On 3/11/2012 7:39 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/11/2012 2:43 PM, acw wrote:
On 3/11/2012 21:44, R AM wrote:
This discussion has been long and sometimes I am confused about the
whole
point of the exercise.
I think the idea is that if comp is true, then the future content of
subjective experience is indeterminated? Although comp might seem to
entail
100% determinacy, just the contrary is the case. Is that correct?
3p indeterminacy in the form of the UD*, 1p determinacy from the
perspective of those minds relative to bodies in the UD*.
However, I think that if comp is true, future experience is not only
indeterminate, but also arbitrary: our future experience could be
anything
at all. But given that this is not the case, shouldn't we conclude that
comp is false?
You're basically presenting the "White Rabbit" problem here. I used
to wonder if that is indeed the case, but after considering it
further, it doesn't seem to be: your 1p is identified with some
particular abstract machine - that part is mostly determinate and
deterministic (or quasi-deterministic if you allow some leeway as to
what constitutes persona identity) in its behavior, but below that
substitution level, anything can change, as long as that machine is
implemented correctly/consistently. If the level is low enough and
most of the machines implementing the lower layers that eventually
implement our mind correspond to one world (such as ours), that would
imply reasonably stable experience and some MWI-like laws of physics
- not white noise experiences. That is to say that if we don't
experience white noise, statistically our experiences will be stable
- this does not mean that we won't have really unusual "jumps" or
changes in laws-of-physics or experience when our measure is greatly
reduced (such as the current statistically winning machines no longer
being able to implement your mind - 3p death from the point of view
of others).
This implies that our measure is strongly correlated with the
regularity of physics. I'm not sure you can show that, but if it's
true it means that physics is fundamental to our existence, even if
physics can be explained by the UD. Only worlds with extremely
consistent physics can support consciousness (which seems unlikely to
me).
Brent
Hi Brent,
I do not understand how you think that "only worlds with extremely
consistent physics can support consciousness" is unlikely. Are you only
considering a single momentary instance of consciousness? It is quite
easy to prove that if there exist multiple conscious entities that can
communicate coherently with each other (in the sense that they can
"understand" each other) then the physics of their common world will
necessarily be maximally consistent as it if where not then pathological
Harry Potterisms will occur that would prevent the arbitrary extension
of their experience. Additionally, it would be extremely difficult for
such worlds to have conservation laws. It is because of this line of
reasoning that I resist the Platonic interpretation of COMP as it puts
pathological universes on the same level of likelihood as
non-pathological ones.
Onward!
Stephen
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.