On Mon, Jun 11, 2012 at 6:42 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> On 6/11/2012 8:45 AM, R AM wrote:
>> But what I'm saying here is not ontological determinism but in fact,
>> about the subjective experience. I'm defending that we cannot imagine
>> ourselves in exactly the same subjective situation and still think that we
>> could have done otherwise.
> I can certainly imagine that. But I wonder if your use of "subjective
> situation" is ambiguous. Do you mean exactly the same state, including
> memory, conscious and unconscious thoughts..., or do you just mean
> satisfying the same subjective description?
I would say exactly the same conscious state.
If we are put again in the same conscious state, I don't think that we can
consistently imagine ourselves doing otherwise. If at subjective situation
t we decided x, why would we decide otherwise if *exactly* the same
subjective situation was again the case?
Of course, unconscious processes might make the difference (in fact, they
do), but this is no help for a defender of free will, because he cannot
maintain that decisions have, at bottom, an unconscious origin.
> Or something equivalent, if we were put again in exactly the same
>> subjective situation, would we do otherwise? I don't think so, but If yes,
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