Bruno, thanks for your 'views' expressed to Evgeniy below.
*"...**Why people believe..."  *I think we agreed that no such thing in our
access as a Theory of Everything (omniscience missing) and the figments
scientists believe IN are fables.
I apologize for writing in brief *"Nature"* and not as I usually do: "the
existence, nature, the world, you name it..." and for *'humans'* in a
similar sense, abbreviated from something like: "the portion of the
infinite complexity we have actually  conscious access to..." (and I am not
sure if 'we' - 'you? - have access to all details of other Loebian machines
or jumping bugs how THEY exercise mental functions akin to our thinking in
this restricted format we apply as our present life (please: don't ask!)
However I barge in 'asking': what is *"rationally"? *your word (machine)
theology is just another name. If you copy the (religious/philosophical)
theology, we are not ahead and if you presume the infinite capabilities of
the 'ultimate' Loebian than we don't (can't) understand the term.
(Your last par is a 'human'(!) impersonation of a machine.
Just thinking
JohnM

On Mon, Jul 9, 2012 at 9:16 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>
>  On 08 Jul 2012, at 19:29, John Clark wrote (to Evgenii Rudnyi)
>
> If you want to understand why people are the way they are I don't think
> the Theory-of-Everything would help you much, you'd do much better studding
> Evolutionary Biology, neurology, or computer science.
>
>
> Yes, computer science might help to understand why people are the way they
> are. But computer science, the theory of, and by,  universal machines,
> already must explain, assuming comp, why people believe in fermions and
> bosons, making it a theory of everything, or at least a good candidate for
> it, especially if you take into account computer science *and* computer's
> computer science (that is, what computer can guess or can experience
> without ever being able to justified rationally: what I like to call
> "machine's theology, or "Tarski minus Gödel").
>
> If a machine postulates comp, which by definition is true for her, she can
> already justify rationally, using her bet in comp, why she has beliefs that
> she cannot justify rationally. Comp itself constitutes such a belief.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> For more options, visit this group at
> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Reply via email to