On 6/11/2012 8:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 Jun 2012, at 22:57, David Nyman wrote:
On 10 June 2012 17:26, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
I am not sure I understand your problem with that simultaneity. The
arithmetical relations are out of time. It would not make sense to
they are simultaneously true, because this refer to some "time", and
only be used as a metaphor.
I agree with almost everything you say. I would say also that the
moments of experience, considered as a class, are themselves out of
time. What it takes to "create (experiential) time" - the notorious
"illusion" - is whatever is held to be responsible for the irreducible
mutual-exclusivity of such moments, from the perspective of the
(universal) knower. Hoyle does us the service of making this
mutual-exclusivity explicit by invoking his "light beam" to illuminate
the pigeon holes at hazard; those who conclude that this function is
redundant, and that the structure of pigeon holes itself somehow does
the work of "creating personal history", owe us an alternative
explanation of the role of Hoyle's beam.
I understand, of course, that these are just ways of thinking about a
state of affairs that is ultimately not finitely conceivable, but all
the same, I think there is something that cries out for explanation
here and Hoyle is one of the few to have explicitly attempted to
David, I can't see the role of Hoyles' beam. The reason of the mutual
exclusivity of moments seems to me to be explained (in comp) by the
fact that a machine cannot address the memory of another machine, or
of itself at another moment (except trough memory). Hoyles' beam seem
to reintroduce a sort of external reality, which does not solve
anything, it seems to me, and introduces more complex events in the
Here we seem to be synchronized in our ideas!
This "cannot access the memory of another machine" and "(cannot
access memory ) of itself at another moment" is exactly the way that the
concurrency problem of computer science is related to space and time!
But now I am confused as you seem to recognize that a machine has and
needs the resource of memory; it was my (mis)understanding that machines
are purely immaterial, existing a a priori given strings of integers.
How does memory non-access become encoded in a string? Is it the
non-existence of a particular Godelization within a particular string
that would relate to some other portion of a string?
Why do you think that pure indexicality (self-reference) is not
enough? It seems clear to me that from the current state of any
universal machine, it will look like a special moment is chosen out of
the others, for the elementary reason that such a state individuates
the "present moment here and now" from her point of view.
How is the index establish a form of sameness? It seems to me that
one needs at least bisimilarity
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bisimulation> to establish the connectivity.
Of course, the idea that some time exists is very deep in us, and I
understand that the big comp picture is very counter-intuitive, but in
this case, it is a kind of difficulty already present in any atemporal
"static" view of everything, which already appears with general
relativity for example.
It is a bit subtle. "To be conscious here and now" is not an illusion.
"To be conscious of "here and now" " is an illusion. The "here and
now" is part of the brain (actually the infinities of arithmetical
The content of "to be conscious here and now" is exactly what Craig
is discussing with "sense"! I see it as a form of fixed point considered
in a computational sense, similar to what Wolfram pointed out in his
Computational Intractibility in physics: the best possible simulation of
a physical system is the system itself. You seem to say that this is a
relation between an infinite number of arithmetical relations. Could you
elaborate more on this?
Feel free to criticize my perhaps too much simple mind view on this, I
might miss your point,
"Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed."
~ Francis Bacon
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