On 12 Aug 2012, at 11:45, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sun, Aug 12, 2012 at 11:01:09AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Aug 2012, at 09:45, Russell Standish wrote:
Nevertheless, randomness is a key component of free will.
So comp is false? I mean comp can only defend a compatibilist (or
mechanist, deterministic) theory of free-will, like with the self-
indetermination based on diagonalization.
I have never seen how we can use randomness to justify free-will.
May be you can elaborate?
Bruno
If there are several actions an agent may perform, and one optimal in
terms of the agent's utility, but the utility is computationally
unfeasible, then an agent can choose one of the actions by random
choice.
How?
I don't see why this would entail comp is false though. Perhaps you
could elaborate?
Because comp implies that there is no randomness at the ontological
level. I guess you are alluding to the self-indeterminacy (à-la
Turing, not to be confused with the first person indeterminacy) which
can make a decision looking random for the one who does it, but which
is not the non-compatibilist kind of randomness that some defender of
free-will want to introduce.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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