On 12 Mar 2012, at 04:47, meekerdb wrote:

On 3/11/2012 8:03 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 3/11/2012 7:39 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/11/2012 2:43 PM, acw wrote:
On 3/11/2012 21:44, R AM wrote:
This discussion has been long and sometimes I am confused about the whole
point of the exercise.

I think the idea is that if comp is true, then the future content of subjective experience is indeterminated? Although comp might seem to entail
100% determinacy, just the contrary is the case. Is that correct?
3p indeterminacy in the form of the UD*, 1p determinacy from the perspective of those minds relative to bodies in the UD*.

However, I think that if comp is true, future experience is not only indeterminate, but also arbitrary: our future experience could be anything at all. But given that this is not the case, shouldn't we conclude that
comp is false?
You're basically presenting the "White Rabbit" problem here. I used to wonder if that is indeed the case, but after considering it further, it doesn't seem to be: your 1p is identified with some particular abstract machine - that part is mostly determinate and deterministic (or quasi-deterministic if you allow some leeway as to what constitutes persona identity) in its behavior, but below that substitution level, anything can change, as long as that machine is implemented correctly/consistently. If the level is low enough and most of the machines implementing the lower layers that eventually implement our mind correspond to one world (such as ours), that would imply reasonably stable experience and some MWI-like laws of physics - not white noise experiences. That is to say that if we don't experience white noise, statistically our experiences will be stable - this does not mean that we won't have really unusual "jumps" or changes in laws-of-physics or experience when our measure is greatly reduced (such as the current statistically winning machines no longer being able to implement your mind - 3p death from the point of view of others).

This implies that our measure is strongly correlated with the regularity of physics. I'm not sure you can show that, but if it's true it means that physics is fundamental to our existence, even if physics can be explained by the UD. Only worlds with extremely consistent physics can support consciousness (which seems unlikely to me).

Brent
Hi Brent,

I do not understand how you think that "only worlds with extremely consistent physics can support consciousness" is unlikely. Are you only considering a single momentary instance of consciousness? It is quite easy to prove that if there exist multiple conscious entities that can communicate coherently with each other (in the sense that they can "understand" each other) then the physics of their common world will necessarily be maximally consistent as it if where not then pathological Harry Potterisms will occur that would prevent the arbitrary extension of their experience.

I don't know what you mean by 'the arbitrary extension of their experience'. How would magical events prevent anything. We have reports of miracles all the time from less scientific places and times and they don't seem to prevent anything. We tend to not believe them because they violate the physics which we suppose to be consistent in time and place - but you can't invoke that as evidence that physics is consistent on pain of vicious circularity.

Additionally, it would be extremely difficult for such worlds to have conservation laws.

But the symmetry principles that result in conservation laws are arguably human selections. We pay attention to and build 'laws' on what does not depend on particular time/place/orientation; so may conservation of momentum and energy are (at least approximately) inevitable.

There is also the problem that according to current theories are many possible kinds of physics even if you limit them to just those consistent with string theory, much less Classical physics.

But my main point was conditional. IF consciousness is strongly dependent on physics then Bruno's program of replacing physics with arithmetic isn't going anywhere because arithmetic will produce too many kinds of worlds and only by studying physics will we be able to learn about our world.

OK, but my logical point here is that in such a case comp has to be wrong. It is not so much a program than an logical obligation for staying rational *and* betting on comp, whatever the level is, if it exists.




It is because of this line of reasoning that I resist the Platonic interpretation of COMP as it puts pathological universes on the same level of likelihood as non-pathological ones.

That's the question. Is there some canonical measure that makes the non-pathological ones overwhelmingly likely?

It exists or comp is false. There are evidences that it exists, like the variants of arithmetical self-reference for example.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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