On 3/29/2012 12:02 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 29 Mar 2012, at 20:08, meekerdb wrote:

On 3/29/2012 10:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

I will ask you to do the "hairsplitting" about that "YOU", that you are using here, so as to convince me and others that it refutes indeed the indeterminacy about the first person experience displayed in the WM duplication thought experience (UDA step 3).

Given that we both agree that we don't die in that experience, and given that you are the one claiming that there is no indeterminate outcome, I will ask to give us an algorithm predicting the result of the future self-localization experience.

The outcome is deterministic just like Everett's QM is deterministic. And it has the same problems being given a probabilistic interpretation as EQM. If you duplicated a coin in the transporter experiment the question, "Where will you expect to find the coin." has the same problems as "Where do you expect to find yourself". The implication is that "self" is not a unique 'thing' (as for example a soul is assumed to be) but is process that can be realized in different media.

I agree. But the experience is lived as unique, so we can follow Plotinus in using the term soul for the owner of the 1-view, that is, the knower. From its pov, it is not duplicable, in the trivial sense that the duplication is never part of his experience.

You don't know that. It's an assumption based on the idea that conscious experience is something a certain physical body, a brain, does. But if conscious experience is a process then it is certainly possible to create a process that is aware of being in both Washington and Moscow at the same time. Think of a brain wired via RF links to eyeballs in M and W. Or The Borg of Star Trek. Of course that experience would be strange and we would tend to say, "Yes but it's still one consciousness." So then the question becomes what do you mean by not experiencing duplication? Is it a mere tautology based on how you define 'consciousness'?

He would not know if we did not give him the protocol.
mathematically, this is related to the fact that no machine can know which machine she is, already seen clearly by Post and (re)intuited by Benacerraf, and "intuited" by the machine itself, accepting the Theaetetus' definition of knowledge.

I am not sure the problem of probability is identical in QM and COMP. In QM, Everett showed that the P = A^2 principle does not depend on the choice of the base,

I don't think that's correct. 'A' is the amplitude of the projection on certain basis determined by what is measured. Yes the Born rule can be applied whatever basis is chosen, but the projection produces different A's.

so that A can be considered as measuring the relative proportion of possible accessible relative realities. This does not work with finite multiverse, but it works with infinite multiverse,

But infinite multiple worlds create a measure problem.  That's one of Adrian 
Kent's points.

and Gleason theorem justifies the unicity of the measure,

I'm not sure what you mean by that?

for sufficiently complex physical reality (meaning the Hilbert space have to be of dimension bigger than 2. So in my opinion, the Born rule is already explained.

With COMP, as I argue, we have to justify the wave itself (assuming QM is correct) from the relative number relations and personal points of view (as done in AUDA, for the logic of "measure one").

Yes, that would be a signal accomplishment.


You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to