On 09 Jul 2012, at 17:26, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/9/2012 6:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Jul 2012, at 19:29, John Clark wrote (to Evgenii Rudnyi)
If you want to understand why people are the way they are I don't
think the Theory-of-Everything would help you much, you'd do much
better studding Evolutionary Biology, neurology, or computer
science.
Yes, computer science might help to understand why people are the
way they are. But computer science, the theory of, and by,
universal machines, already must explain, assuming comp, why people
believe in fermions and bosons,
How do you derive fermions and bosons from comp?
By using addition and multiplication first, to define the observer and
prove its arithmetical existence.
And then looking which measure exist on the observer's neirghborhoods,
at the meta-level.
The measure one is given by the logic of Bp & Dt, and similar one,
i.e. the logics S4Grz1, Z1* or X1*, which admit a quantization []<>p,
from which we can hope (if comp and the classical theory of knowledge
is true), and to make the usual (à-la Feynman) derivation of the
different statistics. This is technically hard, despite shown decidable.
The point is that comp explains why people *believes* in such things.
It is too early to say that we got those fermions and bosons, of
course. The arithmetical quantum logic has to undergone some hard test
in math to make that possible. But if comp is true, that should work,
unless there is no bosons nor fermions in nature, or that they are
geographico-historical accidents (making QM also accidental).
The basic of this is explained in the second part of sane04. You need
to accept a representational theory/definition of belief, and the
classical theory/definition of knowledge.
Bruno
making it a theory of everything, or at least a good candidate for
it, especially if you take into account computer science
*and* computer's computer science (that is, what computer can guess
or can experience without ever being able to justified rationally:
what I like to call "machine's theology, or "Tarski minus Gödel").
If a machine postulates comp, which by definition is true for her,
she can already justify rationally, using her bet in comp, why she
has beliefs that she cannot justify rationally. Comp itself
constitutes such a belief.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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