On 09 Jun 2012, at 22:23, meekerdb wrote:

On 6/9/2012 3:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Imagine that you decide to kill yourself with an atomic bomb, so as to maximize your annihilation probability. Then it might be that your probability of surviving in a world where you are just not deciding to kill yourself is bigger than surviving from some quantum tunnel effect through the bomb's released energy. In that sense, the effect of the bomb makes you backtrack up to a reality where you are just not using the bomb.

Or if you died of a heart attack you might backtrack to when you ate that cheeseburger in 1965. But with such large discontinuities in memory it emphasizes the point that since comp implies the possibility of duplication and forking, there is no well defined 'you'. It is at best a working approximation.

You are *precisely* right on this, in comp.

We cannot know our substitution level, so a third person self is already a bet. Then we are distributed on infinities of computation below the subst level. And then, the fact the first person knower (Bp & p) has no name, so that the question. Who am I? Not something having a name, but the owner of the subjective experience.

The whole point of the thought experience consists in reasoning in a way which does not depend on your conception of identity, it bears only on statistical differentiation of diary notes and attempt toward predictions.

I agree that "there is no well defined 'you'" makes a lot of sense, but the key of comp is to bet that there is (in God's eyes) a substitution level where you survive/notice-nothing after the digital functional substitution. It is an invariant for consciousness.



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