2012/2/28 Stephen P. King <[email protected]> > On 2/28/2012 10:43 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > Comp substitute "consciousness"... such as you could not feel any > difference (in your consciousness from your POV) if your brain was > substituted for a digital brain. > > > Hi Quentin, > > OK, but could you elaborate on this statement? >
It means an hypothetical "you" after mind uploading would feel as conscious as you're now in your biological body, and you would steel *feel* and feel being you and conscious and all... > Is the differentiation that one *might* feel, given the wrong > substitution level, different from what *might* occur if a "digital > uploading" procedure is conducted that fails to generate complete > continuity? > It depends on the wrongness of the substitution or the lack of continuity... it's not binary outcome. > Those "does not feel any difference" terms are a bit ambiguous and vague, > IMHO. > > > > Digital physics says that the whole universe can be substituted with a > program, that obviously imply comp (that we can substitue your brain with a > digital one), but comp shows that to be inconsistent, because comp implies > that any piece of matter is non-computable... it is the limit of the > infinities of computation that goes through your consciousness current > state. > > > Can you see how this would be a problem for the entire digital > uploading argument if functional substitution cannot occur in a strictly > classical way, for example by strictly classical level measurement of brain > structure? > Yes, and if it is, it is a big indication that comp is somehow wrong... > Any dependence of consciousness on quantum entanglement will prevent any > form of digital substitution. This might not be a bad thing for Bruno's > ontological argument - as it would show that 1p indeterminacy is a function > or endomorphism of entire "universes" in the many-worlds sense - but would > doom any change of immortality via digital uploading. > Sure, but if the level is that down... then even if it is still compatible with comp, for all practical purposes, it's the same as if it was wrong... Quentin > > Onward! > > Stephen > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
