2012/2/28 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>
> On 2/28/2012 10:43 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Comp substitute "consciousness"... such as you could not feel any
> difference (in your consciousness from your POV) if your brain was
> substituted for a digital brain.
> Hi Quentin,
> OK, but could you elaborate on this statement?
It means an hypothetical "you" after mind uploading would feel as conscious
as you're now in your biological body, and you would steel *feel* and feel
being you and conscious and all...
> Is the differentiation that one *might* feel, given the wrong
> substitution level, different from what *might* occur if a "digital
> uploading" procedure is conducted that fails to generate complete
It depends on the wrongness of the substitution or the lack of
continuity... it's not binary outcome.
> Those "does not feel any difference" terms are a bit ambiguous and vague,
> Digital physics says that the whole universe can be substituted with a
> program, that obviously imply comp (that we can substitue your brain with a
> digital one), but comp shows that to be inconsistent, because comp implies
> that any piece of matter is non-computable... it is the limit of the
> infinities of computation that goes through your consciousness current
> Can you see how this would be a problem for the entire digital
> uploading argument if functional substitution cannot occur in a strictly
> classical way, for example by strictly classical level measurement of brain
Yes, and if it is, it is a big indication that comp is somehow wrong...
> Any dependence of consciousness on quantum entanglement will prevent any
> form of digital substitution. This might not be a bad thing for Bruno's
> ontological argument - as it would show that 1p indeterminacy is a function
> or endomorphism of entire "universes" in the many-worlds sense - but would
> doom any change of immortality via digital uploading.
Sure, but if the level is that down... then even if it is still compatible
with comp, for all practical purposes, it's the same as if it was wrong...
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