On 3/29/2012 12:02 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Mar 2012, at 20:08, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/29/2012 10:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
And YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED.
I will ask you to do the "hairsplitting" about that "YOU", that you are using here, so
as to convince me and others that it refutes indeed the indeterminacy about the first
person experience displayed in the WM duplication thought experience (UDA step 3).
Given that we both agree that we don't die in that experience, and given that you are
the one claiming that there is no indeterminate outcome, I will ask to give us an
algorithm predicting the result of the future self-localization experience.
The outcome is deterministic just like Everett's QM is deterministic. And it has the
same problems being given a probabilistic interpretation as EQM. If you duplicated a
coin in the transporter experiment the question, "Where will you expect to find the
coin." has the same problems as "Where do you expect to find yourself". The
implication is that "self" is not a unique 'thing' (as for example a soul is assumed to
be) but is process that can be realized in different media.
I agree. But the experience is lived as unique, so we can follow Plotinus in using the
term soul for the owner of the 1-view, that is, the knower. From its pov, it is not
duplicable, in the trivial sense that the duplication is never part of his experience.
You don't know that. It's an assumption based on the idea that conscious experience is
something a certain physical body, a brain, does. But if conscious experience is a
process then it is certainly possible to create a process that is aware of being in both
Washington and Moscow at the same time. Think of a brain wired via RF links to eyeballs
in M and W. Or The Borg of Star Trek. Of course that experience would be strange and we
would tend to say, "Yes but it's still one consciousness." So then the question becomes
what do you mean by not experiencing duplication? Is it a mere tautology based on how you
define 'consciousness'?
He would not know if we did not give him the protocol.
mathematically, this is related to the fact that no machine can know which machine she
is, already seen clearly by Post and (re)intuited by Benacerraf, and "intuited" by the
machine itself, accepting the Theaetetus' definition of knowledge.
I am not sure the problem of probability is identical in QM and COMP. In QM, Everett
showed that the P = A^2 principle does not depend on the choice of the base,
I don't think that's correct. 'A' is the amplitude of the projection on certain basis
determined by what is measured. Yes the Born rule can be applied whatever basis is
chosen, but the projection produces different A's.
so that A can be considered as measuring the relative proportion of possible accessible
relative realities. This does not work with finite multiverse, but it works with
infinite multiverse,
But infinite multiple worlds create a measure problem. That's one of Adrian
Kent's points.
and Gleason theorem justifies the unicity of the measure,
I'm not sure what you mean by that?
for sufficiently complex physical reality (meaning the Hilbert space have to be of
dimension bigger than 2. So in my opinion, the Born rule is already explained.
With COMP, as I argue, we have to justify the wave itself (assuming QM is correct) from
the relative number relations and personal points of view (as done in AUDA, for the
logic of "measure one").
Yes, that would be a signal accomplishment.
Brent
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