On 11 Jun 2012, at 15:09, David Nyman wrote:

On 11 June 2012 13:04, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

Why do you think that pure indexicality (self-reference) is not enough? It seems clear to me that from the current state of any universal machine, it
will look like a special moment is chosen out of the others, for the
elementary reason that such a state individuates the "present moment here
and now" from her point of view.

Yes, but the expression "from the current state of any universal
machine" (different sense of universal, of course) already *assumes*
the restriction of universal attention to a particular state of a
particular machine.

But is that not the result of the fact that each machine has only access to its own configuration?

 Hoyle on the other hand is considering a
*universal state of attention* and hence needs to make such isolation
of particulars *explicit*.  The beam stands for the unique, momentary
isolation in experience of that single state from the class of all
possible states (of all possible machines).

Why could not each machine do the same? Consider the WM-duplication. The body reconstituted in Moscow has access only to the memory reimplemented in M, + the further new change, which includes the feeling "Oh I am the one in Moscow". From the point of view of the "universal person" this is only a particular windows, and both are lived, but not (at this stage at least) from the point of view of the subject in M. I am not sure a beam has to focus on him, for making his experience more genuine. Would the beam have to dovetail on the two reconstitution, making recurrently one of a them into a zombie?

It seems to me that the beam introduces only supplementary difficulties. The reason why we feel disconnected is related to our self-identification with our "most recent memories", which become disconnected in the differentiation of consciousness.

We are all the same person, in a sense similar to the W-guy and the M- guy are the same Helsinki-guy, just with different futures, and by work, they can understand the significance of this, or even experience it through some induced amnesia. The beam is like to reintroduce a sort of "conscious selection" on some conscious order, which seems to me made unnecessary by the use of indexicals (self-reference being what theoretical computer science handles the best).

 Thus, momentarily, the
*single* universal knower can be in possession of a *single* focus of
attention, to the exclusion of all others.

"He" always focus on the whole experience of consciousness, which might be the same for similar creature, and the *relative* truth differentiate by themselves. "He" lives them "out of time", and time +personal differentiation is the fate of those machine which individuates themselves to such personal memories. It is useful when doing shopping or any concrete things locally. No doubt evolution has put some pressure, and every day life pushes a bit in that direction, but eventually your first person identity remains a private matter, and there is matter of choice.

 This is the only
intelligible meaning of mutually-exclusive, considered at the
*universal level*.

I don't see this. It looks like adding something which seems to me precisely made unnecessary with comp.

If you remove such a principle of isolation, how can the state of
knowledge of the universal knower ever be anything other than a sum
over all experiences, which can never be the state of any single mind?

Hmm... You don't know that!
Jouvet, others, including myself in my dream diary notes, have described (experimented) the possibility of awakening from two simultaneous dreams. I can conceive this "easily" for any finite number of experiences, and less easily for an infinite numbers. The implementation is simple, just connect the memories so that the common person in all different experiences awaken in a state having all those memories personally accessible. For the two experiences/dreams case, Jouvet suggested that it might be provoked by the "paralysis" of the corpus callosum, indeed, in some REM sleep.

And the UD generates all possible type of "corpus callosum" *possible (consistent)*. In such a state we might be able to relativize more the difference, and build on more universal things, and then differentiate again.

Sure, the states are "all there at once", but what principle allows
"you", in the person of the universal knower, to restrict your
attention to any one of them?

He looks at all of them, from "out of time" (arithmetic). It is only from each particular perspective that it looks like it is disconnected from the others. That is, with comp, "just" an illusion, easily explainable by the locally disconnected memories of machines sharing computations/dreams.

 It seems to me that, if one wants to
make sense of the notion of a *universal* locus of experience, with
personal identity emerging only as a secondary phenomenon, you are
bound in the first place to consider matters from that universal point
of view.

But that is what I think I sketched in arithmetic by the self- reference logic (on which all machines obeys as long as they are self- referentially correct relatively to the local more probable computations).

It is the "I" of a universal baby. It lives in all of us, and he experiences all or dissimilarities, but locally, it is in that disconnected manner, until he recognizes itself.

And then you must not forget that this point of view, *as a
knower*, is also *your* point of view.  Hence to the extent that you,
*as a merely subsidiary characteristic of such a universal point of
view*, are restricted to "one place, one time", so must it be equally

Why? It is only the extension that makes the restriction. And a sort of amnesia that we are still there without the restriction. It is attachment. The fear of death is a useful program, for the evolution of life, and too quick illumination can impedes its flow, although it can speed it also in other occasion. The human "G*" does contain truth which we are not supposed to justify or even say. A theoretical theology is always eventually a *very* near inconsistency type of study, and that is why it is very important to make clear the assumptions, and the ways of reasoning.

Do remember that I accept that this is a heuristic, or way of
thinking; I do not know how, or if, it corresponds to any fundamental
principle of reality.  But I think that if one purges one's mind of
the implicit assumptions I mention above, one can see that the notions
of "a single universal point of view" and "everything considered
together" are actually mutually exclusive.  So pick one or the other,
but not both together.

Frankly I don't see the problem. The single universal point of view is the consciousness of the universal baby, say. We are all simultaneously that baby, in the sense similar that the W and M guys are the same than the Helsinki one, except that we have forget to be that baby. Imagine that the W and M people forget they have been the person in Helsinki, and are no more able to "recognize" themselves.

The universal consciousness might be the consciousness of the virgin universal machine, and exists out of time and space. But with all the personal relations that universal numbers can develop with respect of other universal numbers, such a consciousness will, from all the other points of view, super-differentiate and fuse, and do things we have not the imagination to figure. Comp makes us humble, for machines can only scratch infinities, even if their consciousness supervenes on those infinities.

Yet we might be able to remember or understand intellectually that we are "that" universal baby-person, making us quite ignorant as "he" posses much more variate extensions than "our local "me"", and our single life does not answer his original questioning (it adds complexity, at first sight).

At least with comp, "it" has the same physical laws, at the root level, and the same classical theology (the set of true sentences involving itself). All this grows up in complexity, from the average machine points of view, and the first pov of the machine is really not even nameable by that machine. It is big. Hubble galaxies, our observable and apparently sharable physical universe describes an infinitesimal village in comparison to that.

The idea that such a single universal point of view can considered and memorize every points of view, like if that universal baby can awaken and remember all dreams, in case of super coherent arithmetical "corpus callosum" is, I'm afraid, a complex open problem (in theoretical computer science and machine's theology).



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