On 11 Mar 2012, at 21:44, R AM wrote:
This discussion has been long and sometimes I am confused about the
whole point of the exercise.
To explain that if we are machine then the mind-bpdy problem reduces
partially into a justification of the laws of physics from computer
I think the idea is that if comp is true, then the future content of
subjective experience is indeterminated?
It depends of the protocols, but eventually if comp is true then some
first plural indeterminacy exists and can be shared, like QM
illustrates. But if comp is correct QM has to be a theorem of
arithmetic concerning the relations between a machine and its possible
Although comp might seem to entail 100% determinacy, just the
contrary is the case. Is that correct?
I guess acw have answered all this. Comp entails third person
determinacy (cf the working of a computer) and some local and global
indeterminacy due to self-duplication. You have to do the thought
experiments by yourself to grasp the meaning of this.
However, I think that if comp is true, future experience is not only
indeterminate, but also arbitrary: our future experience could be
anything at all.
Prove this, and you refute comp.
The UD Argument might leads to that, but actually it leads more to QM
than to a contradiction.
But given that this is not the case, shouldn't we conclude that comp
That would be rather premature. There is a measure problem, but it is
an interesting one. It put light on a possible origin of both
consciousness and the appearance of matter and laws. We discuss that
measure problem since the beginning of this list. All "everything-
type" of theories have a measure problem. It is akin to the modal
inflation in logical realism.
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to email@example.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at