations and less and less about anything like "primitive" substances. So in a sense, the physical world might be considered to be a wide assortment of bundles of invariants therefore it seems to me that to test COMP we need to see if those symmetry groups and invariants can be derived from some proposed underlying logical structure. This is what I am trying to do. I am really not arguing against COMP, I am arguing that COMP is incomplete as a theory as it does not yet show how the appearance of space, time and conservation laws emerges in a way that is invariant and not primitive.

So you miss the UDA point. The UDA point is that if COMP is true, it has to be complete as a theory, independently of the fact that the shorter time to derive physics might be 10^1000 millenia. Comp explains, by the UDA, that whatever you add to comp, or to RA, or to the UD, cannot play any role in consciousness, including the feeling that the worlds obeys some role. So if comp is correct the las of physics have to be derived from arithmetic alone. Then AUDA makes a non trivial part of the derivation. We have already the symmetry of the core bottom physics, the quantum indeterminacy, non locality, non cloning. But this is just for illustrating the consistency: the UDA conclusion is that no matter what, the appearance of matter cannot use any supplementary assumption to comp and/or arithmetic. You can sum up the UD by "comp is not completable". It is the Bell-von Neuman answer to Einstein, in your analogy below. Arithmetic is made conceptually complete. Whatever you add to it will prevent the comp solution of the mind-body problem, a bit like evruthing you add to the SWE will reintroduce the measurement problem in quantum physics. Comp and arithmetic are conceptually complete, but of epistemologically highly incomplete and uncompletable.

Also, once you agree that stuff is not primitive, you have to define it from your primitive terms, which I don't see possible given that your primitive is the word "existence" which is not defined, nor even a theory.

Hi Bruno,

You are still not addressing my questions and what I see as a problem. The speed issue and completeness is not just addressing from an internal perspective since we have to have invariance over many different internal perspectives and these can vary over speed and complexity. This is illustrated by the discussion of how "stuff" can vary while preserving the functionality. The 'theory' of existence follows naturally from neutral monism, you just need spend the effort to understand it.

But I have not yet seen the theory. "Existence" is a word. A theory, when presented, is a set of axioms and inference rules.

Think of this another way, we have a choice between belief that "COMP is true" or "COMP is false".

Assuming classical logic applies at the metalevel, and this is not obvious to me.

In order to have a coherent notion of a bet, both "COMP is True" and "COMP is false" have to exist side by side as equivalently possible.

To bet on comp would be an error like Pascal gambit. You can only evaluate the theory by yourself, trusting the doctor, and makes some bet in case it is the only hope possible. There is no more reason to believe that comp and non-comp are equivalently possible, than to believe that Santa Klaus or non Santa Klaus are equivalently possible.

If we consider that they only can have this "side by side equivalence" in the mind, then we obtain the situation that their truth value is dependent on the choice,


but that would contradict COMP since built into it is the postulate that truth is independent of belief.

Truth of elementary (first order) arithmetical proposition. Only.

We have to look at COMP from the point of view of many minds and not just one, but so far you have stoically resisted doing this. Why?

I have never resisted that. The many mind are in the material hypostases. Many minds appears in the UDA through the collective duplication of populations of individuals. The appearance of matter, in the UDA explanation, comes from the many minds/many dreams, so it is hard to say that I resist to that.

OTOH, I am not arguing for any kind of return to naive realism or that the physical world is the totality of existence. I do know that I am just a curious amateur, so I welcome any critique that might help me learn.

Comp like QM does not admit supplementary axioms, or variables, to reinstall a physical realism.

This makes no sense to me. QM disallows for any particular realism in the sense of property definiteness prior to observation.

That's only partially true in Everett. There is a local realism, which is local, determinist and even clonable.

We do not need to go through all of the no-hidden-variable theorems again, I hope! In fact, the logic of QM is proven to not be faithfully capture in any one form of Boolean representation because it is only representable as an Orthocomplete Lattice.

Yes. that's the part of physics already derived from comp.

An OL is similar but not surjective to an infinite number of Boolean Algebras and there does not exist a way to pick out one of them in an a priori way. There is also the isomorphism between any dualization of a finite vector space and between Hilbert spaces of the same # of dimension that shows this same property. OTOH, we can use the SSA idea to pick out a Boolean algebra by identifying some sub-lattice of the OL, but this only works if we have many observers, each with a set of local observables so that the collection acts like the questioners in a Surprise 20 Questions game.

No problem for comp here.

I think it is, but at the same time, it has solid consequences and a belief in it can be justified for a number of reasons: a) Fading qualia thought experiment, which shows that consciousness is utterly fickle if it doesn't follow a principle of functional / organizational invariance. Most of our sense data tends to point that such a principle makes sense. Avoiding it means consciousness does not correspond to brain states and p. zombies.

