On Sunday, May 13, 2012 6:17:12 PM UTC+10, RAM wrote:
> On Sun, May 13, 2012 at 6:44 AM, Pierz <pier...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> I can see that. But consider that the notion of being able to change the 
>> outcome of future society - 'prevent' or 'deter' anything at all - depends 
>> on the possibility of variant futures. From the absolute perspective, such 
>> variation is impossible (or is merely random and so not subject to reason 
>> or 'choice'). So how does one justify any decision? Seen absolutely, it was 
>> inevitable and there can be no talk of a good or a bad decision. 
> I think determinism should not be confused with fatalism (i.e. it does not 
> matter what you do, things will turn out the same). In determinism it 
> matters what you do, even if what you do is determined. Once an outcome is 
> obtained, we can still analyze the contribution of decisions to that 
> outcome, evaluate them, and most importantly, learn from them. Next time, 
> what we have learned will be taken into account for the next decision. This 
> can take place in a purely deterministic world. Even two deterministic 
> (with some pseudorandomness added) computer chess players playing against 
> each other, can learn from each other mistakes and use what they have 
> learned for future competitions.

Obviously, I agree with you. Because the decision-maker is part of the 
deterministic process, the determinism of the system as a whole is 
irrelevant from his/her point of view. I am saying that given that any 
decision-maker is embedded in a relative local system in this way, the idea 
of free will makes local sense - ie, there are good and bad decisions, easy 
and difficult decisions, and the idea of morality remain coherent, despite 
the determinism that is apparent from a God's eye view. I did not say "it 
does not matter what you do, things will turn out the same". Quite the 

> The point is not changing future outcomes. In fact we don't know what that 
> outcome will be. The point is obtaining good outcomes.

> Ricardo. 

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