On Sun, Mar 11, 2012 at 10:43 PM, acw <a...@lavabit.com> wrote: > On 3/11/2012 21:44, R AM wrote: > >> >> However, I think that if comp is true, future experience is not only >> indeterminate, but also arbitrary: our future experience could be anything >> at all. But given that this is not the case, shouldn't we conclude that >> comp is false? >> > You're basically presenting the "White Rabbit" problem here. I used to > wonder if that is indeed the case, but after considering it further, it > doesn't seem to be: your 1p is identified with some particular abstract > machine - that part is mostly determinate and deterministic (or > quasi-deterministic if you allow some leeway as to what constitutes persona > identity) in its behavior, but below that substitution level, anything can > change, as long as that machine is implemented correctly/consistently.
Not sure if I understand you ... I was thinking of something like this: if comp is true, then we can upload the mind into a computer and simulate the environment. The simulator could be constructed so that the stimuli given to the mind is a sequence of arbitrary "white rabbits". Is there somehing in comp that makes the existence of such "evil" simulators unlikely? Ricardo. > If the level is low enough and most of the machines implementing the lower > layers that eventually implement our mind correspond to one world (such as > ours), that would imply reasonably stable experience and some MWI-like laws > of physics - not white noise experiences. That is to say that if we don't > experience white noise, statistically our experiences will be stable - this > does not mean that we won't have really unusual "jumps" or changes in > laws-of-physics or experience when our measure is greatly reduced (such as > the current statistically winning machines no longer being able to > implement your mind - 3p death from the point of view of others). > > Also, one possible way of showing COMP false is to show that such stable > implementations are impossible, however this seems not obvious to me. A > more practical concern would be to consider the case of what would happen > if the substitution level is chosen slightly wrong or too high - would it > lead to too unstable 1p or merely just allow the SIM(Substrate Independent > Mind) to more easily pick which lower-level machines implement it (there's > another thought experiment which shows how this could be done, if a machine > can find one of its own Godel-number). > >> >> Ricardo. >> >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to > everything-list@googlegroups.**com<everything-list@googlegroups.com> > . > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@ > **googlegroups.com <everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** > group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> > . > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
