2012/2/28 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>

>  On 2/28/2012 10:43 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> Comp substitute "consciousness"... such as you could not feel any
> difference (in your consciousness from your POV) if your brain was
> substituted for a digital brain.
>
>
>  Hi Quentin,
>
>     OK, but could you elaborate on this statement?
>

It means an hypothetical "you" after mind uploading would feel as conscious
as you're now in your biological body, and you would steel *feel* and feel
being you and conscious and all...


> Is the differentiation that one *might* feel, given the wrong
> substitution level, different from what *might* occur if a "digital
> uploading" procedure is conducted that fails to generate complete
> continuity?
>

It depends on the wrongness of the substitution or the lack of
continuity... it's not binary outcome.


> Those "does not feel any difference" terms are a bit ambiguous and vague,
> IMHO.
>
>
>
>  Digital physics says that the whole universe can be substituted with a
> program, that obviously imply comp (that we can substitue your brain with a
> digital one), but comp shows that to be inconsistent, because comp implies
> that any piece of matter is non-computable... it is the limit of the
> infinities of computation that goes through your consciousness current
> state.
>
>
>     Can you see how this would be a problem for the entire digital
> uploading argument if functional substitution cannot occur in a strictly
> classical way, for example by strictly classical level measurement of brain
> structure?
>

Yes, and if it is, it is a big indication that comp is somehow wrong...


> Any dependence of consciousness on quantum entanglement will prevent any
> form of digital substitution. This might not be a bad thing for Bruno's
> ontological argument - as it would show that 1p indeterminacy is a function
> or endomorphism of entire "universes" in the many-worlds sense - but would
> doom any change of immortality via digital uploading.
>

Sure, but if the level is that down... then even if it is still compatible
with comp, for all practical purposes, it's the same as if it was wrong...

Quentin

>
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
>
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