Citeren Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>:
On 30 Jul 2012, at 19:57, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/30/2012 2:19 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
The Boltzman brains , according with what i have read, are
completely different beasts. Boltzman pressuposes, that , since no
random arrangement of matter is statistically impossible, and
Boltzman demonstrated it in certain conditions (ergodic
conditions) , with enough time, some arrangements of matter would
simulate minds, or even worlds and civilizations. But 15.000
Million years, that is the age of the universe is not enough.
Boltzman was considering the question of how the universe came to be
in its state of low entropy. I could be due to a random
fluctuation. And it was more probable that the random fluctuation
simply produced the universe as we see than a fluctuation that
produced a big bang universe which then evolved into what we see.
Actually I doubt this, like the probability that life appears on
earth and leads to us, is plausibly bigger than the probability that
"I" appears here just now, in my exact current state.
And extending this line of thought further, a fluctuation that
merely created a brain along with the illusion of this universe was
still more probable (i.e. less improbable).
If that were true, that could be used to put more doubt on the
existence of the 1-person indeterminacy measure, I think.
In the UD, or arithmetic, this reflects the competition between
little numbers (simple explanation) and big numbers (algorithmically
complex explanation). But the indeterminacy bears on all numbers, so
the little one have to multiply much more than the complex one, in
some ways. Linearity at the physical bottom might be explained by
that phenomenon, qualitatively.
Sean Carroll has a good discussion of this and why this argument
does not hold for a multiverse, in his book "From Infinity to Here".
Looks interesting. I guess this can be very easily extended to the
"many dreams" occurring in arithmetic.
The problem is to explain also why the entropy of the early universe
was so low. If you just accept that this is the case and also don't
bother about the very distant future, there is no problem. But if you
assume that time goes on from the infinite distant past and/or to the
infinite distant future, you have a problem, because smaller local low
entropy states are then more likely than the whole observable universe
being in some low entropy state.
And Sean Carroll's argument amounts to simply hiding the problem in an
ever expanding state space, it's not that he has shown that in a
multiverse the problem doesn't occur.
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