Certainly! We need a precise explanation for psycho-physical parallelism.

But there is no psycho-physical parallelism. The metaphysical physical *is* an illusion, naïve or not. The physical itself is arithmetical truth see from the observable point of view (suggested to be handled by the logics of observation Bp & Dt (& p), at the G and G* levels).

But cannot you see that this claim that "there is no psycho- physical parallelism" completely undermines the entire result? An illusion cannot act as a coherent substrate upon which representations can be implemented.

In which theory. You should prove this.

So in effect you are denying the existence of the computer monitor with which you are reading this email,

Why should I do that? You jump too hastily.
And you are supposed to do the same with your more constricted form of neutral monism, which still remains just one word for me. I don't deny anything physical. I deny the possibility that we have bioth comp and something primitively physical. In the precise sense that physics has to be reduced to number's theology, like biology can be reduced to chemistry.

and the whiteboards upon which you write your symbolic systems of equations and your eyes that read this and everything else that acts as a relatively stable substrate upon which one arithmetic truth can be compared to another.

Arithmetic is simpler to understand than any theory of any pice of matter. You seem to reintroduce primary physics, which contradict your neutral monism. Is your Existence the existence of the physical?

The physical cannot be just the arithmetic truth for such is singular, it has to be at least the comparison between a pair of arithmetic truths and for this to be possible there has to be a relatively stable substrate. There is no escape from this necessity.

Where does that substrate comes from? is it assumed or derived in your "theory"? What is it? Comp eliminate physical substrates. You need just to agree that 0+x = x, o*x = 0, and a few other formula.

My tentative explanation is that at our level a form of dualism holds. A dualism quite unlike that of Descartes, since instead of "separate substances", it is proposed that the logical and the physical are two distinct aspect of reality that follow on equal yet anti-parallel tracks. As Vaughan Pratt explains in his papers, the logical processes and the physical processes have dynamics that have arrows that point in opposite directions. Schematically and crudely we can show a quasi-category theory diagram of this duality:

---- > X -----> Y ----->
         |           |
<----- A <------B <-----

I am OK with this. This is already derivable from the many dualisms contained in the octalist machines points of view, notably between "intelligible" (Bp) and (matter intelligible Bp & Dt). It does reverse the arrow in a way akin to Pratt. It is not a parallelism, or anti-parallelism, though, for the 1p and 3p are not symmetrical. Then the qualia, and the first person plural quanta, are given by the machine's semantics for the logic obeyed by Bp & Dt & p.

The diagram is strictly 3p. It would be helpful if you wrote up an informal article on the octolism. It is very difficult to comprehend it from just your discussion of the hypostases.

See my Plotinus paper(*). Or read the second part of sane04(**). I have already provided many explanations, so you can also look in the archives, on AUDA, "interview" perhaps, etc. Ask any (enough precise) question.

(*) http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/CiE2007/SIENA.pdf

(**) http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html

I have no idea what your neutral monism refer too, except a sort of vague God-like notion of Existence, but that's not a (scientific) theory, yet. And, by UDA, whatever it adds to comp and arithmetic has to refute the comp physics, or comp itself. Craig is, at least, coherent on this: he abandon comp, to save an unintelligible notion of matter and mind (alas).

Read the discussion of neutral monism by Bertrand Russell and others.

I love BR, but his philosophy of math and physics is obsolete. It is pre-Godelian, and pre-UDA, if I can say.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/neutral-monism/ is a good overview (even though the pluralism of neutral entities assumption is problematic as Spinoza understood). It would be helpful to you and the rest of us if you spent some time refreshing your understanding of what theology is by comparing the many theologies that already exist or by learning from the wisdom of those that have done such studies. I hope that Bertrand Russell is someone that you can respect as I respect your skills and understanding of modal logics.

I am NOT a modal logician. Just an expert in self and selves. it is just that Solovay axiomatizes the selves propositional logic soundly and completely by the very particular modal logic G and G*. It is not a chapter of modal logic (or a tiny one which most modal logicians are usually not so much interested). It is a chapter on entities, including machines, self-reference. Comp makes it the main tool to proceed and derive theology and physics. Theology (of machine) is used in the sense of Plato, that is of study of the Truth (about a machine). Strong LUMs can study the theology of simpler LUMs, mathematically. Then lift them at their risk and perils, because they cannot know if it applies to them (they don't know if they are correct)). I have a high esteem for Bertrand Russell. I read the entirety of its work (except Principia Mathematica, of course). But we have progressed since, if only through the discovery of the UMs and LUMs.



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