On 01 Jun 2012, at 19:09, meekerdb wrote:
On 6/1/2012 7:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 31 May 2012, at 21:38, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, May 31, 2012 at 2:09 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
On 31 May 2012, at 18:29, Jason Resch wrote:
On Wed, May 30, 2012 at 3:27 AM, Bruno Marchal
<marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 29 May 2012, at 22:26, Jason Resch wrote:
On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal
<marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
To see this the following thought experience can help. Some guy
won a price consisting in visiting Mars by teleportation. But
his state law forbid annihilation of human. So he made a
teleportation to Mars without annihilation. The version of Mars
is very happy, and the version of earth complained, and so try
again and again, and again ... You are the observer, and from
your point of view, you can of course only see the guy who got
the feeling to be infinitely unlucky, as if P = 1/2, staying on
earth for n experience has probability 1/2^n (that the Harry
Potter experience). Assuming the infinite iteration, the guy as
a probability near one to go quickly on Mars.
Bruno,
Thanks for your very detailed reply in the other thread, I
intend to get back to it later, but I had a strange thought
while reading about the above experiment that I wanted to clear
up.
You mentioned that the probability of remaining on Earth is
(1/2)^n, where n is the number of teleportations.
Not really. I pretend that this is the relative probability
inferred by the person in front of you. But he is wrong of
course. Each time the probability is 1/2, but his experience is
"harry-Potter-like".
I can see clearly that the probability of remaining on earth
after the first teleportation is 50%, but as the teleportations
continue, does it remain 50%?
Yes.
Let's say that N = 5, therefore there are 5 copies on Mars, and
1 copy on earth. Wouldn't the probability of remaining on Earth
be equal to 1/6th?
You cannot use absolute sampling. I don't think it makes any sense.
While I can see it this way, I can also shift my perspective so
that I see the probability as 1/32 (since each time the teleport
button is pressed, I split in two). It is easier for me to see
how this works in quantum mechanics under the following
experiment:
I choose 5 different electrons and measure the spin on the y-
axis, the probability that I measure all 5 to be in the up state
is 1 in 32 (as I have caused 5 splittings),
OK.
but what if the experiment is: measure the spin states of up to
5 electrons, but stop once you find one in the up state.
That is a different protocol. The one above is the one
corresponding to the earth/mars experience.
In this case it seems there are 6 copies of me, with the
following records:
1. D
2. DU
3. DDU
4. DDDU
5. DDDDU
6. DDDDD
However, not all of these copies should have the same measure.
The way I see it is they have the following probabilities:
1. D (1/2)
2. DU (1/4)
3. DDU (1/8)
4. DDDU (1/16)
5. DDDDU (1/32)
6. DDDDD (1/32)
I suppose what is bothering me is that in the Mars transporter
experiment, it seems the end result (having 1 copy on earth, and
5 copies on mars) is no different from the case where the
transporter creates all 5 copies on Mars at once.
This is ambiguous.
What I mean is me stepping into the teleporter 5 times, with the
net result being 1 copy on Earth and 5 copies on Mars, seems just
like stepping into the teleporter once, and the teleporter then
creating 5 copies (with delay) on Mars.
Like the diagram on step 4 of UDA:
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL_fichiers/image012.gif
Except there is no annihilation on Earth, and there are 4 copies
created with delay on Mars (instead of one with delay).
When stepping into the teleporter once, and having 5 copies
created on Mars (with various delays between each one being
produced) is the probability of remaining on Earth 1/6th?
Yes.
That would be a good idea to enhance the probability to be the
one, or a one, finding himself of mars. But again, the guy on
earth will be in front of the "looser", even if you multiply by
20. billions your delayed copies on mars.
Is the difference with the iterated example receiving the
knowledge that the other copy made it to Mars before stepping
into the Teleporter again?
I don't understand the sentence. It looks like what is the
difference between 24.
I apologize for not being clear. There are two different
experiments I am contrasting:
1. A person steps into a teleporter, and 5 copies (with varying
delays) are reproduced on Mars.
2. A person steps into a teleporter, and a duplicate is created on
Mars. To increase the chance of subjectively finding himself on
Mars, he does it again (when he fails) and the copy on Earth does
so 5 times before giving up.
For experiment 1, you and I seem to agree that subjectively, that
person person has a 1 in 6 chance of experiencing a continued
presence on earth, and a 5/6 chance of finding himself on mars.
For experiment 2, I believe you suggested there is a 1 in 32
(subjective chance) of going through this exercise and not having
the subjective experience of ending up on Mars. Have I understood
this correctly thus far?
If so, what accounts for these different subjective
probabilities? How can it be that there is a 31/32 chance of
finding oneself on mars if there are just 5 copies there?
I hope I have been clear enough. Thanks again.
OK. Thanks, this is clearer.
In the experience 1, the guy steps in the teleporter only once, and
his multiplied by 6, including the original. So, it has a
probability 1/6 to stay on earth, and 5/6 to find itself on Mars
(accepting the P=1/2, etc.).
In the experience 2, the guy repeats 5 times a duplication
experience, each of which has a probability of 1/2.
That is what account for the difference. The protocol of the two
experiments are very different in term of the relative
probabilities. OK?
Experience 1 is equivalent with a throwing of a dice. Experience 2
is equivalent with 6 throwing of a coin.
You might be disturbed by the fact that in experience 2, the
"original" remains the same person, so we don't count him as a new
person, each time he steps in the box. This, in my opinion,
illustrates again that we have to use RSSA instead of ASSA.
Suppose the original goes to Mars and the copy stays behind. Then
the probability the original went to Mars is 1.
The question is asked before the guy enter in the box. This is a "step
5" case. The probability to feel to stay the original is 1/2.
Bruno
But which is the original?
Brent
All right?
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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