On Jun 9, 11:17 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > On 08 Jun 2012, at 20:52, Nick Prince wrote: > > > > > > > > > On Jun 8, 8:45 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >> Hi Nick, > > >> This is a bit unclear. How is U and D distinguished from the (absence > >> of) first person view? > > > I've drawn the branches so that they represent a 3p viewpoint of > > someone observing us over time - i.e. we are schrodingers cat! So U > > means observer sees us as unconsciouss and D means observer sees us as > > dead. The ist person view that we see would always be C according to > > the branches I've drawn, provided that you discard all branches that > > have death D preceded by U. I wish I could draw it but I'm limited on > > this user interface. > > > ist branch is C -> U or C then from the U of this branch, we get U or > > D or C > > > I'm bothered by the fact that the observer would end up seeing > > zombies! If you have a C->U or C and then if the new branch from the U > > is U -> D or U or C then 1p (cat) would see only C as expected. His > > route woud be C->C because the whole second branch is deleted. > > However the observer that goes down the U branch would see the cat go > > into some sort of scenario resulting in U or C or D. If it turns > > out that C occurs then the cat is seen as consciouss and yet it is > > disjoint from the conscioussness of the original cat. I'll have to > > really think about this one in terms of the early steps of your UDA. > > OK. In my opinion, based on the post, I would say that U and D are > equivalent. > There are no zombies, nor "absolute" bodies. >
Hi Bruno Yes I've re thought this one through and I agree - no zombies. > > > > > > > >> Given that very minimal change in the brain seems to be able to send > >> someone in the "amnesic arithmetical heaven", as illustrated by some > >> drugs, I am not sure we should worry about QM immortality, which > >> arises itself from the comp immortality. It illustrates also that > >> backtracking might be more probable. Technically this is difficult to > >> compute, and if QM is true yet comp false, I would worry more on > >> this. > >> I do appreciate that people are aware that notions of "after-life" > >> makes sense, and are hard to avoid with current theories. Yet, > >> without > >> handling the whole theology, and not just its physical aspects, we > >> can > >> come easily to weird conclusions. With comp there are too much open > >> problems to decide on this in any quick way. Of course we can > >> speculate. It is a fascinating subject. > > > What do you mean by backtracking? > > Imagine that you decide to kill yourself with an atomic bomb, so as to > maximize your annihilation probability. Then it might be that your > probability of surviving in a world where you are just not deciding to > kill yourself is bigger than surviving from some quantum tunnel effect > through the bomb's released energy. In that sense, the effect of the > bomb makes you backtrack up to a reality where you are just not using > the bomb. Ok I'll look into this - I got a copy of Saibal's paper "Can we change the past by forgetting" I'll try to get round to reading it. I'm not sure whether this involves abandoning causality as we know it though? If such backtracking occurred though could we really be aware of it? > To solve this is really a question of comparing the measure on the > computational histories, including the one with partial amnesia (which > makes things more difficult, but already more quantum like, because > amnesia might explain the fusion of computations, from the first > person point of view). Reports of dreams and drug experiences > involving partial momentary amnesia suggest that such a backtracking > is highly plausible, imo. And the existence of quantum erasing > suggests that our first person plural sharable computations allows > such a backtracking to occur in "nature". Such a backtracking > (proposed once by Saibal Mitra on this list) can also be used to > defend the idea that there is only one person, and that personal > identity is a relative "illusory" notion. We might be a "God" playing > a trick to himself, notably by becoming amnesic on who and what he is. > > Bruno > > What, you ask, was the beginning of it all? > > And it is this ... > Existence that multiplied itself > For sheer delight of being > And plunged into numberless trillions of forms > So that it might > Find > Itself > Innumerably (Aurobindo) > > > > > > > > >> Bruno > > >> On 08 Jun 2012, at 01:11, Nick Prince wrote: > > >>> I’ve just read the following paper : > > >>>http://istvanaranyosi.net/resources/Should%20we%20fear%20qt > >>> %20final.pdf > > >>> which argues that it is possible to avoid the descent into > >>> decrepitude > >>> that seems to follow from the quantum theory of immortality (QTI). > >>> Aranyosi argues that this is plausible on the grounds that any death > >>> branch would be preceded by an unconsciousness branch. Under normal > >>> QTI circumstances, if we were Schrödinger’s cat we would come across > >>> the (3p) node (L= Lives, D= Dies): > > >>> DDDDDD > >>> LLLLLLL > >>> LLLLLLL > > >>> To see the cat’s (1p), view we discard the DDDD branch, but we will > >>> more than likely be harmed at each branch and therefore become more > >>> decrepit. > > >>> If I understand it correctly, and keeping things simple, Aranyosi > >>> seems to be arguing that, by assuming that unconsciousness > >>> precedes a > >>> death branch, then for 3p we have two types of branching: (where > >>> C=Conscious, U = unconscious). First a triple branch: > > >>> D DDDX > >>> UUUUU..UUUUUUUUUU > >>> C CCCCCCC > > >>> And also a double branch: > > >>> CCCCCCCC > >>> CCCCC > >>> UUUUUUU > > >>> Any combinations of these can be put together by matching U’s or C’s > >>> to make a tree. > > >>> A 1p subjective experience comes by discarding all branches that > >>> have death D preceded by U. Hence the first type of diagram would > >>> never be experienced and the cat sees only the C to C/U branching. > >>> You can join two of the second type of diagram – a CUC route simply > >>> being sleep or fainting or anaesthetic etc. > > >>> I would argue though that U can still occur if one suffers > >>> significant > >>> physical damage and hence decrepitude still follows? > > >>> -- > >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > >>> Groups "Everything List" group. > >>> To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org > >>> . > >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > >>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > >>> . > >>> For more options, visit this group > >>> athttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > >>> . > > >>http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/-Hide quoted text - > > >> - Show quoted text - > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > > Groups "Everything List" group. > > To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. > > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > > . > > For more options, visit this group > > athttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > > . > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/- Hide quoted text - > > - Show quoted text -- Hide quoted text - > > - Show quoted text -- Hide quoted text - Thanks for kind reply Bruno Nick > - Show quoted text - -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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