Citeren Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>:

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On 30 Jul 2012, at 19:57, meekerdb wrote:On 7/30/2012 2:19 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:The Boltzman brains , according with what i have read, arecompletely different beasts. Boltzman pressuposes, that , since norandom arrangement of matter is statistically impossible, andBoltzman demonstrated it in certain conditions (ergodicconditions) , with enough time, some arrangements of matter wouldsimulate minds, or even worlds and civilizations. But 15.000Million years, that is the age of the universe is not enough.Boltzman was considering the question of how the universe came to bein its state of low entropy. I could be due to a randomfluctuation. And it was more probable that the random fluctuationsimply produced the universe as we see than a fluctuation thatproduced a big bang universe which then evolved into what we see.Actually I doubt this, like the probability that life appears onearth and leads to us, is plausibly bigger than the probability that"I" appears here just now, in my exact current state.And extending this line of thought further, a fluctuation thatmerely created a brain along with the illusion of this universe wasstill more probable (i.e. less improbable).If that were true, that could be used to put more doubt on theexistence of the 1-person indeterminacy measure, I think.In the UD, or arithmetic, this reflects the competition betweenlittle numbers (simple explanation) and big numbers (algorithmicallycomplex explanation). But the indeterminacy bears on all numbers, sothe little one have to multiply much more than the complex one, insome ways. Linearity at the physical bottom might be explained bythat phenomenon, qualitatively.Sean Carroll has a good discussion of this and why this argumentdoes not hold for a multiverse, in his book "From Infinity to Here".Looks interesting. I guess this can be very easily extended to the"many dreams" occurring in arithmetic.Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

`The problem is to explain also why the entropy of the early universe`

`was so low. If you just accept that this is the case and also don't`

`bother about the very distant future, there is no problem. But if you`

`assume that time goes on from the infinite distant past and/or to the`

`infinite distant future, you have a problem, because smaller local low`

`entropy states are then more likely than the whole observable universe`

`being in some low entropy state.`

`And Sean Carroll's argument amounts to simply hiding the problem in an`

`ever expanding state space, it's not that he has shown that in a`

`multiverse the problem doesn't occur.`

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