On 31 May 2012, at 21:38, Jason Resch wrote:

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On Thu, May 31, 2012 at 2:09 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>wrote:On 31 May 2012, at 18:29, Jason Resch wrote:On Wed, May 30, 2012 at 3:27 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>wrote:On 29 May 2012, at 22:26, Jason Resch wrote:On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal<marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:To see this the following thought experience can help. Some guywon a price consisting in visiting Mars by teleportation. But hisstate law forbid annihilation of human. So he made a teleportationto Mars without annihilation. The version of Mars is very happy,and the version of earth complained, and so try again and again,and again ... You are the observer, and from your point of view,you can of course only see the guy who got the feeling to beinfinitely unlucky, as if P = 1/2, staying on earth for nexperience has probability 1/2^n (that the Harry Potterexperience). Assuming the infinite iteration, the guy as aprobability near one to go quickly on Mars.Bruno,Thanks for your very detailed reply in the other thread, I intendto get back to it later, but I had a strange thought while readingabout the above experiment that I wanted to clear up.You mentioned that the probability of remaining on Earth is(1/2)^n, where n is the number of teleportations.Not really. I pretend that this is the relative probabilityinferred by the person in front of you. But he is wrong of course.Each time the probability is 1/2, but his experience is "harry-Potter-like".I can see clearly that the probability of remaining on earth afterthe first teleportation is 50%, but as the teleportationscontinue, does it remain 50%?Yes.Let's say that N = 5, therefore there are 5 copies on Mars, and 1copy on earth. Wouldn't the probability of remaining on Earth beequal to 1/6th?You cannot use absolute sampling. I don't think it makes any sense.While I can see it this way, I can also shift my perspective sothat I see the probability as 1/32 (since each time the teleportbutton is pressed, I split in two). It is easier for me to seehow this works in quantum mechanics under the following experiment:I choose 5 different electrons and measure the spin on the y-axis,the probability that I measure all 5 to be in the up state is 1 in32 (as I have caused 5 splittings),OK.but what if the experiment is: measure the spin states of up to 5electrons, but stop once you find one in the up state.That is a different protocol. The one above is the onecorresponding to the earth/mars experience.In this case it seems there are 6 copies of me, with the followingrecords:1. D 2. DU 3. DDU 4. DDDU 5. DDDDU 6. DDDDDHowever, not all of these copies should have the same measure.The way I see it is they have the following probabilities:1. D (1/2) 2. DU (1/4) 3. DDU (1/8) 4. DDDU (1/16) 5. DDDDU (1/32) 6. DDDDD (1/32)I suppose what is bothering me is that in the Mars transporterexperiment, it seems the end result (having 1 copy on earth, and 5copies on mars) is no different from the case where thetransporter creates all 5 copies on Mars at once.This is ambiguous.What I mean is me stepping into the teleporter 5 times, with thenet result being 1 copy on Earth and 5 copies on Mars, seems justlike stepping into the teleporter once, and the teleporter thencreating 5 copies (with delay) on Mars.Like the diagram on step 4 of UDA: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL_fichiers/image012.gifExcept there is no annihilation on Earth, and there are 4 copiescreated with delay on Mars (instead of one with delay).When stepping into the teleporter once, and having 5 copies createdon Mars (with various delays between each one being produced) isthe probability of remaining on Earth 1/6th?Yes.That would be a good idea to enhance the probability to be the one,or a one, finding himself of mars. But again, the guy on earth willbe in front of the "looser", even if you multiply by 20. billionsyour delayed copies on mars.Is the difference with the iterated example receiving the knowledgethat the other copy made it to Mars before stepping into theTeleporter again?I don't understand the sentence. It looks like what is thedifference between 24.I apologize for not being clear. There are two differentexperiments I am contrasting:1. A person steps into a teleporter, and 5 copies (with varyingdelays) are reproduced on Mars.2. A person steps into a teleporter, and a duplicate is created onMars. To increase the chance of subjectively finding himself onMars, he does it again (when he fails) and the copy on Earth does so5 times before giving up.For experiment 1, you and I seem to agree that subjectively, thatperson person has a 1 in 6 chance of experiencing a continuedpresence on earth, and a 5/6 chance of finding himself on mars.For experiment 2, I believe you suggested there is a 1 in 32(subjective chance) of going through this exercise and not havingthe subjective experience of ending up on Mars. Have I understoodthis correctly thus far?If so, what accounts for these different subjective probabilities?How can it be that there is a 31/32 chance of finding oneself onmars if there are just 5 copies there?I hope I have been clear enough. Thanks again.

OK. Thanks, this is clearer.

`In the experience 1, the guy steps in the teleporter only once, and`

`his multiplied by 6, including the original. So, it has a probability`

`1/6 to stay on earth, and 5/6 to find itself on Mars (accepting the`

`P=1/2, etc.).`

`In the experience 2, the guy repeats 5 times a duplication experience,`

`each of which has a probability of 1/2.`

`That is what account for the difference. The protocol of the two`

`experiments are very different in term of the relative probabilities.`

`OK?`

`Experience 1 is equivalent with a throwing of a dice. Experience 2 is`

`equivalent with 6 throwing of a coin.`

`You might be disturbed by the fact that in experience 2, the`

`"original" remains the same person, so we don't count him as a new`

`person, each time he steps in the box. This, in my opinion,`

`illustrates again that we have to use RSSA instead of ASSA.`

All right? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.