On 6/2/2012 1:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 01 Jun 2012, at 20:18, meekerdb wrote:

On 6/1/2012 10:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
You might be disturbed by the fact that in experience 2, the "original" remains the same person, so we don't count him as a new person, each time he steps in the box. This, in my opinion, illustrates again that we have to use RSSA instead of ASSA.

Suppose the original goes to Mars and the copy stays behind. Then the probability the original went to Mars is 1.

The question is asked before the guy enter in the box. This is a "step 5" case. The probability to feel to stay the original is 1/2.

Everybody feels they are the original.

"original" refer to the third person body. By definition it is the one being 

It doesn't really solve the identity problem to assume it is physical continuity. The "copy" also has physical continuity; and in any even slightly realistic case the 'original' will be destroyed in the process of extracting information, so there will really be two copies and no 'original'.

The question before he enters the box is, "Will you find yourself on Mars?" To which he could reply, "What does 'you' refer to?"

The question is about your future subjective feeling as seen from your future first person perspective.If you assume comp, you know in advance that you will feel entire and unique,

No, I expect that two someones will feel entire and unique.

either on Earth or on Mars, and you know that you cannot that in advance (or give me the algorithm).

But all that assumes that 'you' and 'your' have meaningful referents. According to comp they are no more meaningful than referring to this number 2 and that number 2 and asking which number 2 counts the moons of Mars.




You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to